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Alternate Routes

A Critical Review Vol. I 1977

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'Canadian Sociology'
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to the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic
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Commentary

Ken Campbell: Class Analysis and
Technological Determinism

Alternate Routes
a critical review

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Editorial Statement

This is the first issue of a Canadian graduate students journal dedicated to the dissemination of theoretical and empirical problems in the disciplines of sociology and anthropology. We have had to rely on our colleagues within the Carleton University community due, in part, to our feeling of isolation from other centers of intellectual activity in Canada. I believe it can be safely said that we, here at Carleton, are not alone in this perception. We hope the publication of this journal will help to 'break the ice' and in the years to come contribute to a dialogue between our friends and colleagues, not only in the province of Ontario but throughout Canada.

Macrosociological Approaches Toward
a 'Canadian Sociology'*

Wallace Clement

There is an element of truth to the analogy between the blind men and an elephant and the sociologist and a society. This paper is no more than an attempt to move toward a wider perspective, a macrosociological approach to Canadian society, by examining some models and theories of modern national societies. It attempts to contribute to the development of what will be called a 'Canadian sociology' approach. As a topic of substantive inquiry, Canadian society needs to be informed by many disciplines, encompassing history, economics, political science (or more generally political economy), social psychology, social geography, anthropology and sociology. Because of its breadth the latter seems suited, more than the others, to encompass each of these disciplines--at least potentially it can.

There is little evidence of a general movement in English-speaking Canada toward a 'Canadian sociology' approach in the sense of a holistic analysis generated from an understanding of distinctive characteristics, relations and patterns within Canada. Many approaches have been 'imported', largely by way of the United States, using Canada simply as another data source or experimental situation without developing a national society perspective. However, in Quebec the situation is exceptional since a 'total society' or société globale viewpoint is common and the analysis has been indigenous to Quebec, thus recognizing the obvious: Quebec is not a miniature replica of the United States--something English-speaking counterparts often find hard to comprehend for the rest of Canada*.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

Following Georges Gurvitch, Guy Rocher suggests three classificatory levels of analysis:

The first is the macrosociological plane of total societies, which includes social groups that are sufficiently complete to satisfy all the needs of their members--such as a country, or Western civilization. These groups are considered as wholes or units. The

*Canada's 'two solitudes' are suggested by Guy Rocher, "It must be recognized that among many differences, Canadian sociology separates clearly into two major categories: French-language sociology and English-language sociology. They are almost airtight entities. Two almost impermeable worlds live side by side in almost total, mutual ignorance" (1974:501). Ignorance of the société globale perspective used by Quebec sociologists has impeded others from developing a perspective on Canadian society as a whole while Quebec sociologists seldom venture into the rest of Canada to apply their perspective, maintaining a somewhat understandable but narrowed inward focus. See also Claude Gousse's, "Reflexions sur l'Avenir de la Sociologie au Québec" in Loubser (editor), 1970.

second is the plane of partial groupings which form part of total societies, such as the family, lineal groupings, voluntary associations, social classes, and so forth. Finally, there is the microsociological plane of different types of social links...the various social relationships which are established between the members of a collectivity and the different ways in which these members are linked to and by the total society (1972:3-4).

These are various points of perception for the analyst but are meant to "interpenetrate" and "link" with one another. For Rocher, the macrosociological plane is both the place to begin and end; it is the context for all other investigation and the level towards which all investigation is directed (5). The goal is the "total context" or a holistic analysis.*

However, Rocher's meaning of macrosociology is much more precise than others. Usually macrosociology refers to "large-scale social systems and patterns of interrelationships within and between these systems, including, for example, national and international forms of social organization" in contrast to microsociology as "the study of small groups".** Thus many of the aspects classified by Rocher on the second plane are often referred to as macrosociological, serving to impose a very large gap between macro and micro levels without any mediating levels. For this reason the Rocher-Gurvitch classification is more useful.

Classificatory problems are different from analytical ones. To provide an analysis of Canadian society it will be necessary to distinguish three types of macrosociological terms. The first may be called 'macrogroupings' and corresponds to Rocher's second plane and what is usually referred to as macrosociology. The other two aim at a holistic perspective and may be referred to as 'total society' and 'national society' approaches. A 'total society' approximates the first plane identified by Rocher in the sense that common social and cultural bonds prevail, as exhibited in common identity, values and traditions, usually carried in a common language and organizations which serve to preserve a particular culture. The conditions for a 'total society' are much stronger than those for a 'national society' in terms of the degree of cultural integra-

*This approach may be contrasted with a social-psychological one like Manzer who turns his analysis towards 'human needs' or the microsociological level (1974:5-22).

**These definitions are provided in George and Achilles Theodorson's Modern Dictionary of Sociology, Thomas Y. Crowell: New York, 1969.

tion evident since the latter is delineated simply by territory and legal-political perimeters commonly referred to as a 'state'. In the former, the degree of social integration is much more important in terms of setting 'boundaries' for analysis while in the latter, the extent of integration within states is left problematic. To demonstrate that a 'national society' is at the same time a 'total society', it would be necessary to show that its members share a common identity, common values and traditions and that these members are bound by a political-legal state which they command. It may be that in some cases the two coincide at particular historical junctures--although it appears this seldom occurs--while in other cases they do not. This distinction is particularly relevant to Canada but elsewhere as well.*

The primary defining characteristic of macro units is the scale of their implications for the total society and the scope of their inter-relationships within the total social structure. Thus, S.Z. Klausner has adopted the term "total society", to refer to:

an ecologically delimited, more or less interdependent set of human collectivities. The student of a total society could inquire into the spatial and/or organizational interdependence of events. He could report the impact of a society's northern upon its southern region, of its army upon its factories, and of its ethnic groups upon its political parties. The term 'total' indicates an intent to consider all of the people in that particular area (1967:3).

As this suggests, what is of central importance is the relationships, or as Klausner prefers "links", which mediate between various dimensions. As he says, "A model of a 'total society', while recognizing the distinctness of various theoretical levels, must be concerned with statements which link a term on one level with a term on another" (6). He remarks that many attempts at 'total society' analysis have failed to specify these 'links' between different aspects and levels. These 'mediating mechanisms' are the critical component for models of 'total societies' because they specify how relationships occur and provide direction to correlations. This parallels the

*See, for example, Jan Szczepański's, Polish Society, where he says, "In the years 1795-1918, Poland was a nation without statehood, and, because it lacked its own independent political organization, culture constituted the very basis of national existence This distinction must always be kept in mind when dealing with Eastern and Central Europe, where the ethnic and cultural areas have never been the same as the political-state demarcations" (1970:4). Jews and Israel may be a further example.

earlier point by Rocher but just as with Rocher does not distinguish between a 'total' and 'national' society as two distinct ways of delineating the perimeters of study.

In Canada it may be that les Quebecois have a 'total society', as may some English-speaking Canadians, but les Quebecois do not have a 'national society' (although some are striving to achieve this); moreover, it may be that for some the English-speaking 'total society' extends beyond Canada as a state into the United States and possibly the West as a whole. These are both empirical propositions which could be explored. Language is a problem here because in French, nation has the connotation given here to 'total society', as in Lord Durham's famous caricature of "two nations warring in the bosom of a single state". The tension between the lack of coincidence between a 'total' and 'national' society in Quebec has been one of the major motor forces explaining developments in that society and accounts for many of the reasons why Quebec sociologists have been so intimately concerned with this issue. However, in the rest of Canada a similar problem has also emerged in the form of nationalism which attempts to identify a distinctiveness vis à vis the United States. The native peoples in Canada experience a similar dilemma vis à vis the white world, while there are rumblings of similar contradictions between western, eastern and central Canada.

Finally, in terms of levels of analysis, before proceeding to the major distinction in this paper, it is important to specify the particular level of analysis being pursued here. The focus is on what may be called the national level or what was referred to earlier as a 'national society' approach to macrosociology. This being said, however, it is important to note this does not mean that the external level can be ignored; indeed, the external impact is crucial to an understanding of the national level and will receive a good deal of emphasis later in the paper. Similarly, a focus on the national level does not ignore the internal level, either in terms of the implications of internal phenomenon on the national level or in terms of the implications of the national level for internal developments.

*The distinction between 'total' and 'national' society adds a necessary analytical distinction to macrosociological theory. This problem is pointed to by Anthony Giddens when he says, "The primary unit of sociological analysis, the sociologists' 'society', in this sense, has never been the isolated, 'internally developing' system which has normally been implied in social theory" (1973:264-265). It is only a 'total society' which is really a 'society' in this sense, yet it too must be placed in the context of other societies which compose its environment.

The ultimate level of analysis in macrosociology would be the study of a wide range of total societies and national societies. But it will be argued later that a prerequisite to this is a solid base in a number of national society analyses, and particularly here, to develop such an analysis for Canada.

A 'SOCIOLOGY OF CANADA' AND A 'CANADIAN SOCIOLOGY'

A 'sociology of Canada' is restricted to the level of 'macrogroupings' at best, and at a microsociological level at worst. On the other hand, a 'Canadian sociology' attempts to move between the analytical levels of 'national' and 'total' societies, both of which inform the type of analysis being promoted here, and be informed by a holistic perspective.

There have been some recent attempts to develop a 'Canadian sociology' approach, an analysis of the enterprise as a whole and the formation of Canada as a state, but a variety of 'sociology of Canada' perspectives continue to dominate; that is, most sociological studies are of individual aspects of Canadian society viewed either in isolation or compared with similar phenomenon elsewhere. Each approach is important but essentially different.

A 'Canadian sociology' focuses on major structural features of the country--such as regionalism, ethnic relations, foreign and indigenous investment patterns, political-legal formations and class structures--as they relate in a national context, especially as they unfold and transform historically. 'Canadian sociology' is not a theory about Canadian society, although it implies a series of models for organizing information. Rather, it is a synoptic perspective which conceptually links together a variety of theories and data on Canada while making the analyst aware of other factors which may affect or be affected by the particular aspect of society under study. For example, if the subject under study is education, it would be fruitful to know the linkage this has with immigration and the Canadian practice of importing highly qualified manpower rather than creating indigenous educational institutions or the linkage between the type of economy Canada has and demands this creates for particular training. Similarly, it is important to know the type of class structure Canada has if education is to be related to class inequalities or the type of sex roles if it is to be related to sexual inequalities. The point is self-evident. The implication being that there emerges from these linkages a broader understanding of various developments by removing them from a narrow view common to a great deal of sociology. Similarly, it is concerned about aggregating data on Canada into meaningful units of analysis. All that makes it a

'Canadian sociology' perspective as distinct from a 'Japanese, American, Polish, British, French, Australian, Russian, etc. sociology' is the substantive focus. This does not mean that various key features such as regionalism, ethnicity, class, etc. will be identical or even similar in each nation. The similarity is that what is being pursued here is simply a specific case of a more general 'national society' perspective. The key is the holistic analysis of a variety of important social phenomenon within a national context.

A 'sociology of Canada' perspective, on the other hand, focuses on particular aspects of the society, such as those listed above or others like education, immigration, sex roles, deviance, voting patterns, urban studies, etc. but does not relate each to other developments within Canada. It may compare them with other countries, à la Lipset or Alford, but is not essentially concerned about the way they combine, emerge and affect one another. If Rocher's point about the macro-sociological plane being both the place to begin and end is accepted, then the problematic is the extent to which several 'sociologies of Canada' could be turned into a 'Canadian sociology' by transcending individual studies and relating them to one another.* While the individual models and frameworks used in 'sociologies of Canada' do not facilitate this end, the information and theories generated may be able to inform a 'Canadian sociology'. The idea of a 'Canadian sociology' is not based simply on a series of microsociological or macrogrouping studies or even an enumeration of national statistics, but hinges on the relationships and combinations of various elements which crystallize into a unique whole. Rather than dealing with each substantive aspect of Canadian society discretely, it attempts to tie them into a total framework on the development, structure and operation of the society.

A recent book by Ronald Manzer, Canada: A Socio-Political Report (1974), will illustrate the distinction being drawn here. Although covering a very wide range of topics and providing abundant empirical data on Canada, Manzer does not organize his analysis or direct himself to the question of a national society. Rather, he tends to deal with a wide range of rather specialized topics without attempting to bring them together in a comprehensive national statement in the way, say, John Porter did in The Vertical Mosaic (1965) where he elaborated relations between

*As Amitai Etzioni metaphorically points out, it may be "that the study of the trivial fruit fly led to the understanding of some general laws of genetics....But just as the anatomy of elephants cannot be studied by dissecting fruit flies, so, too, the morphology of macroscopic social units cannot be effectively explored by studying the structure of small groups" (1968:48).

the themes of class, power and ethnicity within the context of Canada as a national society. Manzer provides a 'sociology of Canada', Porter a 'Canadian sociology'. This is not to say Porter produced the complete analysis of Canada as a national society; this probably could never be accomplished in one book (and even if possible, it would certainly become dated). For instance, Porter focused his analysis of Canada on indigenous national elites and tends to by-pass regional differences which a national framework could have paid more attention to, particularly asking why some regions tend not to produce elites or elites of different types. Similarly, he had a tendency to by-pass in some senses the external impact on Canada and also overlook the historical specificity of some of the many studies recorded in his book. But what he did do was analyse the interaction between class, power and ethnicity as they form Canada's social structure and 'the vertical mosaic'. Manzer's report, however, has no real theme or theory about the operation or organization of Canadian society.* He provides an evaluation based on the ideals of fraternity, equality and liberty, but not a national society approach which would be addressed to a total set of conditions explaining why these ideals have not been achieved, if indeed, they are the ideals of Canadian society.

In this paper there is no attempt to provide a sociology of sociology for Canada, nor a survey of sociological findings themselves. Rather, the attempt is to examine a series of models and approaches which may prove useful in developing a 'Canadian sociology', particularly those which may expand the analysis of Canadian society already provided by Porter's path-breaking work and some issues relevant to such an analysis. But first, a larger context is necessary.

MACROSOCIOLOGY AND THE 'CLASSICAL TRADITION'

Macrosociology** focuses on structures, types of relationships, and their degree of dependence or independence; in short, how social systems work***. It is in the tradition of sociolo-

*For example, in a book of well over 300 pages, Manzer devotes less than 10 pages to his introduction and conclusion combined, while his first chapter on "Human Needs and Political Goods" has only a passing reference to Canada. The remainder of the book is devoted to reporting on important statistical comparisons with other countries.

**For a recent discussion of macrosociology, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld's Main Trends in Sociology, Harper & Row: NY, 1973:22-36.

***C. Wright Mills provides a series of questions in his Sociological Imagination which represent some areas a national society approach could explore: "(1) What is the structure of this par-

gists like Marx and Weber who attempted, in the words of Gerth and Mills, "to grasp the interrelations on all institutional orders making up a social structure" (1946:49). But what is meant by 'structure'? A social structure is a stable set of relationships among the various parts or elements making up the totality of a society. However, to say these relationships are stable does not discount their continuous transformation. As Z.A. Jordan has said in his summary of Marx, "macro-sociological structures and laws can claim validity only within a specified period of time and, therefore, must be considered historically" (1971:66). 'To analytically 'weave' various institutional orders into a whole from the perspective of national societies requires a historical dimension which seeks to comprehend the interactive effects between different orders, their exchanges--both of decision-makers and resources--and their relative strengths or weaknesses vis à vis each other and different orders. For example, someone examining present-day Canada may tend to dismiss the religious order in the overall pattern of power but historically it has had an enormous effect, particularly in Quebec, but elsewhere as well, in helping to shape the current orders. In Quebec it could be argued that the church was important in retarding indigenous capitalism but effective in increasing the power of the state and unions vis à vis capital. The impact of religion thus could be detected only through a historical analysis.'

Thus the call for a 'Canadian sociology' is not meant as a replacement for the 'classical tradition' in sociology; ex-

titular society as a whole? What are its essential components and how are they related to one another? How does it differ from other varieties of social order? Within it, what is the meaning of any particular feature for its continuance and for its change?

(2) Where does this society stand in human history? What are the mechanics by which it is changing? What is its place within and its meaning for the development of humanity as a whole? How does any particular feature we are examining affect, and how is it affected by, the historical period in which it moves? And this period--what are its essential features? How does it differ from other period? What are its characteristic ways of history-making?

(3) What varieties of men and women now prevail in this society and in this period? And what varieties are coming to prevail? In what ways are they selected and formed, liberated and repressed, made sensitive and blunted? What kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining?" (1959:6-7).

*See Hubert Guindon's, "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered" (1964:154ff).

**For an important collection of some major works in the 'classical tradition' of sociology, see C. Wright Mills (editor), Images

actly the opposite. It is the application of classical approaches, such as those used by Marx and Weber, to macrosociological issues of Canadian society. It is within the tradition of 'holistic' analysis which maintains that the whole cannot be reconstructed from the parts; the parts can only be understood in light of the whole. Rather than a separate focus on theory and methodology, it calls for a reflexive relationship between theory and research and the development of sociologies at several levels of analysis, especially as they relate to one another, including an understanding of the past, a feeling for the present and an eye to the future.

A 'Canadian sociology' approach is consistent with what Irving Zeitlin sees as the main task of theory construction, 'a problem oriented approach to social science'. He argues that, "If one is generally interested in empirical social systems, one ought to have questions about their workings that one would like to answer. To do this, one does not begin with 'society' in the abstract but with a specific society (or several of them) and with an interesting problem" (1973:23).

One major guiding question for a 'Canadian sociology' already posed is how do major inequalities such as class, regionalism, ethnicity, education, occupation, income distribution, foreign control, etc., affect and reinforce one another? Of the few national society studies now available, most seem to present their analysis around a particular theme or guiding value. Ralf Dahrendorf writes in 'Is Society and Democracy in Germany' that "the analysis of total societies requires an attempt to relate the structures of many specific areas of society to an underlying political problem" (1967:ix). He identifies his problem as follows:

Good analyses of total societies require...a problem that removes all statements from the tedious fog of arbitrariness and provides the whole with a beginning and an end. Tocqueville had a problem of this kind: 'democracy', however, we mean something different from Tocqueville, to wit, liberté rather than égalité, a liberal political community rather than an egalitarian society (viii).

There need not be agreement with the particular problem of liberty chosen by Dahrendorf but few would disagree that this is a

of Man, George Braziller: New York (1960), where he says, "Classical sociology contains an enormous variety of conception, value, and method, and its relevance to the life-ways of the individual and to the ways of history-making in our epoch is obvious and immediate. This is why it is central to contemporary cultural work, and among the most valuable legacies of Western civilization" (17).

macro level problem and an interesting guiding question. In The Vertical Mosaic, John Porter also uses a guiding theme, that of inequality, aimed at the image of a 'middle class society'. Similar problems are posed by Sol Encel in his Equality and Authority: A Study of Class, Status and Power in Australia. These are also some of the types of problems which could be posed by a 'Canadian sociology'--problems not constrained by either theory or methodology, but problems which use theories and methodologies to resolve problems. As C. Wright Mills has said, "For the classical social scientists, neither method nor theory is an autonomous domain; methods are methods for some range of problems; theories are theories for some range of phenomenon" (1959:121).^{*} The first task of the analyst is to provide the macro problem whether these are liberty, equality, democracy, efficiency or whatever will depend on each researcher's values.

As has been argued, one of the most important units of analysis is the nation state within which is encompassed a national society^{**}. Within this framework the focus is on major structural components and their relationships as they interact to form the whole. Many macro studies have used the nation state as a unit of comparative analysis but this is not the same as analysing a national society. Stein Rokkan has pointed to what he calls the "whole nation bias" in comparative studies and the weakness inherent in taking aggregates rather than components. He says, "most comparisons have been limited

^{*}Following this, Mills offers some advice to those concerned about substantive problems: "in actual practice, every working social scientist must be his own methodologist and his own theorist, which means only that he must be an intellectual craftsman. Every craftsman can of course learn not much more than a general kind of awareness" (1959:121), going on to add that, "The Classic focus, in short, is on substantive problems. The character of these problems limits and suggests the methods and the conceptions that are used and how they are used" (128).

^{**}A case for using the nation state as the key level of analysis is made by C.W. Mills, "In our period, social structures are usually organized under a political state. In terms of power, and in many other interesting terms as well, the most inclusive unit of social structure is the nation-state. The nation-state is now the dominating form in world history and, as such, a major fact in the life of every man....In choosing the national social structure as our generic working unit, we are adopting a suitable level of generality: one that enables us to avoid abandoning our problems and yet to include the structural forces obviously involved in many details and troubles of human conduct today. Moreover, the choice of national social structures enables us most readily to take up the

to institutional or aggregate statistical data for each nation as a unit and have tended to neglect highly significant variations in the rates of growth among competing economic, political or cultural centres and between such centres and the rural peripheries" (1970:49). In other words, to overcome the "whole nation bias" in comparative studies requires the apriori analysis of the national society which in turn may then be compared in terms of the types of relationships found within the national society and the processes* of developing to this stage. It may seem unusual that a paper on Canadian society would have this concern about comparative studies but it is to be understood that each nation has its differences as well as similarities and much can be learned from these. Indeed, C. Wright Mills has noted, "it is only by comparative studies that we can become aware of the absence of certain historical phases from a society, which is often quite essential to understanding its contemporary shape" (1959:157). Moreover, it is not merely a theoretical or academic exercise but many Canadians themselves engage in just such comparisons--principally with the United States, but with Europe and other industrialized nations as well, although typically limiting these to other liberal democracies.

Aside from the outstanding work of John Porter, there are only a handful of sociologists in English-speaking Canada who have taken a total or national society approach--such as, at times, S.D. Clark, Kasper Naegle, A.K. Davis and, to some extent, Frank Vallee and Don Whyte. But in Quebec there are many more, such as Hubert Guindon, Maurice Pinard, Guy Rocher, Marcel Rioux, Jean-Charles Falardeau, Jacques Dofny, Gerald Fortin, Phillipe Garigue, pioneer Quebec sociologist Léon Géérin and Fernand Dumont,** to name but a few. As suggested earlier,

major issues of public concern, for it is within and between the nation-states of the world that the effective means of power, and hence to a considerable extent of history-making, are now, for better or worse, tightly organized" (1959:135).

*John Porter has commented, "There is no comparative analysis, for example, when six scholars produce separate papers on the educational systems of six different countries. Each study may as well have been published separately rather than bound together since they draw nothing from each other" (1970a:144). The same, of course, may be said for readers which are called Canadian Society but lack any internal unity aside from the common subject matter of Canada. They might more appropriately be called 'Sociologies of Canada'.

**See especially Dumont's, "The Systematic Study of French-Canadian Total Society" (original, 1962) along with the 14 articles in the section on 'Sociological Interpretations on the Social Evolution of French Canada', 'Economic Structure and Social Stratification' and 'Social Organization and Culture' in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin (eds.), French-Canadian Society (1964). See also Nock (1974).

however, Quebec sociologists have limited themselves to a 'total society' analysis of Quebec and have not engaged in a 'national society' analysis of Canada. These contributions cannot be minimized because they represent necessary starting points, but their lead must be expanded, elaborated and developed if a reasonable sociological understanding of Canadian society is to be achieved. This emphasis, it needs to be stressed, is not parochial. It should be seen as a necessary requisite to national comparative analysis, as Rokkan suggested above. Nor should it be abstracted from sociological theories and methodologies developed elsewhere; rather, these should be adapted to the Canadian experience, if and when they fit.

Vallee and Whyte, in their paper "Canadian Society: Trends and Perspectives", have argued that "sociologists are too busy making up for the backlog of sheer information about Canadian society to worry about the enterprise as a whole and to engage in much soul-searching concerning the theoretical and methodological aspects of this enterprise" (1968:849). In terms of the distinction presented earlier, they are arguing that most of what has been occurring is a 'sociology of Canada' rather than a 'Canadian sociology'. In fact, they argue that, with a few notable exceptions, "Canadian sociologists have rarely adopted a holistic perspective, one in which the system-as-a-whole is the universe of study" (849).*

This does not mean that every piece of research must cover all aspects of Canadian society and address every issue. It does mean that regardless of the particular focus of study--be it ethnicity, regionalism, immigration, class, or whatever--a central question is what this means for the national society, that is, how each part relates to the whole. Similarly, it is important to stress again that the focus on a national society suggests that the differences within society are important as differences between one society and others. Thus ethnic differences, regional splits and class relations within Canada go a long way to understanding that society. At the same time aspects such as these cannot be abstracted from an analysis of Canada's international context. This means more than simply a 'comparative perspective', which itself is interesting and informative, but an international framework of analysis placing Canada's internal developments in the context of external ones.

*Similarly, A.K. Davis argues, "by and large anglophone academic sociology in Canada has failed to present a realistic and holistic picture of the evolution of Canadian society" (1970:31).

SOME FRAMEWORKS FOR THE STUDY OF NATIONAL SOCIETIES*

(i) REGIONAL POWER RELATIONSHIP FRAMEWORKS

Recently there have emerged some frameworks, developed mainly for Latin America's relationship with advanced capitalist nations, based on regional power relationships. These models integrate both national and international dimensions and are built on both a national society and total system perspective. That is, they analyse each nation state in terms of the indigenous regional and class power structures while simultaneously analysing the relationships between these structures and external centers of power. Central to all of these models is an unequal relationship between interdependent units which form a set of asymmetrical associations either within national societies or between nation states.**

According to Andre Gunder Frank and his 'development of underdevelopment' model, "contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing econ-

*In The Canadian Corporate Elite (1975:345-353), I discussed a national society framework which will not be presented here, except to say Ralph Miliband's distinction between the state system and political system suggests a fruitful organizing framework.

**Barrington Moore, Jr., although applying an interesting analytical scheme to various societies, is a subject to a 'large society bias'. He writes, "The fact that smaller countries depend economically and politically on big and powerful ones means that the decisive causes of their politics lie outside their own boundaries. It also means that their political problems are not really comparable to those of larger countries" (1966:xiii). Is Canada a 'small country' in Moore's terms? In some respects, but not in all, nor is it an underdeveloped nation, nor totally politically or economically dependent. But it is also not a 'large country' in international terms. The 'decisive causes' are not totally outside Canada and to the extent they are, it is in large part a result of internal policy or non-policy, as the case may be. Theda Skocpol has made a similar point in her critique of Moore, emphasizing the relationship between "intersocietal" and "intrasocietal structures and processes", suggesting his focus is intrasocietal. She writes, "Variations of ultimate political outcomes of the modernizing process (Moore's dependent variable) are explained by a combination of the strength of the 'commercial impulse' and the type of class structure through which its effects are channeled.... Moore was anxious to establish his cases as societies free from 'foreign influences'. But, of course, no society is free from foreign influences, and, in his case accounts, Moore is repeatedly forced to refer to 'external' conditions or events in order to explain 'internal' states or changes" ("A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy", Politics and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1973:28-29).

omic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and now developed metropolitan countries" (1969:4). The model is not restricted to international relations; rather, it attempts to link internal developments to relationships within as well as outside of nations, or what he refers to as "a whole chain of constellations of metropolises and satellites" (6). His central hypothesis is that "within this world-embracing metropolis-satellite structure the metropolises tend to develop and the satellites to underdevelop" (9). In other words, there is a chain of exploitive relations between various levels from the local to the regional to the national and international which serve to accumulate power and resources at the highest levels and drain them from the lowest.

Johan Galtung presents a variation on the themes of Frank. He begins, as did Frank, by focusing on "inequality within and between nations" and specifically analyses the interactive relations contained therein. The key linking or mediating mechanism he defines as "coupling" which means "some type of social causation in interaction relations and interaction structure" (1971:83). Using the imagery of 'center' and 'periphery', Galtung argues "there is a disharmony of interest between the Center nation [metropolitan nation] as a whole and the Periphery nation [satellite nation] as a whole" but maintains that this misses an important refinement "because it blurs the harmony of interest between the two centers, and leads to the belief that imperialism is merely an international relationship, not a combination of intra- and inter-national relations" (84). The key mediating party in the Galtung model is the "bridgehead" in the center of the Periphery nation. Inequality results from the way interaction takes place and can be identified in terms of sets of elites. In what he calls the "multi-national, asymmetric stage", Galtung argues, "elites have emerged in the Periphery nations, strongly identified with and well harmonizing with the Center elites" (96). One final refinement Galtung introduces has particular relevance to Canada and that is the 'go-between' status of some nations, mediating between Center and Periphery nations in much the same way the center in the Periphery nation mediates in the general model (104).

Because of the type of imagery used, a problem with the regional power structure models is their emphasis on geographical distinctions rather than class distinctions; for example, the bourgeoisie may be located in metropolitan areas but so is much of the proletariat. While keeping the overall perspective

*The terms 'periphery' and 'center' as images of international economic relations have been used since at least 1949 by Raul Prebisch in his The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems, New York, United Nations Department of Social and Economic Affairs, 1950:1 (original published in Spanish in 1949).

of international relationships and their intra-national implications, recent analysts have paid much more attention to the class structures within these nations and have argued that some elements of these class structures have become 'internationalized'. These types of analyses Norman Girvan has classified as "historical/institutional/structural" approaches.* The most impressive example of such an approach is the work of Osvaldo Sunkel in "Transnational Capitalism and National Disintegration in Latin America". Using five inter-related concepts of "development, underdevelopment, dependence, marginality and spatial imbalances", Sunkel argues:

A realistic analysis of Latin America development should therefore be based on a conception which assumes our socio-economic system to be formed by two groups of structural elements: internal and external. Among the internal factors are: the pattern of natural resources and population; political institutions, especially the state; sociopolitical groups and classes; the ideologies and attitudes of different groups and classes; the specific policies followed by the government; etc. The complex of internal and external structural elements, and the interrelations among them, define the structure of the system, and constitute, therefore, the framework within which the functioning of the national system and its processes of structural transformations take place (1973:135).

More specifically, there are three dimensions of the analysis--process, structure and system--whereby "it is postulated that underdevelopment is part and parcel of the historical process of global development of the international system, and therefore, that underdevelopment and development are simply two faces of one single universal process" (135-136). The most recent phase in these relationships maintains the overall structural asymmetry between nations but now that they have become "ever more closely integrated--it is necessary to take into account that this new model of international economic relations is based operationally on the transnational conglomerate, a new kind of business organization that has experienced an enormous growth during the last decades" (139). There now appears an "internationalized" sector in both the center and periphery nations built on the institution of the multinational corporation. For the periphery nation this likely means that "international mobility will correspond to the internal

*For an important overview of the types of analysis which have been performed in Third World countries, see Girvan's, "The Development of Dependency Economics in the Caribbean and Latin America: Review and Comparison", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1973: 1-33).

mobility particularly between the internationalized sectors of developed and under-developed countries, which, as we have indicated before, constitute the nucleus of the international capitalist system, and, therefore, probably also constitutes an international market for skilled resources" (170).

Sunkel's model thus focuses on developments within center and periphery nations but, in addition, adds an international category because of his 'global perspective'. From this wider perspective, analogous with the continental system between Canada and the United States, two basic components can be identified: -

- a) a complex of activities, social groups and regions in different countries which conform to the developed part of the global system and which are closely linked transnationally through many concrete interests as well as by similar styles, ways and levels of living and cultural affinities;
- b) a national complement of activities, social groups and regions partially or totally excluded from the national developed part of the global system and without any links with similar activities, groups and regions of other countries (146).

Thus the imagery used by Sunkel is of a "transnational kernel or nucleus" at the "heart" of the international system which tends to be integrated plus national segments which tend to be "segregated or marginal" to the core of the dominant national and international system. The importance of these segregated sectors in both the center and periphery is their relationship with the transnational integrated sectors in terms of the types of demands they may make and conflicts which may occur.

It is important to recognize that in Sunkel's model class relationships are of crucial importance but do not correspond to the 'integrated-marginalized' dichotomy. Rather, there is a 'core' of international capitalism into which some segments of the periphery bourgeoisie, middle class and a portion of the working class or even agricultural classes are incorporated while some parts of all classes are marginalized. There is still an overall international hierarchy between nations based on an asymmetrical relationship but above this is an integrated multinational segment 'transcending' this in an international capitalist system.

The effect of integrating Galtung's idea of 'go-between' nations with Sunkel's 'integrated and marginalized' segments of the class structures of center and periphery nations means that a rather integrate model of international and internal economic relations could be developed. Mediating between the various structural components of the model would be the institution of the multinational corporation and the elites who control them

and others who work for them. To turn this general model into a theory of international and regional capitalism would require a great deal of empirical work but as a guide to this system requires a model somewhat more developed than that for Latin American nations because of Canada's unique role of mediator for foreign controlled capital plus its own foreign investment and the extensive foreign investment within Canada itself.*

Although there has been some discussion of various regional power structure frameworks within Canada, very little empirical work has actually been done. What has been undertaken is at the level of the Frank 'development of underdevelopment' thesis and not in terms of more recent models such as Galtung's or Sunkel's. Mel Watkins, for instance, suggests using a "center-margin framework" similar to Frank's model for examining the national bourgeoisie and "its relationship of dependency or independence with respect to the imperial business class or the imperial bourgeoisie" (1970:35). In so doing, he recognizes the importance of the "metropolis-satellite chain" used by Frank (37-39), arguing that in the international framework, "Canada would lie above the line as one of the exploiting nations rather than an exploited nation" (40). But at the same time the internal relationships must also be taken into account and it is in this context that Arthur K. Davis' paper, "Caradian Society and History as Hinterland versus Metropolis" (1971), is important**. However, these humble beginnings have led to very little in the way of model building or theories, not to mention the absence of empirical research. While this is somewhat better in the case of regional analysis within Canada, there is virtually nothing published about the continental context.***

*See Wallace Clement, "The Canadian Bourgeoisie: Merely Comprador?", a paper presented at the Marxist Study Institute, Toronto, Feb., 1975 and the section on "Absentee Ownership and 'Linkages'" at the end of the next section.

**The importance of the boundaries selected for study is also noted by Keyfitz when he writes, "If we study any institution in Canada, for example, trade unions or an automobile plant, our conclusions will come out one way if we treat it as autonomous, as though any links with the United States can be disregarded, and another way if we treat it as part of a larger continental entity" (1974:34).

***To comprehend the nature of the relationship between Canada and the United States at any given time, it is necessary to understand what is happening within each. Milner and Milner are among the few who have actually practiced this, writing, "the United States behaves toward other nations in ways which are to a great extent a reflection and outgrowth of the economic structures and social system inside its borders...in order to understand many of the most important aspects of everyday experience in Quebec, we must understand

These frameworks have a particular promise for Canadian social science as models because they reflect a centralist tradition important in Canada's development, particularly in terms of its early colonial links and the early development of central Canada as exemplified in Innis's staple theory and the Lower/Creighton 'Laurentian thesis'. Each has been built on an analysis of structural power links binding them into a whole founded on geography, regionalism, and resource extraction. One of the differences between most elite models, such as that used by John Porter in The Vertical Mosaic, and the regional power structure frameworks outlined here is the force of opposition built into the latter. They see the relationship as one of running conflict whereby Canadians are placed in a 'double-bind' between the United States and Canadian business interests, both of whom have turned toward the regional hinterlands for their surplus extraction.

Replicated in Canada are the beginnings of a model of a national society in its international context.* Although these have not as yet been developed sufficiently or applied adequately to Canadian society, there are clearly beginnings in this direction. Many more specifications are required in such a model, some of which are suggested in the international models, before it can address some particular characteristics of Canadian society. It would seem important to specify more clearly the dimensions such as regionalism, class or ethnicity being analysed and recognizing some of the differences and clusterings which may occur. For instance, there may be an important difference in French-English relations with respect to the economic domain as compared to the state. Indeed, this has recently been shown to be the case (Clement and Olsen, 1974). Also, the links between various levels must be more clearly specified and the mechanisms of mediation examined more carefully. Furthermore, the relationships between the various 'parties' in both the 'center' and 'periphery' must be examined more thoroughly. This means, for instance, examining relations based on economic and state power in terms of the ethnicity of the power holders and their regional location. It may be that there is uniformity within the 'center' but diversity in the 'periphery' which affects the types of resistances Davis suggests should exist. Finally, the international dimension must be explored more thoroughly for the internal implications of

some of the crucial facts of life in the United States--beginning with its internal class structure and the culture which sustains this structure" (1973:9).

*While the international context has been stressed here, internal relations can also be examined within this model. For example, Frank Vallee notes, "one cannot understand situations and trends among the native people without taking into account the non-native people who form part of the social environment" (1971:149).

these structures. These preliminary points arising from various regional power structure models may prove useful in the attempt to develop a 'Canadian sociology'. They would clearly allay any criticism of such an undertaking as parochial. Indeed, they would bring the analysis of Canada into an international framework in a more meaningful fashion than could any series of 'sociologies of Canada'--or traditional comparative studies--because they demand that relations between various institutions in Canada and other national societies be specified, not simply as they compare. For example, rather than comparing political, judicial, economic, or educational institutions and policies in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom, the researcher would ask what implications the institutions and policies of one nation have for others--both in terms of models that have been adapted after being established in one place as well as the impact of policies and institutions from other nations and their implications for the nation under study*. Some of these questions will be returned to later but first the consociational democracy model will be examined.

(ii) CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

There has been an attempt to present a model of certain types of national societies characterized as 'segmented' in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, or political structure. This approach has been presented and applied specifically to Canada and other nations in a collection of papers edited by Kenneth McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (1974). Although variously called "segmented pluralism", and "contradictarian democracy", McRae suggests that the term "consociational democracy" is most convenient (3-4). He distinguishes three perspectives in the general consociational literature:

- 1) As a pattern of social structure, emphasizing the degree of religious, ideological, cultural or linguistic segmentation in the society itself;
- 2) As a pattern of elite behavior and mass-elite relationships emphasizing the processes of decision-making and conflict regulation;
- 3) As an underlying characteristic of the political culture arising from historical circumstances that may antedate the period of mass politics (5).

McRae's summary of the literature suggests that one element stands out as most important and is a prerequisite for a society being

*On the relationship between 'endogenous' and 'outside' factors on development, see Giddens (1973:265).

considered consociational; he says, "the cleavage in question should be sufficiently intensive and durable to give members of the respective groups a distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation that is different from that of other sectors, a *raison d'être* for maintaining organized segmentation" (6). Underlying the entire model, but not made explicit, is the assumption that these cleavages will become organized and be manifest in the political system so as to stabilize the society as a whole. This is apparent, for example, in Lijphart's definition: "Consociational democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy" (1974:79). While the model explicitly deals with cleavages based on regional, religious, linguistic and ideological splits, it does not attempt to incorporate social classes as possible subcultures. Similarly, the consociational model stresses the role of the political system but does not take into account others such as the bureaucratic, economic, labour, or mass media in terms of representing population segments.

McRae has made a cautioned application of the consociational model to Canada, albeit limited to the political system because of the bias contained within the general model. His main findings are that, "The primary lines of segmentation in Canada are difficult to identify with precision on account of [sic] the reinforcing but not completely overlapping effects of province, language and religion", especially because there is not one government in Canada but eleven, including the provinces and federal government thus creating a "distorting forum" for the segments. Using a comparative method to place Canada's segmentation in a relative position to 'classic' segmented societies, the results are "inconclusive" since "by any of these criteria province, religion and language Canada must be ranked significantly lower". Probably most significant, given the political orientation of the model, is his finding that "Because of the nature of the party system and the electoral system, modern political parties in Canada have not divided along any of the axes of subcultural cleavage--accommodations between subcultures must take place within the governing party" (260-261). While there may be some resemblance between Canada and the consociational model, it does not adequately explain developments even within the political system. Some of the preconditions for the development of a consociational political system may in fact exist but they have not become organized and represented in the political system in the way the consociational model suggests.

In his book, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (1973), Robert Presthus has adopted a consociational approach, particularly as developed by Lijphart. His use of the model, however, is more metaphoric than real because he adapts it to the study of interest groups rather than the study of cleavages based on so-

cial segments. In fact, what he does abstract from the general model are those elements related to "elite accommodation" as "an integral part of the larger process of national integration" (4). This is simply another way of saying "elite pluralism" (see Bachrach, 1967). But what is made quite explicit in Presthus' analysis is that he regards this not only as a desirable way to organize a 'democratic' society but as the only way. He says, "elite accommodation may be regarded as a structural requisite of any democratic society in which political decisions are the result of negotiation and consultation among the elites concerned...:Elite accommodation is inherent in the process of democratic government" (4). While Presthus' account of "elite accommodation" may be an interesting ideology* as a "way to overcome pervasive modern schisms between labour and capital, social classes, and indeed, between government and the governed" (25), it is not an adequate base upon which to build a theory or model of the way Canadian society operates. It is subject to the same limitations McRae pointed out for the consociational model and confines the analysis to the role of the state system, virtually ignoring the operation of other power domains in the society and not providing any insight into such issues as regionalism or class structures.**

While the consociational model does not address sufficient issues necessary to develop a 'Canadian sociology' it does provide at least some potential in terms of the two major segments of Canadian society. These are the 'two nations' of French and English Canada. Language, religion, political units and regional centralization are all elements serving to reinforce this major cleavage, as is economic position and, at least to some extent, political parties with the Liberals dominant in Quebec and the Conservatives and NDP almost totally absent. However, the issue of social class is not integrated in the model and for this it is necessary to turn to a long standing debate over the place of the concepts 'class', 'nation' and 'ethnicity' in Canadian society.

(iii) THE PROBLEMS OF CLASS, NATION AND ETHNICITY***

Although the theoretical debate has been centered mainly in Quebec, the issue has relevance for all of Canadian society,

*See, for example, W.L. Mackenzie King's, Industry and Humanity, Macmillan: Toronto, 1918.

**In a highly critical review of the book, John Meisel has noted that Presthus introduces the idea of elite accommodation but fails to integrate it, saying, "the book makes only a marginal contribution to this still open issue", Canadian Forum, May-June, 1974:44-46.

***This question will be discussed again shortly in terms of dominant issues in Canadian society. Hubert Guindon's work, especially "Two Cultures: An essay on nationalism, class, and ethnic tension" (1968),

as John Porter's extensive analysis has demonstrated. Bourque and Laurin-Frenette have analysed the relation between the concepts 'class' and 'nation' within Quebec, maintaining that "a diversified class structure has existed within the two nations present in Quebec's social formation...the structure does not prevent, on the one hand, the collaboration between the classes whose members are in the main from different nations, and on the other hand, the class struggle, within each nation". While they see the two concepts as related they are by no means identical, nor should they be merged into such hybrids as 'ethnic-class'. They define and analyse the concepts as follows:

An ethnic group forming a single dominated social class cannot therefore constitute a nation. We can only analyse it as a social class within the social formation and, in the case of the capitalist mode of production, the nation to which it belongs. In the case of an ethnically differentiated class, the ethnic character may be the vestigial result of another social formation; an earlier social formation in the case of conquest; another nation, where large-scale emigration is involved (1972:192).

The distinction is put more simply by Stanley Ryerson when he says, "The concepts of class and nation are not equatable. Classes embody relationships of property and work, in the context of a mode of production...nation-community embodies an identity linguistic and cultural, that is not simply an 'effect' of class, however closely its evolution may be interwoven with the shifting patterns of class relations"(1972:224).

For some time now, Quebec sociologists have been relating the issues of class and nation to a total society analysis. More than other sociologists in Canada, they have also given a 'richer' meaning to the concept of class.* This can be seen, for example, in the use given the term by Dofny and Rioux:

on the role of the middle class in French Canada is a total society analysis which takes into account its larger context and the interplay between 'class' and 'nation'. He clearly relates class developments and political movements within the context of ethnic differentiation. See also Maurice Pinard's paper on this topic, "Working Class Politics: An Interpretation of the Quebec Case", Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1970).

*Contrast Dofny and Rioux with Porter's use of class (1965:9-25).

The concept of social class is intrinsically related to the concept of 'total society'; unless social and cultural phenomena are placed in the context of the total society, there is the risk of confusing social classes with groups based on occupation or socio-economic interests....Social classes are very large groups, real rather than nominal, that appear in those societies where the economic structure predominates and determines the congruence between the other sub-systems of the society. These groups we call social classes are mainly differentiated according to economic inequalities. Social classes appear in heterogeneous societies and tend to form sub-cultures, in other words, cultural systems which are relatively coherent (1964:307-308).

Later Dofny and Rioux raise the problem of the "truncated" nature of the class system in Quebec, a problem also raised by Rocher when he speaks of "a double system of classes, permeating each other at certain levels, but relatively autonomous in relation to each other" (1964:336).

While Porter is generally noted for his 'nominal' use of the term class, it is apparent in the following comment on Quebec that he is using the term as more than statistical categories. He says, "because British and French live as largely separate groups there are two class systems, each bearing the stamp of its own culture. Both French and British have their old aristocratic families as well as their lower classes. However, these two class systems while operating side by side are also firmly interlocked in the economic system" (1965:91). Unfortunately, there has not been a major attempt to provide a class analysis for the national society in the way this has been done for Quebec. Leo Johnson's article (1972) is the closest there is to analysing classes as large, active groups on a national scale. This may be because they are not real or associational groups on this level but research has not been done to either confirm or deny this.

Aside from their importance in terms of 'class' and 'nation', what is important in the way these concepts have been related analytically is the use of a historical perspective. This is particularly true for Bourque and Laurin-Frenette, Ryerson and Guindon, but is also evident in Porter, who says, "To understand the interplay between ethnic inequalities and class inequalities it is important to look at how ethnic differentiation within a society develops. In most historical instances it has been through conquest or migration" (1974:5). Porter differs from others mentioned in one other important respect; he analyses the relationship between 'ethnicity' and 'class'.

rather than 'nation' and 'class'.* This allows him to deal more broadly with Canadian society as a whole because it extends the analysis to cover 'third' ethnic groups, representing about one quarter of the Canadian population.

A recent book by David Hughes and Evelyn Kallen, The Anatomy of Racism: Canadian Dimensions (1974), has expanded the study of ethnicity well beyond earlier attempts. Although they begin with one central problem, that of racism in Canada, they expand their analysis to include a wide range of inter-related phenomenon, such as conquest, immigration, individual, institutional and structural racism, ethnic group boundaries, the role of education, religion and language, and the effect of state policies, as they affect and are affected by their central problem. Of particular note is the way they are able to relate ethnicity and power, privilege and prestige in Canada in a way not evident since The Vertical Mosaic. Hughes and Kallen systematically deal with many problems at the core of a 'Canadian sociology' by searching out the linkage between inequalities in each of these phenomenon.

Thus there are two fairly distinct issues; one concerning the place of Quebec in Confederation and another the relationship between class and other relatively fragmented ethnic groups. The first may be analysed in terms of conquest; the second is better understood in terms of selective migration and other factors.

To summarize this discussion before examining some dominant issues in Canadian society, it may be said that there is much that is suggestive in regional power struggle models, the consociational democracy model and the 'class'-'nation' distinction but they have not been developed into what could be called a model of Canadian society. A number of sub-theories or models are available in the literature but they have not been brought together into a coherent and comprehensive 'Canadian sociology'.

SOME ISSUES IN CANADIAN SOCIETY

The preceding sections have discussed the idea of a 'Canadian sociology' and some approaches which may prove useful in the attempt to develop this perspective. This final section will provide a few dominant issues (for illustrative purposes) which could be addressed in such an undertaking. The conclusion will provide some suggestions about how these issues could be related and expanded.

*On the relationship between ethnicity, cultural groups and territory, see Hughes and Kallen (1974:88).

(i) NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CANADIANS

The literature in Canadian sociology on 'national identity' is probably more extensive than on any other single topic, particularly one at the national level, yet little consensus has emerged in terms of what this means in Canada or what its implications are for a 'Canadian sociology'. Some have argued Canada is conservative because of its 'tory' origins and rejection of the American Revolution, others that it is liberal because of its American orientation, still others that Canadians are engaged in a love-hate relation with themselves and the United States. Whatever the case may be, the 'national character' route to understanding Canadian society seems a 'dead end', not a place to begin but a place to arrive. The only conclusion seems to be that there are a number of social forces affecting the way Canadians act and believe. It seems more reasonable to first identify these social forces and then address the consequences for the Canadian consciousness.

One of these social forces is ethnic diversity, the struggle between the French and English plus the ethnic pluralism of the other one quarter of the population. In the absence of alternative identities, the Canadian state has pursued policies of 'biculturalism', and more recently, 'multiculturalism', which serve to reinforce these atomized 'organized' minorities.** It is difficult to tell if these are identities arising from the Canadian 'mosaic' or ideologies projected by the Canadian state elite (see Clement and Olsen, 1974).

Sociologists themselves are not free from responsibility on this matter, as Vallee and Whyte have said:

Sociologists who have written on national character and values in Canada have based their conclusions on impressions, introspection, and on inferences from such disparate sources as literature, historical developments, and statistics on a variety of subjects. The framework within which these studies are carried out and presented is almost always a comparative one in which Canadians are

*See, for example, Kasper Naegele (1968); S.D. Clark (1974); George Grant (1965); Mildred Schwartz (1967); J.M.S. Careless (1969); John Porter (1967, 1971, 1974); G. Horowitz (1971); S. M. Lipset (1964, 1971); Don Whyte (1973).

**Examining the consequences of these policies Porter says, "It really seems questionable that we seek our psychic shelters through ethnic identification. There is no doubt that ethnic groupings can play this role, but at the cost of perpetuating ethnic stratification" (1974:10).

viewed as not quite as American as the Americans, not quite as British as the British, not quite as Australian as the Australians, not quite as French as the French. In this way, sociologists reinforce a folk impression of long standing that Canada is a hybrid product and an intermediary between the United States and Europe (1968:836).

Religion, ethnicity, linguistic groups, class, sex and region all compete with a sense of national identity but it seems an understanding of how and why these operate can best follow from the study of the structure of Canadian society. A study of regionalism using the framework outlined earlier would suggest some of the reasons why there are several identity references operating simultaneously. In the West, for example, there is one pull to central Canada and another north-south pull to the United States. Nations need not be monolithic or highly integrated; indeed, precisely the way the parts (be they ethnic, regional, class, etc.) relate to the whole is one of the most important and interesting variables.

Only very recently with the appearance of Patricia Marchak's Ideological Perspective on Canada has the weakness of the 'Canadian character' literature begun to be overcome and this has been done by using a methodology different from the earlier studies. She has chosen to do her macrosociology of Canada by counterposing "two versions of the Canadian reality" -- dominant and counter ideologies (1975:viff). The method is to contrast ideology and reality and see why some classes adopt one or another, and evaluate which 'fits' an understanding of Canadian society. Marchak is able to weave an analysis of history, class, nation, foreign ownership, sovereignty, regionalism, French Canada, ethnicity, native peoples, sexual inequality, professions, unions, political parties, institutional arrangements--public and private, education, wealth and income distribution into her theme of dominant and counter ideologies, and this is all done at the national society level. Although they are not as yet related in such a way that it could be said that they constitute a model or theory of Canadian society, the beginnings of such an attempt are apparent.

An analysis using the regional power structure discussed earlier which attempted to integrate the findings of Rex Lucas' study, Minetown, Milltown, Railtown, John Porter's study of the national power structure and other work on the international level* is another approach worth exploring. The number of such

*In a paper, "Economic Elites in Ontario: A Broader Perspective on Regionalism" (presented to the Canadian Studies Institute, University of Waterloo, November, 1974), I attempted to show the linkages between the local, regional, national and international levels. This approach is particularly useful for illustrating the implications of broader power structures on the day to day activities of Canadians.

links as education, corporate control, regionalism, urban-rural migration, social mobility, unions and others, are innumerable.* A study which tried to examine national identities based on these types of linkages would probably have more to say about how people develop 'identities' than those undertaken within the 'national identity' approach thus far. Indeed, studies such as the impressive work of Lucas have done a great deal to link the social psychological level of analysis into broader social forces and structures. It is likely that studies such as his or Marchak's would be the primary way that a 'Canadian sociology' approach could tap this level of analysis yet still retain its broad national focus.

(ii) FRENCH CANADA AS A HINTERLAND MODEL

It was mentioned earlier that Hubert Guindon's analysis of French Canada provides an analysis of a total society which could be expanded to the whole of Canada. Guindon links the "increase in the political and economic relevance of the provincial governments at the expense of the federal government" to changes which have occurred in the class structure of Quebec (1968:33ff). This could also be related to postwar transformations in the Prairies, particularly oil in Alberta, which have catalysed similar developments there.** Although all of the parallels and points of analysis cannot be developed here, it is worthwhile to suggest some of the more obvious. Guindon says,

The vulnerability of the traditional elite set the stage for an easy introduction of industrialization even if it meant dependence on foreign capitalists. The capitalists transformed the French Canadians into urban dwellers. To service the needs of the recently urbanized masses, the traditional power elite had to transform its institutions into large scale bureaucracies, giving birth in the process to the new middle class of French-Canadian society (44).

In these few sentences Guindon has introduced and integrated a historical framework for the study of industrialization, bureaucratization, foreign investment, class transformations and the study of elites. Later he discusses social mobility, saying, "French-Canadian bureaucratic pyramids have a narrow base --geographically, socially, and organizationally--because of their small scale. This means that upward mobility is more re-

*These linkages will be returned to in the final section.

**See John Barr and Owen Anderson (editors), The Unfinished Revolt, McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1971.

stricted, less diversified, and less extended" (51). All of this resembles closely the experience of other regional hinterlands in Canada.* It places the analysis within its Canadian and international context, shows the limitations of attempting to create parallel mobility structures alongside dominant ones (and the need to do this because of exclusion from dominant ones); it explains the role local elites have in mediating with outside power centers and where their interests are located.

Vallee and Whyte have commented:

compared to the total Canadian nation-state, the distinctive entity called French-Canadian society is easy to grasp in its totality. The inter-dependence of the parts that make up the socio-political entity called Quebec can be traced historically and synchronically in a way which it would be extremely difficult to do for Canada as a whole, except at the most abstract level (1968:850).

Perhaps it is not so much the size or complexity of Canadian society as the lack of attempting to develop such an approach among English-speaking sociologists that explains this failure. Surely the same kind of analysis can be done for the rest of Canada; it even has the model of such analyses as Guindon's to start with.

(iii) ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND 'LINKAGES'

Since I have discussed the international setting of Canada's economy elsewhere in "The Changing Structure of the Canadian Economy" (1974), only a few aspects of national level absentee ownership will be provided for illustrative purposes of some of the 'linkages' necessary to develop a 'Canadian sociology'. Canada's economy has two types of elites, comprador and indigenous, which are centered in relatively distinct economic sectors. The comprador elites are the Canadian counterpart of foreign controlled multinationals. In terms of the Galtung model, they are the 'go-between' elites in the periphery nation. Some modifications to this model are necessary because, in addition to the comprador or 'go-between' economic elites, there exist independent indigenous elites. Aside from this amendment, the fragmented economic system in Canada can be related to the fragmented political system, particularly in the context of the above re-

*The case studies of Philip Mathias', Forced Growth, James Lewis and Samuel: Toronto, 1971 are interesting illustrations. All five cases are located within the weakest provinces. See also Garth Stevenson, "Continental Integration and Canadian Unity" in Andrew Axline, et al, editors, Continental Community?, McClelland and Stewart: Toronto, 1974.

marks on the relationship between foreign investment and regional hinterlands. That is, the fragmented political system has encouraged the development of foreign direct investment within various provinces which compete with each other thus encouraging differential patterns of growth between provinces and higher rates of foreign investment. This, in turn, has resulted in an increase in provincial power in the postwar period, particularly in the oil rich Prairies, which has also weakened the federal system. These brief remarks suggest that it is important to establish relationships between various developments and places them within their international context. Absentee ownership on the national level has had important economic, political and regional implications but these represent only one side of the relationship. If the full implications for a 'Canadian sociology' are to be explored, then other aspects must also be taken into account.

Absentee ownership may be defined in terms of the distance from a particular center, similar to the metropolis-hinterland chain discussed earlier. The boundaries under consideration must be specified; for example, at the national level foreign ownership is absentee and the economic boundaries do not coincide with the nation state. On the community or regional level, absentee ownership refers to the branches of firms which are not locally owned but are part of larger corporations, themselves either Canadian or foreign owned. The consequences of foreign ownership at the national level and local level exhibit similar characteristics, including lack of autonomy from outside control and decision-making, withdrawal of capital and resources, as well as a higher degree of uncertainty about the continuation of the branch plant at both levels since by definition they are peripheral to the overall operation.

Another consequence of importance is the effect on the class structure and mobility of the indigenous population, either local or national. With a branch plant system, management is typically recruited outside the community and frequently transferred thus creating a system of 'transient managers'. This means local people have a lower probability of upward mobility and participation within this type of structure. On the national level the matter is more complex. If management is brought in from outside, as has often been the case in the past, the opportunity structure for indigenous Canadians is blocked. However, if foreign firms recruit within Canada to fill these positions, this opens the possibility for middle class Canadians who are university educated. Given the high degree of blockage which occurs within Canadian controlled firms, this may be desirable from the perspective of individual mobility, but must be weighted against other consequences of absentee ownership suggested above plus the fact that this may be a way that indigenous entrepreneurial talent is drained off within Canada, thus inhibiting the creation of indigenously controlled activity.

In some respects it does make a difference whether the absentee owners are Canadian or foreign. These would be with respect to the retention of profits within Canada which could be used to expand industrial activity thus creating greater surplus and more jobs. It would also mean that many of the secondary and tertiary spin-offs such as technological development could be supported and encouraged within Canada. Being based within Canada may also mean the firms would be subject to greater regulation by the Canadian state.

In other respects it makes little difference whether the branch plant is Canadian or foreign controlled, particularly for the regional or local level. In either case the major access points to occupational mobility, the major accumulation of surplus, and the sources of decision-making, occur outside the area. The community or region within which the branch plant is located is equally vulnerable to decisions taken at head office, be it in Toronto or New York.

This discussion is the result of taking several levels of analysis such as the local or regional level represented by Rex Lucas' Minetown, Milltown, Railtown, John Porter's analysis of national economic elites and tying them all together in a variation of regional power structure model. While this discussion is very brief and only illustrative, as well as being confined mainly to economic dimensions, it does provide some indication of the type of analysis that could be developed into a national society framework. The key analytical points are in the linking mechanisms between each level and a concern with the entire scope of the society, including the frequently missing local level. Several other types of analyses could be provided which link external and internal developments; for example, the relationship between immigration and retaining a French-speaking population base for the purposes of political power as evident in the recent Bill 22 controversy in Quebec or the relationship between foreign control of industry, the occupational structure of the labour force and the implications this has for post-industrialism. While these cannot be developed here, they give some indication of other types of studies which could be related to a national society analysis.

CONCLUSION

The future of Canadian sociology will depend upon its keeping up with current trends and being able to place them within the context of the national society. In Canada there is a double dilemma of trying to catch up empirically and theoretically by developing the basis for a 'Canadian sociology' while at the same time staying abreast of current developments and remaining relevant. Moreover, there are many areas that have been almost totally neglected, not only in a substantive sense but in the sense of the types of perspectives used in the analysis. For

example, there has never been in Canada a macrosociological approach by a Marxist on the scale of, say, Charles H. Anderson (1974) for the United States, although elements of such an analysis exist such as Leo Johnson (1972) on the decline of the petite bourgeoisie or in some respects Davis' metropolis-hinterland analysis (1971) following the town-country dichotomy in Marx. More work needs to be done even with existing studies. For instance, an important undertaking would be tying the analysis of class, power and elites together empirically; put crudely, this means tying Part I of *The Vertical Mosaic*, 'The Structure of Class', into Part II, 'The Structure of Power', by maintaining the national perspective and adding an historical analysis.

There do exist a number of theories, models or at least themes about the nature of Canadian society, some of which have already been mentioned. Porter, for instance, has identified the relationship between class, power and ethnicity, and this has now been expanded by Hughes and Kallen; A.K. Davis' hinterland-metropolis relationship based on regional inequalities; A. Richmond's relationship between immigration and ethnic inequalities, following, in part, from Porter's 'two stream model' of migration; Leo Johnson's changing occupational structure and the decline of the petite bourgeoisie; Pat Marchak's two competing versions of social reality; and I have suggested the relationship between foreign and indigneous economic development. Together, and with others, it may be possible to form these into a 'Canadian sociology'.

Social life is highly complex and experiments in types of societies have been varied. The task of social studies is to 'make sense' out of the variety of experiences and experimentations by identifying major processes, structures and relationships. Therefore, the study of Canadian society can and should be approached from a number of perspectives, using a variety of methodologies and data sources. But ultimately, to have relevance for the study of the national society, they have to be tied into an overriding framework and presumably be aimed at a common concern--such as improving the lot of Canadians, which could mean being concerned about the decline of inequalities of all sorts and the increase and redistribution of the society's resources.

It has been argued that the focus of a 'Canadian sociology' should be on an array of substantive problems in Canadian society but these in turn must also be worked out in terms of the priorities of each researcher. This means an evaluation of what are considered important or significant social issues and concerns, an analysis of them and reporting these results. The process of reporting to other scholars and the public is intended to have others re-examine what they consider to be social issues and to re-order their priorities accordingly. This goal would be one of the major tasks of such an undertaking, and one of its most important rewards.

One important question remains: Is there a uniqueness to Canadian society that makes it a valuable topic beyond its intrinsic interest to its residents? The answer offered in this paper has been in the affirmative. Canada lends itself for comparison to probably a wider range of nations than does any other single country. It encompasses a number of problems such as its industrial development, ethnic diversity and regionalism, comparable with, yet distinct from, other countries. Its role as a 'mediator' or 'go-between' generates a number of unique internal developments different from most other nations. For these reasons and more, it seems a worthwhile undertaking to continue to develop a 'Canadian sociology'.

Postscript 1977

In the two years since this paper was written there has been a maturing of my thinking about models and theories of Canadian society; although I continue to accept the paper's central direction. I would now adopt the political economy tradition as the most fruitful approach; in my view, it has the strongest historical roots and the greatest insights into Canada's social structure. It is a tradition represented in different ways in the works of such diverse people as Donald Creighton, Harold Innis, Tom Naylor and Stanley Ryerson. It encompasses scholars from C.E. Macpherson to H. Claire Pentland to John Porter. Broadly contained within this tradition is the basis for a distinctive Canadian social science which would make sense of and give meaning to the development and current structure of Canadian society.

The following are what I regard as the most central components of a model of Canada as developed within the political economy tradition. These features of Canadian society give direction to the most appropriate questions to be asked and relationships to be explained:

1. The implications of external relations for internal development, especially early colonial ties with France and the United Kingdom and current dependence on the United States in many economic, political and military activities.
2. The persistently active role of the Canadian State in the economy and its fragmented federal-provincial structure.
3. The continued survival of two nations within a single state--the conquered French and the conquering English--and the demise of the native population.
4. The role of immigration in filling the West during the early stages of development (1879 to 1914) and the urban centres of today (especially Montréal, Toronto, and Vancouver), which have served to build an indigenous

labour force and domestic market while creating an ethnically diverse society stratified by class.

5. The persistence of enormous regional differences within the country, especially the underdevelopment of the Atlantic region and the northern sections of the central and western provinces.

6. The constraints imposed by geography, especially the rapids of the St. Lawrence River, the Laurentian Shield, the Rockies, and now the North.

7. The effect of technology and the ownership of that technology, especially patent rights, in shaping the economy and labour force.

8. The tremendous costs of transportation networks from early roads, canals, ports, seaways, and railways to pipelines for oil and gas and their role in creating a national and continental economy.

9. The dependence on external markets, both as outlets for raw materials (making Canada vulnerable to world conditions) and as capital sources (which ultimately act as drains on capital).

10. The origin of Canadian capitalism in a staple economy, its movement into commercial and financial specialization and its continued reliance on resource extraction.

11. The persistence of a petty bourgeoisie class as the most powerful class outside the capitalist class until the Second World War, prior to which Canada was largely rural and agrarian/resource based.

12. The slower development of an industrial working class, the product of large-scale industrialization which does not become a dominant force in Canada until well into the twentieth century and continues today to be rivaled in importance by the service sector of the labour force, especially the growing number of state workers adding to an already overdeveloped commercial sector.

As in any model, these central components are each related to the others. Various theories have been offered in the political economy tradition which order these components and purport to explain their relationships in Canada. For example, Innis offered the 'character of the staple' as explaining most of these other factors. Creighton, on the other hand, contended that the central explanatory relationship of Canada's development was the creative role of its commercial capitalists and their relationship to the state. Naylor also focuses on this relationship as a means of explaining Canadian development, but for him financial capitalists in Canada have a distorting rather than creative role. For Ryerson the relationship between the capitalist class and the working class is the central dynamic, although for him this class relationship is necessarily framed in the context of two nations in an 'unequal union'. Contrary to Ryerson's Marxist approach is the liberal framework of John Porter and his thesis of a 'vertical mosaic' of social class and ethnicity which has shaped Canadian society.

I am still not prepared to offer my own theory of Canadian society as a whole or to present my theory of a Canadian sociology, but I do know that these twelve features will be most important in doing so, and that the task itself is a valuable one.

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The Dominion Government as Gatekeeper to the Canadian Ethnic Mosaic:

The Case of Quebec, 1867-1885

Dan Glenday
Introduction

Social scientists concerned with the study of ethnic relations have made use of many concepts to describe the forms ethnic interaction have taken. In the vast American literature on the subject; assimilation, prejudice, discrimination and pluralism have had the longest history (Wirth: 1956; Rose: 1968; Simpson and Yinger: 1972). Criticisms of all these approaches are bountiful, but need not concern us here since this essay will address itself to only one of these processes, namely, the dynamics of ethnic pluralism as it has historically manifested itself in Canada between the two "charter groups" (For a definition of "charter group", see Hughes (1952: 23)).

We begin with Louis Wirth's classic statement on minority aims entitled "The Problem of Minority Groups" (1956: 237-60). Wirth defined minorities as objectively occupying a disadvantageous position in society (1956: 238). Their subordinate status within society translates into "their unequal access to educational opportunities and in their restricted scope of occupational and professional advancement" (1956: 238). As to their social origins, Wirth noted that most minorities were indigenous or earlier arrivals to the territory than were the dominant group. Through conquest the dominant group achieved its position of power in the society. In referring to Canada, Wirth remarked that "the earlier French settlers are a minority in relation to the more recent English migrants. In almost all colonial countries it is the "foreigners" who are dominant and the indigenous populations who are subordinate" (1956:239). Therefore, any discussion of ethnic relations must begin with the differential access to power and resources as experienced by different ethnic groups within the nation-state. What is more, when analysing power relations between ethnic groups, we must also admit the significance of powerful individuals and

M.G. Smith (1965) and L. Kuper and M.G. Smith (1969), Derek Smith emphasizes "that conflict or confrontation within the plural society is between distinctly separate, culturally differentiated sections each pursuing its own institutional arrangements and, at least in the extreme limiting case, have no value consensus between them or common participation in core institutions of the society as a whole (1975: 16; emphasis added mine).

The important point to note in Smith's summary is the significance of internally generated forces for change. What we wish to add is any concrete situation can give rise to structural strains whose cause may be isolated in a sphere other than the economic and political. As a result, there may well be political and economic consequences to both the dominant group and subordinate minority.

A word or two should be mentioned concerning our acknowledgement of the significance accorded to political and economic factors for any analysis of social change. What is more, these factors can be analytically divided into external and internal influences on the total social system. Our concern for the moment though is to stress the importance of one internal factor to a rural based social system - demographic change within the subordinate ethnic group.

To summarize, pluralism denotes one way in which different ethnic groups have created their own sets of institutions in the face of an assymetrical allocation of resources within a particular nation. In colonial societies, the indigenous population is likely to be located in a structurally subordinate position vis-a-vis the dominant ethnic group. Within the subordinate ethnic, population change can have significant repercussions for the total social system.

families that make up the elites within ethnic communities (Schermerhorn: 1970; Rex: 1970; Blauner: 1972).

Further on in the article, Wirth divides minority aims into four types; assimilationist, secessionist, militarist and pluralist (1956: 245). Assimilation is the aim of a minority when its members desire absorption and like treatment with the dominant ethnic group. But, in order for such a strategy to be even moderately successful, the dominant group must accept their (ie. minority) participation in the society at large. Secessionist aims are characterized by Wirth as the struggle for cultural and political independence from the dominant group. A minority that seeks domination over a one time dominant group is defined as militant. Finally, pluralism "is the conception that variant cultures can flourish peacefully side by side in the same society" (1956: 245). The operative verb in that sentence is "can". The effectiveness of "peaceful co-existence" between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups is contingent on numerous circumstances such as the size of the ethnic minority, the differences in race, language and/or religion between the dominant and subordinate ethnics and the nature of the social relationship between the dominants and the subordinates such as master-slave or exploiter and exploited. One must remember that the balance is precarious and can collapse at any particular moment. Wirth's typology is exhaustive but does not explain under what circumstances minority aims can change.

A contemporary Canadian writer on the subject of ethnic pluralism, Derek Smith, began his investigation by cataloguing pluralism into two general types - pluralism as a political theory of 'open' or democratic societies and an anthropological theory stressing culture contact and conflict. Basing his analysis of conflict in plural societies on the works of Furnivall (1942;1948).

Population decrease could lead to cultural or linguistic assimilation into the dominant group. Population growth would result in structural pressures toward the expansion of occupational and social service institutions within the community. Population growth within the subordinate ethnic group will put pressure on the minority elites to seek ways of expanding its political, economic and social frontiers. These demands will lead to conflict between the subordinate minority and the dominant ethnic group. Demands for a greater share in jobs, services or even physical space caused by population growth will be interpreted by the dominant group as a threat to their own appropriation of these resources and services. We base this hypothesis on the assumption that at any particular historical moment, power contests are a zero-sum game.

This essay then will be concerned primarily with the internal structural and historical factors that account for the loss of dualism in Canada as a whole but resulted in the Quebec provincial boundaries becoming the sole territorial and political domain within which linguistic and cultural rights for French-Canadians could be effectively guaranteed. In other words, we are addressing ourselves to the processes that have led to the isolation of the province of Quebec as the "patrie" for French-Canadians living within Confederation.

What we are about to describe represents one of the necessary conditions from which an analysis of the contemporary secessionist movement in Quebec can be understood. Hopefully, this essay may also provide some indicators as to how plural societies can give rise to secessionist movements.

Ethnic Pluralism in Quebec

Hubert Guindon (1964;1968) argues that ethnic pluralism in Quebec historically has taken the form of "self-satisfying, self-segregated institutions" in all spheres of social life except at work and in politics. Yet, even in the work-world, "ethnic contact was established (only) with the introduction of industrialization" in rural Quebec (1968: 56). Previous to this period, which Guindon benchmarks with Confederation, the rural French-Canadian was "busily involved in reproduction and parochial settlement (1968: 52). Guindon argues that as a rural society, Quebec, by the third quarter of the nineteenth century was faced with a structural crisis. "The stability of the (rural) system" had been maintained "by handing down the family farm to one inheriting son" which meant that "the system required an ever expanding geographical base in order to absorb the surplus population" (1968: 43-44; emphasis added mine). A rural system based on (1) a single-son farm inheritance scheme and (2) the availability of enough arable land within a given territorial unit proved to be an unstable arrangement. Once arable land became a scarce resource in the equation, the traditional society was faced with an internally generated source of strain. Unless suitable farm land outside of Quebec could be found and colonized under the leadership of the traditional elites - the political leaders and the Roman Catholic Church, or new means for rural surplus population absorption found inside Quebec, the system faced a structural crisis. According to Guindon, by Confederation the rural system was faced with surplus rural population seeking arable land (1968: 53).

Ethnic Pluralism Outside Quebec

By accepting Guindon's explanation of ethnic pluralism and the basis for structural strain in Quebec society for the period leading up to Confederation, we might well ask what happened to this surplus rural population since we know that the rural system 'survived' until well into the mid-twentieth century. Industrialization "from above" by "foreign" capitalists has been one explanation offered to account for the source of rural surplus population absorption.

Anglo-Saxon industry moved into a society faced with an acute population surplus, a distinctive political and religious elite, and a developing set of institutions anchored in the rural parish . . . They could invest their capital, open industries, and be supplied with an abundant source of unskilled labour seeking employment. The managerial and technical levels were filled, with no protest, by the incoming group, who also brought along their own set of institutions servicing their own nationals . . . Industry was relieving the economic burden of the demographic surplus of French-Canadian rural society. The local elite's leadership was not being challenged (1968: 56-57).

Industrialization "from above" though did not have a sufficiently profound impact on rural Quebec society until well into the second decade of the twentieth century. What happened to the surplus population in the years between Confederation and the First World War?

Geographic expansion became the only alternative open to both the traditional elites and the young men and women seeking land on which to settle. The routes that could be taken were (1) westward into the Canadian Prairies, (2) south to the industrial towns in New England and the American Mid-West, or (3) internally generated efforts on the part of the Catholic Church towards colonizing new lands in the Quebec hinterland.

Quebec, the Manitoba Act and the Louis Riel Rebellion of 1885:
Ethnic Marginality in the Canadian Prairies

The worst option for the traditional elites (political and religious), but an excellent opportunity for the rural sons and daughters was to work in the industrial towns of New England (MacDonald; 1966: 183-85). Writing in 1891, P. Hamon estimated that over 400,000 French Canadians had become workers in American factories (1891: 173). The number of emigrants from Quebec between 1875 to 1890 had tripled (1891: 174). Nathan Keyfitz has reported that by 1921 a conservative estimate of emigrants from Quebec to the USA was 1 and 3/4 millions (Wade; 1960: 136-37). We can summarize that from 1891 to 1921 over 1 1/4 million French Canadians emigrated to the U.S.A. The lack of sophistication in these statistics due to the fact that neither the Canadian nor the American government kept accurate emigration records still does not erase the trend that a remarkable number of French Canadians left Quebec during the decades from 1880 to 1920. We might conclude that many more people left during this forty year period than in the previous 120 years. This trend was also evident in English Canada, especially Ontario. Donald Creighton, quoting from the Toronto Mail in 1887 states that 'there is scarcely a farm house in the older provinces where there is not an empty chair for the boy in the States' (1957: 354). Even though this trend can rightly be seen as a phenomena that gripped all of Canada, the seriousness with which it was greeted in Quebec was as a crisis of the social system. The social basis from which an important segment of the traditional elite, the Roman Catholic Church drew its authority was located in the farming communities of rural Quebec. Any threat to the social stability of the rural system would at the same time directly jeopardize their authority and indirectly affect the power base of

the political leaders.

What conditions precipitated this option over emigration to Manitoba or colonizing isolated regions within Quebec? What forces were responsible for such a vast exodus of French Canadians out of the country? In part, I am sure that the lure of a better standard of living in the United States contributed to this exodus. Certainly, this ideological factor cannot be seriously treated as the necessary and sufficient condition that explains the location of French-Canadian emigration. Well-established classic sociological tradition holds that ideological and cultural formations can only be adequately understood by reference to the material structures of society. Besides, the Depression of the seventies and the eighties did not result in repatriation to Quebec or to Manitoba. What structural factors can we begin to isolate that may provide a fuller picture?

We could begin by concluding that a lack of historically developed links between the Quebec elites and the population towards the Canadian West would have eliminated this alternative for the rural Quebecers. Norman Macdonald has made the opposite point in that:

"the lure of the West had been in the blood of the French Canadians ever since the days of the fur traders, and the Metis figure prominently in its colourful history. In the hope of arresting their exodus to the U.S.A., Sir John A. MacDonald and George E. Cartier favoured extensive settlement in the West and it has been hinted that 'the Manitoba Constitution was purposely made bilingual in the hope of deflecting the French Canadians from the United States to the West' (1966: 189-90).

The West appeared as an attractive alternative to the overpopulated parishes of rural Quebec. We turn to the history of colonization in the Canadian West up to Confederation in order to get a clearer picture of its ethnic composition and how the settlers viewed their colonies.

The first settlement in the territory was the Selkirk colony founded in 1818. Over 2/3 of the original settlers were Scottish. The remainder were French Canadians. In time, the French Canadians equalled the number of Scottish and English settlers and "because of this ethnic mixture the colony was described as 'un petit Quebec'" (Wade; 1955: 393). The ethnic division of labour in the colony was divided into three tiers. The most influential group were the English who dominated both trade and government, followed by a homogeneous Scottish agricultural group and the more numerous French Canadian and Metis groups who followed an agricultural and semi-nomadic hunting life. Chester Martin has observed that "the policy of building up a smaller Quebec upon the Banks of the Red River had been patiently and successfully pursued for more than fifty years" (1920: 360). Quoting Sir Stafford Northcote at the time of the Manitoba Act, Creighton records that "the French are earnestly bent upon the establishment of a French and Catholic power in the North-West to counteract the great preponderance of Ontario". Their purpose was to fix the character and institutions of the new province at a time when French-speaking Roman Catholics formed a large part of its population, and therefore at the most favourable moment for preparing defences against the approaching influx of Protestant, English speaking settlers" (Creighton; 1969: 6; emphasis added mine).

Let us take a closer look at the MacDonald-Cartier proposal for a bilingual Manitoba. Referred to by Norman MacDonald as "deflecting French Canadians from the United States to Canada", it may be recalled that the Manitoba Act ensured equality for the English and French languages in the legislature and the courts and provided for separate or confessional schools in the newly created province.

To the claim that the provisions of the Manitoba Act of 1870 represented the westward extension of the philosophy of "cultural compact", Creighton in his important article entitled "John A. MacDonald, Confederation and the Canadian West" (1969: 1-9), counters with the argument that the bicultural and bilingual clauses of the Act which dealt with equality of the English and French languages in the legislature, courts and separate (confessional) schools, resulted from Riel's "dictatorship", from the necessity of a quick settlement at Red River and security for Canada's continental destiny. They did not represent, he says, "the carrying out of a solemn commitment to biculturalism which had been made at Confederation". They were imposed by an "exceptional and transitory" set of circumstances and not by an ideal conception of what Canada should be, (1969: 6-7).

What were some of the measures that MacDonald and the Conservative federal government took to insure that the West would never become "un petit Quebec". In 1873, only three years after the Manitoba Act and in the same year as his French-Canadian partner George E. Cartier died, Sir John A. MacDonald introduced a bill into Parliament which founded the North West Mounted Police. In July 1874, three hundred men set out for the northwest. The "fundamental purpose" of the police and the government officials who were soon to follow "was to make ready the land of the west for the coming of settlers. The older order was gone forever" (Creighton; 1957: 360).

What was meant by "the old order"? Which settlers would be enticed to come and would be welcomed in Manitoba? Were the N.W.M.P. sent to Manitoba simply to 'protect' the Indians and Metis from bootleggers or were they also sent as the extension of the federal government whose aim was to inaugurate "a new order" in which the French Canadians living there would become

marginal to the political life of the province? Creighton's interpretation of MacDonald's concessions to the Red River rebels can be understood as a temporary hindrance to the overall policy of immigration from outside Canadian borders. An immigration policy that would emphasize the English-fact in Canada, especially that part of Canada west of Ontario, was to be the tacit design of the Canadian federal government. Obviously, for such a scheme to be successful emigration from Quebec to Manitoba would not be encouraged.

And yet there were men who could read the true intentions of the federal government. One such man was Bishop Taché. As early as 1869, this Roman Catholic leader of the Metis and the French-Canadians living in Manitoba on his return to Rome recorded his bitter feelings on the imminent disappearance of the French fact in the Northwest and the role of the Canadian government as contributing to the demise of French-Canadian society in that territory west of Ontario. Writing to George E. Cartier, he laments his having

always feared the entrance of the North West in Confederation, because I have always believed that the French Canadian element would be sacrificed; but I tell you frankly it had never occurred to me that our rights would be so quickly and so completely forgotten (Martin; 1920: 367).

He turns to the colonization efforts by French Canadian political and religious elites to locate French Canadian settlers in Manitoba. What obstacles did they face? The efforts of one man, Senator Girard, are instructive in this regard.

In March, 1875, the federal government awarded Girard as head of the Colonization Society of Manitoba, four townships in the Red River. There was, however, a major condition: within two years seventy settlers must be located

on them. Girard ran into trouble immediately when he attempted to relocate expatriate French Canadians who had been living in New England onto this Manitoba soil because

"so many Orangemen had settled on its reserve that in one township (alone) there was no room for anyone else, with the result that sixty French Canadians repatriates were reported to have returned to New England. The Society accused the Orangemen of indulging in a racial and religious war, in order to disrupt its work of repatriation".

No matter how many protestations were made by the Society to the federal government "the Orangemen were left in possession of the field" (MacDonald; 1966: 190).

Indications of a policy of foreign immigration into Manitoba as the preferred policy can be gleaned from the account of the government and CPR's efforts to attract southeastern European to Manitoba. From the years 1880 to 1885, the Canadian Government had spent thousands of dollars in vain to entice settlers from South-eastern Europe to come to Canada. In the spring of 1885, agents of the Canadian Pacific Railway in the United States discovered a Hungarian nobleman named Count Paul O de Esterhazy who was more than willing to use his influence to attract his compatriots living and working in the United States to come to Manitoba. Most of these immigrants were under contract labour to work in the Pennsylvania coal mines. But, the U.S. had abolished contract labour in 1882 so that these immigrants could freely move, if they so desired. Esterhazy believed that his countrymen would be well disposed to the idea of settling in the Canadian west as farmers instead of the status of poorly paid mine workers in the United States. Andrew Marchbin records the first encounter between representatives from the Canadian government and Count Esterhazy.

The Canadian Pacific Railway, greatly interested in the colonization of the Company's lands in the West, invited Esterhazy to the Dominion . . . After a personal audience with the Governor-General, Esterhazy made his formal request on May 9, 1885, for the formation of military settlements in the Canadian West; settlements which would be colonized with Hungarians then living in the United States, who, while being trained farmers had also had military experience and could be used in case of rebellion or invasion to defend British interests. The proposal was highly interesting to the government and especially to the Minister of Agriculture the Hon. F.H. Pope. The Department was willing to extend some financial assistance as its officials had long been interested in finding suitable settlers for Manitoba and the North West Territories. (1934: 112; emphasis added mine).

Why would any one man make such a proposal unless he believed, especially after having spoken with the Governor-General, that such an idea would be appealing to certain influential members of the Canadian Federal Government? Why would men within the Federal government approve of such a plan unless they felt that the danger posed by French-Canadians in Manitoba was not only a serious internal matter but contrary to their vision of the west as a unilingual territory.

Had the federal government not been influenced by considerations of ethnicity and language (i.e. an English-speaking nation), the logical decision would have been to invite (and even subsidize) Quebec farmers to settle the west. For what better way of appeasing the anxious Red River Valley French Canadians than by forging a cohesive nouveau Quebec, and alleviating Quebec's over-populated parishes as well? The Canadian Government had clearly not favored such a development.¹

¹ The first successful settlement was called Hun Valley which was under the leadership of Geza de Dory who "not only showed them how to break the land and level the forest but also taught them the English language" (1934: 115).

The Quebec Reaction

How did Quebec view the Red River Rebellions and the Manitoba Act of 1870? Laurier Lapierre has succinctly captured the feeling of Quebec during the years immediately following Confederation when he says:

"In spite of Cartier's presence, French Canadians had begun to experience the pangs of political and racial insecurity almost immediately after 1867. Viewing with alarm the agitation (in Ontario) over the granting of an unconditional amnesty to the French-speaking Metis who had participated in the Riel insurrection of 1869-70, many French-Canadians wondered if Confederation was not already a failure. They became even more concerned when in 1871 the government of New Brunswick ended government subsidies to Roman Catholic schools in the Province. In both cases all attempts to force the federal government to redress what French Canadians considered infringements on their rights failed. Tarte echoes these sentiments 'L'on serait tente de croire qu'il y a une immense conspiration contre la race francaise dans la Dominion'" (1962: 9).

Cartier had died in 1873, the same year MacDonald founded the N.W.M.P. and many French-Canadians at the federal level now felt uncertain as to the degree of their political influence. Such concerns were soon to lead the French-Canadian elites to a drastic change in political alignments.

The main concerns of many French Canadians in both the Liberal and the Conservative Parties prior to 1885 was to forge a co-operative effort at the federal and provincial levels in order to arrest the emigration of French-Canadians from their parishes in Quebec. As we have seen, the attempts to settle repatriated French-Canadians on western soil could not be considered a success. Lapierre echoes the concern of the French-Canadian political elite when he remarks "only seven years after Confederation (1874), French Canadian politicians of every persuasion were viewing the position of their province with dissatisfaction and alarm" (1962: 19).

The Riel Rebellion of 1885 was to seal the fate of French-Canadian aspirations of westward expansion into the Canadian Prairies. It forecast the demise of French-Canadian political influence at the federal level.

The reaction in Quebec was at once quick and decisive and "increased in intensity after Riel was captured and French-Canadians increasingly saw his fate as an indication of their own hope of national survival" (1962: 148).

The federal government was now faced with the "dual problem of choosing between the demands of Quebec and those of Ontario and then of reconciling Quebec to its decision" (Lapierre; 1962: 146).

The consequences of the hanging of Riel were such that "the (French-Canadian) political leaders would not forget the limit of their power which the affair had revealed. The French-Canadian ministers had not been able to influence their colleagues" (Lapierre; 1962: 169). George Stanley also remarks that as a result of the "crisis of 1885, the most conservative province in Canada swung over to the Liberal party, a position which was consolidated by the selection of a French-Canadian, Wilfred Laurier, as leader of that party in 1887" (1960: 381). In the autumn of the same year (1887), five provincial delegations from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba, four of whom were Liberals, met in Quebec to work out proposals for increased provincial powers (Creighton; 1957: 365-66).

Conclusion

The social history of ethnic pluralism in Canada as it affected French-Canadians reveals the emaciation of their society and confinement to the Quebec provincial boundaries. The hypothesis explored in this essay suggests that the events leading up to the Riel Rebellion of 1885 represent the watershed in the westward expansionary hopes of French-Canadians. We have also noted that the federal government's role can be interpreted as one of complicity in the outcome.

This essay has argued that the increase in Quebec's population is a singularly important factor in the relations of a subordinate ethnic group (the French) to the dominant 'charter' group (the English). Whereas the Quebec elites - the Roman Catholic clergy and hierarchy in particular - attempted to influence les jeunes francais to remain within the Dominion and within the established French Roman Catholic Church in Manitoba, the English political elite deemed otherwise.

The death of Riel signalled the end of ethnic dualism, not only in Manitoba, but in all the western provinces. The finality to the process came with the enactment of the Manitoba School Act of 1916 which established English as the sole official language and created a secular public school system for the province. Only in Quebec would the principle of ethnic dualism be enshrined in law and in fact.

The Quebec reaction to the role of the federal government in guaranteeing French-Canadian rights in the nation as a whole from Confederation to the Rebellion of 1885 was one of uncertainty but hope. As we have pointed out, the Manitoba Act of 1870 represented a temporary political compromise. The federal government had been caught off-guard and therefore had to submit to the Rebels'

demands until such time as it could extend and consolidate itself in the western hinterland. The CPR and NWMP represented such structural links. The only recourse left to the political and religious elites in Quebec was to turn inwards. The political elite would demand greater provincial autonomy from the federal government. The claims for more provincial autonomy which it held in common with the other provinces who sought greater freedom of action gave it added strength to realize these demands. The Roman Catholic Church also turned inward and began to sponsor colonization efforts in the hinterland regions of the province. (Ryan: 1966).

The internal demographic factor - the surplus Quebec population - confronted both the dominant and minority group. The political elite of the former effectively prevented dispersion of French-Canadian institutions and culture within the Dominion. The latter political and religious elites have pushed respectively for increased provincial autonomy and up to the Second World War fostered the migration of surplus population within Quebec itself as one way of alleviating the internally generated structural crisis.

The intransigence of the Federal government towards a preferred British and unilinguist Manitoba was carried to that province with the election of Thomas Greenway as Premier in 1888. Greenway ended the use of the French language in government and stopped public support to Catholic schools. T. Peterson has convincingly argued that Manitoba took on a decidedly British character in the period from the Riel Rebellion until well into the twentieth century (1972: 69-115). As a direct consequence of these historical forces the French-Canadians outside Quebec would be relegated to a marginal position in the political sphere. The power of numbers and the Roman Catholic Church as a pressure group would be the only countervailing factors that the French-Canadians outside Quebec could

count on to help preserve their cultural and linguistic rights.

What is more, these historical forces set in motion a collective feeling of distrust by French-Canadians within Quebec towards the Federal government. They also evinced the conviction that only by effectively manipulating the provincial against the Federal political structures could a form of "special status" for Quebec be realized. Unlike the other provincial governments where the demand for increasing autonomy was rooted solely in economic motives, such a demand from Quebec was also linked to cultural and linguistic survival and would be aggressively pursued throughout the twentieth century.

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Embourgeoisement or Proletarianization?

Stan Marshall

Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other; bourgeoisie and proletariat.¹

Marx and Engles' proposition that the system of capitalist relations would inevitably result in a polarization of the two main classes - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - is and has been under considerable debate. The rise of a new middle class which appears to be located between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has sparked speculation that the expected polarization of the class structure would not occur. The debate, of course, centres around whether there are any processes in operation which will have such a polarization as its end result. Two theoretical propositions have been advanced. The first, the proletarianization thesis, asserts that the old and new middle classes are being drawn into the proletariat or working class. The second, the embourgeoisement thesis, argues that the upper levels of the working class are being assimilated into an ever increasing middle class.

This paper will endeavour to examine critically these two hypotheses in order to determine the merits of each in studying the class structure of capitalist societies. In order to accomplish this task it is necessary to allow for the examination of society at the level of production relations as well as at the level of distributive relations. More specifically, the aims of this paper will be (1) to identify the

processes of embourgeoisement and proletarianization in terms of their operation in capitalist society, (2) to determine the composition and location of the "new middle class", and (3) to formulate a basis from which to look at the middle classes of modern capitalist society in order to determine if there has been or will be a significant change in the class structure.

Before this can be accomplished, it is necessary to look at both proletarianization and embourgeoisement in order to determine the emphasis of each thesis. At first glance, it appears that these propositions are polar opposites. However, it is not the case when one looks at the arguments at different levels of analysis. As will be seen later on, G. Carchedi² and Harry Braverman³ both attempt to look at the proletarianization of the middle classes from the level of the economic substructure and changes in the relations to the means of production. On the other hand, the embourgeoisement thesis is primarily concerned with changes in the superstructural elements resulting from a change in consumption patterns and life styles within the working class.⁴

Embourgeoisement has as its major focus the perceived increasing affluence of the western working class.⁵ These changed material conditions and increased opportunities for workers are seen as resulting in a general homogeneity of lifestyles and values. In other words, the traditional working class is seen as developing middle class lifestyles. The argument rests on the increase in the affluence of workers and the perception that material conditions are better for western workers today

than they have ever been at any other time. These improved conditions are seen as being paramount in stifling any development of a working class consciousness. Thus the embourgeoisement process is seen as operating upon the traditional working class in a manner which has changing material conditions resulting in changing values and lifestyles.

Proletarianization has as its major focus the economic or objective conditions which perpetuate the traditional working class and adds to its number by forcing segments of the middle class to become working class. These segments are proletarianized only in an economic sense i.e., their economic identification is with the working class. This does not mean that at any given point in time, their values or behaviour will be the same as production workers. G. Carchedi is one author who recognizes that a proper class analysis must take into account all the analytical components.

...there is no automatic correspondence between the economic identification of classes and their definitions. This is so because classes must be defined in economic, political and ideological terms.⁶

The proletarianization process is seen as operating upon the middle classes in a manner in which the economic (objective) identification of the middle class is changed. Once the economic condition is changed we can expect a corresponding change in the superstructural elements. It is recognized that changes in the political and ideological spheres are not necessarily immediate. However, at its limit, the proletarianization process will result in the middle classes "becoming proletariat".⁷

It is clear that proletarianization is not necessarily opposed to the embourgeoisement thesis. Its basis does not rest entirely upon the assumption that workers are becoming less affluent. Proletarianization refers to a structural transformation in the relation of the worker to the means of production. The embourgeoisement thesis, on the other hand, rests upon the assertion that workers are becoming more affluent and is concerned mainly with distributive relations.

One area where the two theses tend to make opposite projections is in the development of a working class consciousness. Proletarianization supporters claim that changing economic conditions set the stage for a rising working class consciousness while embourgeoisement supporters claim that the material affluence of workers militates against the development of a working class consciousness. These are questions worthy of examination but due to the limited scope of this paper, they can be touched upon only superficially here. It is now necessary to examine each of these processes individually.

Embourgeoisement

The thesis of working class embourgeoisement in its simple formulation is no longer in fashion. But its political corollary has come in again by the back door, with these newer and more sophisticated interpretations of the situation of the "affluent worker".⁸

The studies concerning the "affluent worker" that are the most well known are those of John Goldthorpe, David Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt at Luton in Britain.⁹ These authors set out to determine if workers are becoming "bourgeois". The locale which they chose, they believed to be one in which the conditions would lead to the

embourgeoisement of the workers. For Goldthorpe et al., the test to prove embourgeoisement would be to prove that the acquisition of incomes and living standards by manual workers similar to white collar workers would lead to the adoption of a new social outlook and new social norms that are middle class. The acquisition of this new outlook and these new norms would then have to lead to an acceptance of the manual worker by the middle class on the basis of equality.¹⁰ In this way it was to be a stiff test of the embourgeoisement thesis.

Goldthorpe et al. concluded that the affluent worker is not becoming bourgeois but is becoming a new type of worker whose work is no longer central to his life and whose orientation is "instrumental". This "instrumental" worker is concerned primarily with making money which he can spend on his family. In other words, his "outside of work" activities become his central life interest. Goldthorpe et al., call such a worker the privatized worker and as such he is not middle class. However, this privatization militates against collective organization by the worker and in this way hinders the development of a class consciousness. Privatization does not preclude militancy or radical action but it does decrease the probability that radical action will occur.¹¹

J.H. Westergaard criticizes these studies from both a theoretical and methodological viewpoint. His main criticism is that the authors of these studies do not recognize that the workers' monetary orientation to the job is remarkably similar to Marx's "cash nexus". Marx recognized this "cash nexus" as the binding force in capitalist society.¹²

The interpretation of these studies

...underplays evidence [strikes, industrial sabotage, work stoppages] to indicate the precariousness of the balance between attitudes of cooperation and "societal resignation" on the one hand, and on the other hand those conflicting attitudes involving a generalized social discontent which may be released once the single stranded "cash orientation" becomes strained or broken.¹³

In other words, at any one point in time, the workers may be cooperative and resigned to the workings of the existing society but the cooperation and resignation does not preclude the possibility of action resulting from the continuing conflict once the cash nexus is broken.

Although Goldthorpe et al., make a case for the inaction of the working class, their case is not strong enough to say that workers are becoming bourgeois. In addition, their argument is not strong enough to say that becoming affluent or privatized, eliminates the possibility of some radical action in the future.

For while the affluent workers' "instrumental" orientation to work militates against any radicalization stemming from his employment situation, new and more radical demands may well be engendered by the clash between steadily rising aspirations and the barriers to their achievement in the world outside work.¹⁴

In addition to the possibility of action resulting from the strain on the cash nexus, there is also a possibility of action resulting from the inability of the system to maintain and increase the workers desire for individual upward mobility. If these aspirations are stifled then

the potential for radical action may be stimulated. Up to this point, the possibility of such events taking place are mostly speculative based upon a few isolated labor disputes which have resulted from similar conditions. However, such a possibility cannot be dismissed offhand.

An integral part of the affluence thesis is that blue collar or manual workers' incomes are converging with those of white collar workers. This convergence results in increased consumption by the working class from which results a corresponding identification with the middle class. Richard Hamilton points out that people tend to assume that there was a wide gap between manual and non-manual incomes in the past and that the tendency today is for incomes to converge and overlap.¹⁵ Hamilton disputes this convergence. He maintains that those workers viewed as well-off are in those families in which there is more than one wage earner and that the pattern of work for families of non-manuals is different from that of families formed by manual workers.

Affluent working class families are not like equivalent middle-class families. The majority of well off working-class families achieve "affluence" through a greater expenditure of effort.¹⁶

There are several other differences between so called affluent working class families and middle class families. For example, in middle class families, wives and children are more free from work. In this sense, the determinants of income for middle class are linked to the head of the family's job and career; while working class "affluence" is dependent upon the wife's job and career.¹⁷ In other words, the wife's

income augments the husband's and accounts for the "extras" that the family may buy. One can see that the expenditure of effort in the working class family is significantly different from that of the middle class family.

The acceptance of the idea that incomes are converging i.e., that manual wages are increasing, provides the basis for a theory of general satisfaction in society. However, there are some misconceptions about increasing incomes. Hamilton notes three in particular:¹⁸

- (1) The frame of reference is usually past experience, therefore people perceive that their wages are increasing. They are perceiving an absolute increase as opposed to a relative increase.
- (2) Incomes estimates are often based on hourly rates of pay and people assume full employment at that specific rate. However, they do not consider that many jobs which have high hourly pay rates are not jobs which guarantee year round employment. In many fields, construction for example, year round employment is a rarity.
- (3) The third misconception is related to the first in that there is a perceptual distortion due to continuing inflation. For example, the minimum wage keeps increasing. People remember when the minimum wage was much lower and draw a conclusion that incomes are increasing. This is obviously true in absolute terms but is questionable when viewed in relative terms.

Due to the increasing incomes (in absolute terms), living standards are also assumed to be increasing for the working class and converging with the middle class. Hamilton measured living standards

in terms of home ownership and automobile ownership. He found that the lower middle class¹⁹ and the working class shared a similar life condition, that is, a lower percentage own homes in comparison to the upper middle class and the homes that they do own are less expensive. Similarly, the upper middle class are significantly differentiated from the lower middle and working classes in automobile ownership. The ability to buy new cars varies directly with social class. Hamilton concludes that convergence in income and consumption theses are not well founded. It might appear from Hamilton's work that there is some convergence between the lower middle class and the working class. Associated with this is a problem of definition and identification of the middle class.²⁰

Related to Hamilton's work and corroborating it to some extent is the work of Andrew Levison.²¹ He purposely sets out to dispel some of the myths associated with the embourgeoisement thesis. He attacks the assumption that the majority of Americans²² are white collar workers by pointing out inaccuracies in the census categories researchers use to determine the number of people who make up the white collar or blue collar ranks. He notes especially two instances (1) the lumping of large numbers of clerical and sales occupations into white collar categories and (2) the contention that service categories are something other than blue collar. By rectifying these two situations, he estimates that 60% of America is in the working class.

A second myth which Levison attacks is the myth that blue collar workers earn as much as white collar workers. His procedure for

determining this is directly related to the work of Richard Hamilton. He corrects for inaccuracies in categories used to show the distribution of income. His conclusion is that the working class earns less. Related to the distribution of income is the condition of lifestyle. The myth maintains that blue collar lifestyle is similar to white collar lifestyle. Levison dispels this by noting differences in the lifestyles of working class and middle class families especially in the location of working class areas vis a vis middle class areas. He makes a valid criticism of this myth by saying that the working class and the middle class very seldom come into contact with each other. In other words, the working class are not being assimilated into the middle class. He elaborates by looking at community life. Blue collar life is permeated by economic insecurity and a lower quality of life.²³ In other words, the blue collar worker is not "affluent" in that he does not have job security. In addition the "affluence" of the blue collar worker often refers to the ability to buy a house. It is questionable whether being able to meet such an essential need as shelter constitutes "affluence". There is also a problem of comparability in that working class communities tend to have less expensive homes and their neighborhoods are seldom given the priority that middle class communities are given with regard to services or development.

Even the educational system which was to have opened up opportunities for the working class has failed to do so. There have been many studies documenting middle class bias in the school system, discriminating against working class children.²⁴ At the same time higher

education has become more universal, the educational requirements for jobs (even manual jobs) have shifted upwards. Coincident with this, there are not enough jobs available for those who have a university education. In other words, an increase in education has not resulted in an increase in opportunity within the upper and middle levels of the occupational structure.

Obviously, this paper has not taken the position that the workers are becoming bourgeois. It supports the position that the working class has not decreased and has not become more affluent relative to other segments of society. It is optimistic that the working class is becoming more aware of their objective class condition and that the potential for radical action is reflected in high absenteeism, shoddy workmanship, sabotage, use of drugs, periodic refusals to accept the authority of the foreman, strikes, increasing incidences of rejecting settlements, wild cat strikes, and challenges to incumbent union leaders. In this sense, the working class is alive and retaining its revolutionary potential.

Up to this point, the discussion has revolved around the embourgeoisement or "affluent worker" thesis. As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the central focus of the embourgeoisement thesis lies in the distributive relations in society. This fact is obvious in light of the works discussed here. Although they formulate an effective refutation of the embourgeoisement thesis, the works of Hamilton and Levison tend to be descriptive rather than explanatory. They tend to focus upon a descriptive account of the distribution of surplus in

society rather than those factors which underly changes in the class structure. Moreover, to refute embourgeoisement is not to illustrate proletarianization for the two, as I have argued, are not completely antithetical. With this in mind, it is now necessary to turn to the proletarianization thesis.

Proletarianization

One of the main obstacles to a study of proletarianization has been an inadequate understanding of the class position of those who appear to be in contradictory class positions. This lack of understanding of the class position of the middle classes has led to the criticism that the process of proletarianization is inadequately or improperly defined. In other words, if the criteria for placing individuals in the middle class are not clear, then it is impossible to understand how any process could lead to a deterioration of that class position. However, the work of G. Carchedi has gone a long way to identifying the class location of those who seem to be neither wholly in the bourgeoisie nor wholly in the proletariat. Harry Braverman also acknowledges that this is a problem and both he and Carchedi come to a similar type of conclusion. The most important problem in locating the "middle class" is not that they are a class unto themselves but that they take on characteristics from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Braverman comes to the conclusion this way,

The complexitics of the class structure
of pre-monopoly capitalism arose from
the fact that so large a proportion of

the working population, being neither employed by capital nor itself employing labour to any significant extent, fell outside the capital-labor polarity. The complexity of the class structure of modern monopoly capitalism arises from the very opposite consideration: namely that almost all of the population has been transformed into employees of capital.²⁵

This quotation suggests that it is necessary to make a distinction between the "old" middle class and the "new" middle class. The old middle classes are the petite bourgeoisie - the small businessman and the independent commodity producers. The new middle classes are the managers and supervisors. For Braverman the old middle class is neither bourgeoisie nor proletariat because they lie outside the dominant relations of production i.e., capital-labor-polarity. On the other hand, the new middle class is situated between capital and labor. Their class location becomes difficult to define because they are both manager and worker.

...there is a range of intermediate categories, sharing the characteristics of worker on the one side and manager on the other in varying degrees.²⁶

Implicit in this statement is a recognition that managers and workers carry on different functions and that there is a group of people who are both manager and worker. As such, they must carry out the functions of both these positions. Carchedi makes it very clear that there is a definite distinction between the old and the new middle class. His conclusion is similar to Braverman's in that the new middle class seems to be both bourgeoisie and proletariat. However he introduces specifically that component which we extrapolated implicitly from

Braverman - the idea that functions are important in determining class position.²⁷

Carchedi's main contribution to the controversy surrounding the middle class and whether this sector of the labor force is being proletarianized, is the introduction of the two functions - the function of global capital and the function of the collective worker. It is necessary to try to understand exactly what Carchedi means when he speaks of these two functions and how they enable us to understand the economic identification of the middle class. It is unnecessary to go through the rather lengthy and complex derivations of these definitions as given by Carchedi. Instead the definitions will be borrowed as he finalizes them.

...to perform the function of the collective worker means to take part in the capitalist production process as a whole ... from the point of view of the labour process and thus of the surplus labour producing process. Conversely, to perform the global function of capital means to take part in the capitalist production process as a whole exclusively from the point of view of the surplus labour producing process.²⁸

Put more simply "there will be those who will collectively perform the labour process and those who will supervise".²⁹

Returning to the distinction between old and new middle class, Carchedi makes his distinction very clear. The old middle class (1) owns (legally and economically) the means of production, (2) performs the function of capital and the function of the collective worker, (3) is laborer and non-laborer and (4) is exploiter and exploited.³⁰

However, Carchedi maintains that at the level of production relations, the role of ownership is dominant over the functions performed and thus the old middle class belongs to the capitalist class. However, in the monopoly stage of capitalism, the function of capital becomes the global function of capital which can be performed by agents outside the capitalist class. These agents are the new middle class and are characterized by (1) not owning (legally or economically) the means of production, (2) performing the global function of capital and the function of the collective worker, (3) being laborer and non-laborer and (4) being exploiter and exploited.³¹ Thus the differences between the new middle class and the old middle class according to Carchedi are substantial. The old middle class perform the function of capital individually while the new middle class perform the function in conjunction with the capitalist and with other members of the new middle class. In the old middle class the function of capital is always dominant but in the new middle class either the global function of capital or the function of the collective worker could be dominant at any given time. These are the key points to understanding the new middle class.

...that the new middle class performs the global function of capital even without owning the means of production, and that it performs this function in conjunction with the function of the collective worker, is the basic point for an understanding of the nature of this class.³²

Carchedi claims that the new middle class can perform the two functions (not simultaneously) in varying degrees. The range is from performing exclusively the function of global capital to performing any combination

of the two functions. Any definition of proletarianization formulated at this point must be composed of two elements (1) a change in function performed and (2) a devaluation of labor power. From a completely economic standpoint, proletarianization for Carchedi becomes

...the limit of the process of devaluation of the new middle class' labour-power, i.e., the reduction of this labour-power to an average unskilled level coupled with the elimination of the global function of capital.³³

The phenomena which are associated with proletarianization (lower level of living, unemployment, lowering of lives' conditions degradation of the work process etc.) are manifestations of the devaluation of labor power in conjunction with the stripping away from the new middle class of the global function of capital.³⁴

Carchedi makes one final remark which is central to understanding the process of proletarianization. It is a remark which relates to the beginning of this paper where it is noted that proletarianization has a different focus than embourgeoisement. It was noted that the analysis may focus on the economic, the political or the ideological. Proletarianization is generally focused on the economic while the embourgeoisement thesis is generally focused on the political and the ideological. Carchedi makes it clear that the processes operating in this limited sense will not be sufficient to change the definition of a class.

...we should be careful not to confuse proletarianization with "becoming proletariat". The former term only refers to the economic sphere which, as we know, is not enough to classify groups and strata within one or another class. When the

process of proletarianization has been completed we have only the objective conditions for a certain stratum to become part of the proletariat. There are, however, also political and ideological conditions which must be met before that stratum or group will actually become part of the proletariat.³⁵

With this in mind, we can see that any definition of proletarianization taken from Carchedi will be limited exclusively to the economic sphere and will give us only one dimension to examine in trying to ascertain any changes in the class structure. This is not a criticism of the excellent work Carchedi has done, but is a plea for a more comprehensive definition of proletarianization at both the political and ideological levels as well as at the economic level.

As mentioned previously, Carchedi has opened up a new avenue in the research of proletarianization by introducing the two functions. Previous research, especially that done by Leo Johnson³⁶ and Harry Braverman has provided some empirical substantiation of the devaluation of labor power in Canada as a condition of becoming proletarianized. However, further research is needed in the area to determine if there are changes in the functions performed by the middle class in Canada i.e., changes in the balance of functions performed as described by Carchedi. The devaluation of labor power is adequately documented in many places in Harry Braverman's book Labor and Monopoly Capital.

He highlights the processes of change in the economic sphere which had a resultant change in the objective identification of workers. The introduction of Samuel Taylor's techniques allowed the capitalist to extract far greater surplus value from the worker than ever before.

The advancement of technology allowed the capitalist to usurp control of the work process from the worker. It separated the worker from the conception and planning portion of the labor process. Increasing division of labor in the workshop further removed the worker from engaging in the entire production process. Thus the worker was further degraded.

Braverman indicates that the same processes were occurring in the offices of the capitalist enterprise. The clerical workers were undergoing a process of change as well. The meaning of "clerk" has changed in the transformation from early capitalism to monopoly capitalism. In Carchedi's terms, office workers have had the global function of capital removed from them. Many office jobs are no longer associated with management but with manual labor and have been mechanized in order to increase efficiency. The clerical portion of the new middle class is becoming increasingly proletarianized.

...The process in the course of which the body of salaried employees becomes a mass group rests on the successful attempt to replace the personal experience of the individual by a rational scientific business administration, so that an increasing proportion of the workers can be changed without danger to the efficiency of the enterprise... the salaried employees as a whole are being subjected to a process of decreasing social esteem.³⁷

An excellent example of this process is documented by Joan Greenbaum in Monthly Review, "Division of Labor in the computer field". In this article she documents the rise and fall of computer related occupations.

In a short twenty-year span, work in the computer field has been transformed by capitalism to suit its needs, through carefully planned division of labor.³⁸

Greenbaum describes this rise and fall as the degradation of a technical work force into a "white collar assembly line where control of knowledge is concentrated"³⁹ In addition to the down grading of skills, the situation outlined by Joan Greenbaum also highlights another consequence of the process of the increasing division of labor. This consequence is the formation of a surplus labor force as there is an increasing centralization of computer companies. The centralization compounded the other consequences by continuing the lowering of wages and by further reducing task definitions. The end result seems to be

...lower salaries relative to the cost of living, expansion of clerical like jobs, and a shift away from computer specialists. Technological skill has been removed from all but a handful of workers.⁴⁰

It seems obvious from the foregoing discussion that the devaluation of labor power is integral to any definition of proletarianization and so we must accept it as part of the definition used here.

It is necessary to make a distinction between proletarianization as it affects the "old middle class" as opposed to how it affects the "new middle class". Because of the differences between the two segments of the middle class, proletarianization is going to have a different consequence for each. According to the definition of proletarianization at the economic level, there must be a devaluation of labor power plus a change in the function performed i.e., a shift from the global

function of capital towards the function of the collective worker. However, the proletarianization of the old middle class would have to entail an elimination of the function of capital and thus an elimination of that occupational grouping. This is necessarily so because in the old middle class the function of capital is always dominant as they own the means of production.

The shift away from employment classified as petite bourgeoisie in this century would be an indication that this proletarianization is taking place. The decreasing proportion of the income allocated to the petite bourgeoisie is another indication and is a factor involved in the elimination of those employment sectors.

Leo Johnson documents the decline of the petite bourgeoisie in Canada. This decline is illustrated in a drop in their relative numbers from 14.7% of income earners in 1948 to 10.9% in 1968. In addition the petite bourgeoisie have become relatively more impoverished in terms of income during that period. The petite bourgeoisie income as a percentage of the average income decreased from 120% in 1948 to 94% in 1968.⁴¹ This decline occurred for both the small independent commodity producer, especially the small farmer, and the small independent businessman, although for each of these subgroups the decline was at different rates. We have already documented the tendency of capitalism to erode the new middle class and now we see an even more startling erosion of the old middle class.

Thus far the paper has dealt with the emphasis of both the embourgeoisement and proletarianization theses. In doing so it has highlighted

and refuted the embourgeoisement thesis as being an inaccurate and incomplete assessment of the changing class structure. This paper has accepted the proletarianization thesis as being infinitely more amenable to empirical research which would allow for a complete and indepth analysis of the class structure. The embourgeoisement thesis is deficient in that it concentrates on the distributive relations and the superstructural elements in society. This deficiency is a fundamental one in that it neglects changes in the production relations and it is these changes which are determinant and dominant over changes in the superstructure.⁴² Conversely, the proletarianization argument uses this as its very starting point. If any criticism can be made of this approach, it is that it rarely progresses past this starting point i.e., it is concerned almost entirely with the economic level of analysis. What needs to be developed is a more comprehensive definition and examination of proletarianization which would account for the political and ideological levels as well.

Basically the conclusion which must be reached at this time is that it is an empirical question as to whether the formation of the "new middle class" is a class with middle class characteristics or a class with traditional working class characteristics. Either way, the most appropriate way to analyze it is to prove or disprove the increasing deterioration of the old and new middle classes in conjunction with the continuing proletarian condition of the traditional working class. What follows is a very brief outline of how this may be accomplished.

As mentioned earlier the new and old middle classes have to be

treated somewhat differently. A deterioration in the old middle class will be detected by an absolute decrease in the percentage of the population making a living in the petite bourgeois occupations. However, this in itself is not sufficient in that a corresponding increase must be found in occupations which are traditionally working class or are devalued new middle class occupations. In this way there must be a change over time in the occupational groupings. There are several indicators which can be used to detect these changes. The devaluation of occupations can be tested by analyzing the income (including benefits) changes over time. A devaluation in labor power will lead to corresponding devaluation in income of that group relative to the incomes of other occupational groupings. This analysis could be used to check the embourgeoisement thesis as well by checking the incomes of traditional working class occupations relative to other occupations.

Another aspect which has to be examined in the changing class locations of occupations is the innovation of technology. It is necessary to look at how diversified jobs have become as a result of the implementation of technology. The result could have either of two consequences (1) routinization i.e. a more complex job is broken down into two or more additional, more routine, less skillful jobs or (2) technological rationalization i.e. several jobs are brought together into one job which does not demand as much skill as the original jobs. Either way, it is an indication that the labor power of those performing the jobs has been devaluated. The most obvious consequence should be a reduction in the relative income of those occupations.

Not unrelated to the above is the degree of unemployment in occupational sectors. Rationalization of jobs due to technological change can result in large numbers of unemployed. Before an occupation is devalued there should be a high demand for workers in that area. As devaluation takes place the supply of workers capable of filling devalued positions should outstrip the demand. Therefore, an indication of devaluation should be a large number of unemployed who are qualified to work in that occupational sector.

Other variables which have to be considered include trade union activity, male-female occupations, and education and experience. The trade unions could have the effect of obscuring some of the obvious differences in income differentials. At the same time, increased trade union activity in occupational sectors where there has been little activity previously may be an indication that the workers are becoming aware of the deterioration of their position. It matters not whether the activity is a result of their becoming proletarian or a reaction against their becoming proletarian. The same obvious indicator, increased trade union activity, is still there. The sexual differentiation among occupations is important in looking at proletarianization. One must determine whether occupations with a high proportion of female manpower are more prone to deterioration than those with mainly male manpower or whether women are drawn into jobs where the deterioration process has already begun. The amount of experience and education required for performing jobs must be analyzed to determine if there is a deterioration of these qualifications in certain sectors relative to other sectors.

The brief discussion given above states some of the factors which may be examined in a study of the devaluation of labor power. However, if one follows Carchedi's definition, then the functions which the agents perform must be analyzed as well. In this case the operationalization is somewhat more difficult. The function of global capital may be related to the work of supervision and control. The function of the collective worker occurs when the agent takes part in the labor process.⁴³

If over any two time periods the function of the job shifts from that of global capital to that of the collective worker then the occupation is becoming more proletarian. In order to research this type of change it is necessary to look at such variables as (1) supervisory duties of the job and (2) the amount of control over other employees the job requires.

Obviously the investigation of the changes occurring in the middle classes is an exceedingly difficult and imposing task. This task has been touched upon only very superficially in this paper but it is a topic worthy of much more intensive scrutiny.

NOTES

1. Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. The Communist Manifesto, New York: International Publishers, 1st published 1848. p.9.
2. Carchedi, G. "On the economic identification of the new middle class" in Economy and Society, 1975.
3. Braverman, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capital, Monthly Review Press 1974.
4. These superstructural elements are the political and the ideological.
5. The embourgeoisement thesis was most popular in the 1950s and 1960s. Some of its major proponents were Kurt B. Mayer, Class and Society, New York: Random House, 1955; Ferdinand Zweig, The Worker in an Affluent Society, London: Heinemann, 1961; and Gerhard Lenski, Power and Privilege, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
6. G. Carchedi op. cit. p.59.
7. The difference between "proletarianization" and "becoming proletariat" will be expounded upon later in this paper.
8. Westergaard, J.H. "The rediscovery of the cash nexus" in Socialist Register, 1970, p.113.
9. This study is published in three volumes. (1) The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behavior, Cambridge University Press, 1968, (2) The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behavior, 1968 and (3) The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, 1969.
10. Goldthorpe, J.H. et.al. The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, 1969, p.24. Also see J.H. Westergaard. op.cit. p.113.
11. Studies conducted by W.G. Runciman, Relative Deprivation and Social Justice, 1966 and R.T. McKenzie and A. Silver, Angels in Marble: Working Class Conservatives in England, 1968 lend support to the conclusions of Goldthorpe et.al. pertaining to the development of the working class. Workers are described as "secular and pragmatic" "instrumentally oriented" and "privatised".
12. J.H. Westergaard. op.cit. p.120.
13. Ibid. p.121.
14. Ibid. p.132.

15. Hamilton, Richard. Class and Politics in the United States, New York: Wiley, 1972, p. 378.
16. Ibid. p.369.
17. Ibid. p.371.
18. Ibid. pp.380-381.
19. By using this type of designation for classes, Hamilton differs somewhat from the conception of classes used in this paper. A more fully developed definition of class will be attempted later in a discussion of the middle class which is integral to the proletarianization thesis. However, for the purposes of illustrating the problems of the embourgeoisement thesis, Hamilton's concept of class can be accepted here.
20. Harry Braverman, op. cit. and G. Carchedi, op. cit. address themselves to this problem and lend support to the thesis of proletarianization of certain segments of the middle class.
21. Levison, Andrew. The Working Class Majority, New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, Inc. 1974.
22. Levison uses strictly American data gathered from the U.S. census and the Dept. of Labor statistics.
23. See also Richard Sennett and Jonathon Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class, New York: Vintage Books, 1973.
24. For example, see Marion R. Porter, John Porter and Bernard Blischen, Does Money Matter? Prospects for Higher Education, Toronto: Institute for Behavioral Research, York University, 1973.
25. Harry Braverman, op. cit. p.404.
26. Ibid. p.405.
27. André Gorz, in an earlier article "Technical Intelligence and the capitalist division of labor" in Telos, 1972, points out that functions are important in the process of capital accumulation.

...we shall not succeed in locating technical and scientific labor within the class structure of advanced capitalist society unless we start analyzing what functions technical and scientific labor perform in the process of capital accumulation and in the process of reproducing capitalist relations. (p.27).

Gorz's statement, although it is speaking specifically of scientific and technical employment, could be applied to all those middle levels of employment which seem to be both proletariat and bourgeoisie.

28. G. Carchedi, op. cit. p.43.
29. Ibid. p.43.
30. Ibid. p.50.
31. Ibid. p.51.
32. Ibid. p.51.
33. Ibid. p.65.
34. Ibid. p.66.
35. Ibid. p.66.
36. Johnson, Leo. "The development of class in Canada in the twentieth century" in Gary Teeple (ed.) Capitalism and the National Question in Canada, University of Toronto Press, 1972.
37. Harry Braverman, op. cit. pp.350-351.
38. Greenbaum, Joan. "Division of labor in the computer field" in Monthly Review, vol.28, July-August, 1976, pp.40-55. See also John and Barbara Ehrenreich, "Hospital workers: a case study in the 'new working class'" in Monthly Review, vol.24, #8, Jan. 1973.
39. Ibid. p.41.
40. Ibid. p.42.
41. Leo Johnson, op. cit. p.148, table 1. These figures are for the total petite bourgeoisie. Also Harry Braverman, op. cit. notes these same changes in the occupational structure especially in the drastic reduction in the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture.
42. The political and ideological can react back upon the economic in a form of overdetermination. However, they react back upon the economic only within the limits set by the economic substructure.
43. This may be either productive or unproductive work. Both Carchedi op. cit. and Leo Johnson op. cit. allow that non-productive workers can be part of the working class and thus perform the function of the collective worker. However, Nicos Poulantzas, "On Social Classes" in New Left Review, 1973 assigns non-productive workers to the middle class specifically on the grounds that they are unproductive. Thus for both Carchedi and Johnson the proletarianization of non-productive workers in the middle class is possible without changing their unproductive nature, while for Poulantzas this proletarianization is not possible save for a change from unproductive work to productive work.

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SOCIAL MOBILITY: CURRENT THRUSTS (AND NON-THRUSTS):
A CRITICAL APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS OF MOBILITY

Jan Mayer

"...the most important thing...that we can know about a man is what he takes for granted, and the most elemental and important facts about a society are those that are seldom debated and generally regarded as settled."

(Louis Wirth, preface to Karl Mannheim's *IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA*, 1936, xxii, cited in Pease, Form and Rytina, 1970: 127)

In the sections which follow, various aspects of mobility research will be examined, beginning in Section II with a brief summary of various approaches which have been taken. The discussion of the sources and functions of social mobility in industrial societies leads to a discussion of the relationship between mobility and industrialization trends, including changes in the occupational structure. The paper ends with a critique of some of the dominant assumptions and lacks of attention in mobility research. The title of the paper indicates a certain skepticism with regard to any progression to date towards shedding light on the "taken for grantedness" of the mobility researcher's world, which encourages a narrow focus on some elements to the exclusion of others. Some reasons why this is so are suggested in the concluding section.

I INTRODUCTION: THE MEANING OF MOBILITY

The theory of social mobility, Goldhamer informs us in the *INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*, attempts to account for the frequencies in movements of individuals, families and groups from one social position to another. As Moore (1966: 195) notes, such movements may be in terms of location, relative position, sector or industry, in terms of lateral or occupational moves, or in terms of employer. Movements may be intra-generational (career mobility) or inter-generational (change from father's to offspring's status). Clearly, some types of mobility will be of more importance than others when such questions as degrees of opportunity or social inequality are raised.

The subject of social mobility is an element in the more general study of "social selection"--the distribution of people into positions in social structures, with positions in turn varying in terms of three major "scarce and desirable" social rewards: income (or material goods), prestige, and power. Thus, there is a relationship between the stratification system of a society and mobility within it--an "open" class system produces a certain kind and degree of mobility distinct from more closed "estate" systems or nearly rigid caste systems. Different mechanisms or processes

are said to operate in each type, and these types have a relationship to the type of society--agrarian or industrial, and within industrial, whether "market" (capitalist) or "command" (Soviet-type) systems.

Industrialism and its impact on the stratification system and implications for mobility will be examined in Section IV. At this point, however, it is important to note a number of general features of social structures which determine forms mobility will take in different societies. Smelser and Lipset (1966: 8-11) identify three such features: (1) "ascription" or "achievement" as the institutionalized basis of legitimation for movement, implying collective and individualistic bases respectively; (2) the degree to which differentiation in the kinship, religious, economic, and political institutions makes for differential status of individuals among the dimensions of wealth, power and prestige (a high degree of formal segregation existing in highly institutionally differentiated social structures making it easier for individuals to move on the basis of a single role); and (3) the locus of control of sanctions (rewards)--and if in the hands of a few, the degree to which these concentrations coincide in various institutional orders.

Smelser and Lipset (:2) also make the point that economic development (specifically, industrialization) requires more movement, or at least different forms of movement, and that the ease or difficulty of such movements will depend on the social structure of that society--there is an "emerging tension" between the "demands" of the developing structure and the characteristics of traditional structures. Social systems, in their view, have certain "directional tendencies" and certain resources, which are linked by social structure in terms of basic units: roles and social organization (clusters of roles). Systems have "functional imperatives" which must be met if systems are to survive: the economic, political, and "integrative" (norms, values, culture) are basic. These imperatives are interrelated, both in terms of interdependence and also in terms of the way in which sanctions produced in one may be used or involved in complex interchanges in another context, to produce other sanctions (e.g. wealth transformed as power, or education as information). Thus the stratification system must be seen in terms of roles characterized by different (and differential) receipts of sanctions; roles, organizations, individuals or classes may be seen as stratified on the basis of these distributions (:2-7). To the functionalist, stratification (and hence inequality) is both necessary and inevitable if efficiency and survival of the social system are to be assured. Historical and empirical data have at least confirmed the ubiquitousness of stratification.

Parkin (1973: 49) states that "as a rough general estimate, between a quarter and a third of those born into the manual working class in modern Western countries will move into the ranks of the middle class."--and for most of these, as Blau and Duncan (1967) have found, mobility will involve only short-range changes, such as to low white-collar positions, with the less usual cases, Parkin notes, becoming mobile by entry into middle-class professions.

McRoberts' (1975) survey of the literature shows that mobility, whether up or down, occurs in single "steps" (i.e. to adjacent categories) (:7).

Lipset and Zetterberg (1966: 566; first published 1956), using only the statistically crude comparative tools available at the time, concluded that most western industrial societies revealed roughly the same "high" rate as the U.S., but perhaps it would be preferable to say "low" (for obviously, what one regards as evidence of an acceptable rate of mobility will be a normative judgment). (Rates of mobility, however, were not related to differences in income inequality)

These findings have been confirmed by more recent comparisons which show that there is little difference in mobility between countries at different levels of economic development, having different normative orientations or class structures (McRoberts, 1975: 7; from Muller and Laver, 1973). As for the United States over time, for example, Duncan (1968) concludes that the data to the 1950's tell a "monotonously repetitive story"--no regular increases or decreases in the magnitudes of correlations to be expected if stratification were becoming less rigid since about World War I, that is, no trend either towards increasing or decreasing mobility (:711). Moreover, Blau and Duncan's (1967: 424) findings indicate that manual workers are less likely than others to achieve an occupational status different from that of their fathers. They identify the three major class divisions in terms of manual/non-manual and blue-collar/farm as manifested in inter-generational and intragenerational mobility matrices; the lowest white-collar and lowest blue-collar categories, located just above the class boundaries, apparently serve as channels for upward mobility, while self-employed groups are largely "self-contained" (:422).

II APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF MOBILITY

Perhaps the most striking aspect of mobility research over the decades is how little it has progressed. Duncan, as cited in the introductory section, concluded that the results of his research were "monotonously repetitive"; the same could be said about mobility research in general. Research has been dominated by the questions "What factors affect mobility?" and "How 'open' a society is this?" (or more often, "What is the rate of mobility?"). Some different kinds of questions have recently been raised, but as will be shown in the concluding section, even these have fallen short of the mark in terms of a contribution to a more encompassing understanding of the mechanisms, consequences, and structural-causal roots of lack of mobility, the other side of the coin which comes closer to the heart of questions of inequality, "relative deprivation," and the like.

Goldhamer highlights one objection to the mobility-measurement enterprise:

"...moral and political critiques of society must rest not on distributions of children's status by parents' status.. but on the nature of the processes that produce these distributions." (INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA..; :430)

Obviously, such questions are not contained within the limits of statistical inference--they must be placed there through theory which guides data-gathering and interpretation, and what is included in theory as relevant depends upon the researcher's bias and the bias of the dominant mode of thinking he accepts. What is absent in the theory will not magically appear in the statistics.

Duncan (1968) dates the methodological emphasis on measurement from the 1940's with the publication of an article by Sibley (1942). Up to that time only Cooley and Sorokin had made some contribution to an understanding of mobility. But even Sibley's work had no data on vertical mobility per se, only on net shifts in the occupational structure as presumed evidence for past mobility.

Sibley's focus was on structural factors--demography, in terms of immigration and differential fertility, and on the educational system as a mechanism facilitating selection of talent and merit. Between that time and about 1952, most writers were concerned with the "rigidification" thesis--that the opportunity structure of America had rigidified or that people had "lost the belief" in the possibility of mobility. It was not until Natalie Rogoff's 1953 study, with its "methodological elegance," that any significant data was brought forward, according to Duncan; her finding was that there had been no significant changes in mobility rates between 1910 and 1940.

McRoberts (1975: 2-6) defines three main approaches to the study of mobility. These are all approaches at the "macro," societal level, as distinguished from much rarer "micro" approaches such as that of Harrison White in CHAINS OF OPPORTUNITY (1970), in which a mathematically sophisticated "systems" analysis is applied to the mechanisms of mobility within organizational settings involving populations within them. All three "macro" models, the "matrix," "status-attainment," and "life-history" approaches, are essentially mathematical models, relating variables together and searching out statistical associations.

The earlier approach uses a matrix of father's occupation and son's current occupation (father's occupation represented at approximately mid-career by specifying his occupation at the point when the son was 16); the matrix describes the amount of mobility in a society intergenerationally.

The status-attainment approach goes further. Initially developed by Blau and Duncan (1967), the model introduces the variables of father's education, respondent's education, and respondent's first job on completion of education. It attempts to account for factors which contribute to the transformation of son's origin status into son's present status, but also allows for an examination of the relationship between educational attainment and status attainment independent of origin, through the statistical method of path analysis, which also allows the introduction of other factors thought to be relevant (McRoberts :2-6). As Duncan (1968: 681) explains it:

"The rigidity of stratification, in this sense [i.e. intertemporal predictability greater than chance], is measured by the intergenerational correlation or coefficient of association...to be distinguished from the degree of inequality, which refers to the extent of differentiation on a relevant scale of rewards...".

The analysis "places" the present generation on an occupational scale relative to placement of the father, but little more.

Aside from the limitations of the model, a number of methodological problems come to mind: first, the impact of structural change on occupational categories (this is addressed in section IV); second, the question of scaling of positions in terms of whether a "step" from one occupation to another always has the same significance (a point raised by Goldhamer :430 and also by Smelser and Lipset, 1966: 18, particularly in terms of the autonomy and social relations connected with jobs). The Elau and Duncan model appears to be able to deal with the first but not the second objection.

The life-history approach (which McRoberts thinks of not as distinct from but as an extension of the status-attainment model) places its emphasis not so much on inter-generational movement but on the process of intra-generational (career mobility) movements and factors in the opportunity structure (1975: 7). As developed in the later work of Katalie Rogoff (now Ramsøy) in the Norwegian occupational life-history study (1974), the focus is on "the socio-economic life cycle of a cohort" and on the distances between groupings in terms not only of societal goods but "bads" (the distribution of negative rewards such as unemployment, illness, work discomforts, and factors usually labelled "quality of life").

Ramsøy questions "how effective the occupational system is as a transmitter of the rewards involved in the stratification system." (:14), noting that occupational status has been found to account for "relatively little of the variance in income in the United States." (:15). The Norwegian study found it accounted for only 22% of the variance in income (:18). Education and occupational status correlated .70 (slightly less than half of the variance), the highest correlation obtained (:19). Ramsøy also pointed to the possibility in there being a trend towards education bringing a lower monetary return than it did in the past (:22). Although she did not raise the question, a relevant concern of research would seem to be the variance unaccounted for--what is there in the structure of industrial (specifically, capitalist) societies which perpetuates inequality and lack of mobility?

III SOURCES AND FUNCTIONS OF MOBILITY

As mentioned in section I, Sibley's (1942) analysis of mobility focussed on structural conditions, including the demographic "clues" of immigration, which aided mobility of native Americans by injecting a large number of unskilled workers into the bottom end of the labour force, and fertility differentials between the

lower and higher occupational classes, which created a surplus at the lower end who could move up the social ladder to fill places left vacant there due to lower rates of reproduction. Two other sources of upward mobility Sibley identified were continuing technological progress, and the ability of the educational system to outfit people for positions of skill and responsibility. As Sibley suspected immigration and differential fertility might eventually be "dwindling sources of upward mobility," he placed great emphasis on the educational system rather than on the effects of technology for upgrading the labour force, since he also noted the appearance of the offsetting effects of unemployment. He saw the future of technological progress as depending on the "ability of the nation's leaders to readjust political-economic institutions so as to produce a genuine 'economy of plenty.'" (:325), thus preventing political unrest and polarization into distinct classes.

An important mechanism of stratification is intergenerational transmission of status including not only those parental statuses which influence offsprings' opportunities and orientations, such as parental occupational status and educational attainment, but also, as Duncan (1968: 683) points out, such ascribed statuses as racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious group membership. Other factors which affect mobility are inheritance of property, wealth or "intangibles," genetics, socialization, access to opportunities, advantages or handicaps of environment, and something which Duncan calls "differential association," which includes items such as assortive mating, which place constraints on the socialization field or act as limits on access to opportunity (:685).

Causes of mobility identified in the literature may be divided into two types--those which are structural in nature such as demographic factors and occupational structure as related to industrial development, the creation of vacancies; and those which are "individual" in nature: genetic (intelligence, native ability) conditioned by environment, education, training, motivational factors (aspirations to achieve and to be mobile), and valuational (cultural orientations and belief in mobility as a good end) (see Lipset and Bendix, 1959; Goldhamer; Lipset and Zetterberg, 1966; Blau and Duncan, 1967).

It can be argued that much of the latter concern constitutes an "individualistic bias" in the literature, inasmuch as it places a great deal of responsibility for success or failure on the individual rather than on social conditions (as, for example, Lipset and Bendix's 1959: 286-7 statement that "the cumulation of disadvantages at the bottom of the social scale is in large part the result of a lack of interest in educational and occupational achievements" which cannot be attributed solely to the environment but to individuals' defence mechanisms against psychological burdens of mobility). By focussing undue attention only on the characteristics of mobile versus non-mobile individuals qua individuals, attention is drawn away from characteristics of social structures and of social groupings relative to one another--that is, from the relationship between existing social arrangements and social classes, in the Weberian and Marxian senses.

Smelser and Lipset (1966) argue that "status values"--a "strong concern for social mobility in a society"--will contribute to economic growth because those desiring mobility success "will seek ways to maximize resources" (:20). Their distinction, cited earlier, between ascription- and achievement-oriented societies is important here--in societies where emphasis is on ascribed status of people based on kin groupings, "particularistic" rather than "universalistic" standards will tend to prevail, and so impede the workings of meritocratic principles to seek out and elevate talent--principles which are applicable to individuals and not to like groupings. Thus, according to these theorists, "This phenomenon of increasing individual mobility appears to be one of the universal consequences of industrialization" (:12). Blau and Duncan (1967: 430) also express a belief that "expanding universalism" (the prevailing of objective criteria of evaluation of individuals over particularistic and subjective bases of evaluations) are causes of mobility, since such criteria become tied to a concern of individuals with materialistic values and hence to an interest in achievement and efficiency. For technological progress and efficiency to continue, the social system has to be such that "The great potential of society's human resources can be more fully exploited in a fluid class structure with a high degree of mobility" (:431). Hence class lines which restrict mobility are a waste of human talent.

The assertion of the democratizing and politically stabilizing effects of industrialization and hence mobility has been expressed by many writers, among them Blau and Duncan (1967: 439), and also by Lipset and Bendix (1959), although the latter also remark that it is a strong belief in mobility, aside from the actual rate, which has the stabilizing influence (:260). Lipset and Zetterberg (1966: 571) observe that it is strains introduced by thwarted mobility aspirations which predispose individuals towards more extreme political views. They see a consequence of economic development being a potential tension in contradictions between the aristocratic and egalitarian sentiments, where egalitarianism is a characteristic of mature industrial societies.

The functions of mobility are also taken up by Lipset and Bendix (1959: 260-265) in connection with the impact of rapid industrialization creating structural instabilities and disrupting orderly political processes through such factors as conflicts between individual aspirations and kin loyalties, or between emphasis on personal achievement and the management of failure; they speak of the "social and psychic costs" of high rates of mobility. This concern is also expressed by Tumin (1970), who views the emphasis of mass societies on mobility strivings and the success ethic as creating: (1) fragmentation of the social order into status-competing groups each striving to emulate higher groups and shut out lower ones, (2) a move away from the belief in the dignity of work and work for its own sake to a cynical instrumental use of work as a means to the ends of social and financial success, and (3) a "cult of gratitude" among those who are mobile, blunting social criticism and reinforcing an acceptance of the "status quo" (:335-338). Tumin's overriding concern, however, does not appear to be for individuals or for social classes, but rather for social

stability and cohesion of society. Tumin's functionalist (and conservative) concern for the social system makes of individuals merely means for the ends of "system needs," it would seem.

Although Blau and Duncan (1967: 402) identified social origins, career preparation, and first job as important conditions for occupational success, they also argued that it is the "basic structural features" of industrial society which are the source of high rates of occupational mobility, and expressed a faith that technological progress would continue to improve chances for upward mobility by making possible the shift from primary and secondary to tertiary industry (especially in professional and semi-professional services), thus expanding the occupations at the top of the hierarchy, contracting the bottom, and acting as a vehicle for upward mobility (:426-429). This is the thesis of the general upgrading of the labour force which many writers have seen as basic to the process of industrialization, and these remarks will thus serve as a suitable introduction to the critical issues raised in the next section.

IV INDUSTRIALIZATION, SOCIAL STRUCTURE, AND MOBILITY

The assertion of the occupational upgrading of the labour force as a result of advanced industrialism, and the assertion of the increasing homogenization of class groupings arise from two kinds of social structural analysis which are closely related: the "logic of industrialism" model as exemplified by Clark Kerr (see Goldthorpe, 1966: 649; see Ossowski's statement cited in Lipset and Bendix, 1959: 281), and the "post-industrial society" thesis as exemplified by Daniel Bell (see Rinehart, 1975: 83-88). Both of these approaches have been much criticized for their lack of accord with empirical facts, and they will not be dealt with here. However, they both share the "upgrading" thesis in common and it is this aspect which has important implications for mobility theory.

Although Goldthorpe (1966: 651-3) agrees that in general, industrial societies appear to have higher rates of mobility than non-industrial societies, it does not follow that industrial society is in essence "open" or "meritocratic" or that high rates of mobility are inevitable consequences of technology, increasing specialization and the need for talent expressed in the division of labour. He cites two sources of counter-argument: after Kolko and Myrdal, Goldthorpe argues that levelling in some ranges of the income distribution (as, for example, a swelling of the middle ranks) does not mean more equality, since other trends may be operating--the gap between top and bottom may have remained the same or have widened (indeed there is evidence that in some nations, this latter appears to be the case). Moreover, Goldthorpe points out, increased inter-generational mobility as indicated by the data may be associated with an actual limitation on intra-generational, or career, mobility.

Lipset and Zetterberg (1966: 567) argue that the expansion in white-collar positions at the expense of manual creates a "surge of upward occupational mobility to the extent that new industrial labour is

drawn from farm areas." Although they cite a study by Bendix which shows a parallel trend in a number of western industrial countries towards an increase in administrative employees per 100 production workers since the beginning of this century, they give no evidence to support the argument that in general white-collar work represents upgrading, or that a move from farm work to industrial manual work represents upward mobility.

Far from representing upgrading, Rinehart (1975: 86) argues that the swelling of white-collar ranks has not occurred at the expense of manual work but at the expense of farm, and that in 1971 the overwhelming majority of white-collar workers (six out of ten in clerical and sales) were engaged in low-level white-collar work, and that within the category "professional and technical," 70% were semi-professional or technical workers not involved in the complex and challenging "knowledge-work" attributed to them by post-industrial society theorists. Moreover, he indicates there is evidence that people are becoming over-educated for their jobs (:87). An extended argument is made by Braverman (1974) for the increasing "deskilling" of much work which previously demanded higher amounts of skill and thought, through the process of subdivision of tasks and the separation of conceptualization from execution of tasks, with control of conceptualization and execution in the hands of high-ranking members of hierarchies or their agents. Thus, in effect, much of what may appear to resemble mobility from blue-collar to low-level white-collar and the proliferation of low-level technicians is in actuality a process of "proletarianization" of increasing proportions of the labour force. These arguments would point to a form of downward mobility as more blockages are introduced into the occupational structure, or at minimum, that relative position in terms of class distribution has remained the same despite changes in the nature of work.

Despite the fond hopes of some of the structural theorists cited here, attempts at measuring structural (occupational) trends also lend support to the interpretation that the progression of industrialism has not resulted in increased mobility--as for example is shown by Natalie Rogoff's 1953 finding that when changes in the occupational structure were "standardized out", a major factor in mobility changes between 1910 and 1940 was accounted for (cited in Moore, 1966: 196). Although Moore recognizes that skill dilution rather than upgrading is a possibility of structural change (:197) and that it is not clear why some white-collar occupations are termed "head" work (such as typists) while some blue-collar jobs are "hand" work (such as linotypists) (:206), he argues that "it is generally true that occupations commonly classified as non-manual require somewhat higher educational levels and...yield higher incomes." (:206). The question of certification through education will be addressed shortly.

Arguments for upgrading (and hence, sources of mobility) tend to take on a curiously circular cast. Occupations which require more education often do so as a result of decisions by employers and may have nothing to do with job content. A listing of occupations in some kind of rank-order says little about differences in authority or job-content between two adjacent categories and may in fact be

a reflection of other factors, such as income differentials which may be the result of unionization or its absence. Status rankings on which objective rankings are in part based have experienced little change in consensus over the years or from country to country because they are part of the dominant definition of reality. The last point refers to Parkin's insight that through socialization into or by dominant-class ideologies, people learn not the placement of every occupation in the scale but rather, "the criteria by which positions are to be ranked...certain criteria become institutionalized as 'relevant' for ranking purposes, while other criteria are excluded or defined as 'irrelevant'." so that technical expertise, skill, or responsibility are accepted by subordinate classes as relevant for high prestige, and not physical effort, danger, or dirtiness (1973: 42). If the assertion of occupational upgrading is based upon upgrading in status, and status is a subjective dimension, then a serious point of confusion is introduced into what is purported to be an attempt to measure objective phenomena.

Since Blau and Duncan's task was to measure the extent to which a man's occupational achievements depended on occupational status of his father, the question of occupational changes was a crucial one. The issue, as Duncan sees it, is "whether occupational status... is sufficiently stable over time as to permit meaningful inter-temporal comparisons..." (1968: 705). Duncan's "strong presumptive evidence" of stability was based on income positions and on prestige rankings, and he concluded that the occupational status structure is subject to such small "random shocks" that changes cumulate very slowly and have thus not affected the statistics to an appreciable degree (:709). It could be argued equally as well, following Parkin, that after all, there has been no major overturning of the criteria by which the dominant view accords status, and no major questioning of its legitimacy. The question of whether or not an occupational structure has been "upgraded" cannot be answered by reference to a scale but involves other criteria and other kinds of observations. If upgrading cannot be shown, then one is left only with data which indicates there has at best been no change in the occupational structure, however much it may have changed in other ways, to make any difference to mobility.

Before proceeding to some general critical comments, it will be in order to discuss one other aspect of the industrialization arguments which pertains to what might be described as "the myth of increasing rationality" and "the myth of increasing universalism." Since a highly sophisticated industrial society needs efficiency and rational means for allocating ability, so Blau and Duncan's argument went, "Objective criteria of evaluation that are universally accepted increasingly pervade all spheres of life and displace particularistic standards of diverse ingroups, intuitive judgments, and humanistic values not susceptible to empirical verification." (1967: 429).

However, in "Strategies of Social Closure in Class Formation," Parkin (1974) puts forward a different interpretation of the use of universalistic criteria. He distinguishes between two historically distinct ways in which dominant groups exclude others

from claims to social rewards: "classes of nomination" are the product of rules of exclusion "that single out the specific attributes of individuals rather than the generalized attributes of social collectivities" (:6) which are the historically older "classes of reproduction." He points out that individualistic rules of exclusion operate within societies dominated by the "liberal ideal." The establishing of universal criteria for evaluating individuals in the form of "credentialism" is a way of controlling entry to valued positions to those qualified, using seemingly impersonal means, but universalism is distorted when the "means of credentialism" are monopolized by one social group, and by the transmission of "cultural capital" which introduce "socially inherited handicaps and easements" that are de facto types of collectivist exclusion and class reproduction (:7-8).

Certain desired social qualities (that is, desired by groups in control of occupational recruitment and selection) come to be more predominant in some groups than others--the nebulous quality of "character" is one such that is sufficiently loose to be used by dominant groups subject to their own definition. There are many such "intangibles" which go into the selection process of potential new elites, for example, by established elites, such that through the recruitment of people "like" themselves and through co-optation, existing social arrangements are perpetuated.

V CRITIQUES OF THE MOBILITY-MEASUREMENT ENTERPRISE

What follows is not a critique of measurement *per se*, but of the way it has been used, particularly its lack of including any other methods of data-collection. The attempt at making statistical connections usually begins or ends with a nod to social structure and accepts the dominant theories and assumptions about industrial societies as put forward by structuralists who are often functionalists in one guise or another. The fact remains that statistics do not tell a story in themselves--they are subject to interpretation and they are only as reliable as the operationalization of variables that went into them. The selection of variables in turn is only as good as the theory behind them. A number of reasons will be suggested for why this theory may be found lacking.

The study of mobility over the years has been largely an enterprise based on variations of the same themes; it has utilized mathematical models of increasing sophistication which have nevertheless been premised on an oversimplified view of the social system, one aspect of which they purport to account for. Their variables have been few, their assumptions lacking in theoretical inclusiveness--many have fallen easily into the "individualistic" trap and have hence been overly psychologistic in their explanations of the sources and mechanisms of mobility; many, often the same, have also fallen into the "logic of industrialism" trap. It is perhaps no accident that the two types of explanation are not unrelated in their minds: that is, the belief in the overriding effect of meritocratic and universalistic principles operating impersonally in the selection system means that the burden of responsibility for mobility is upon the individual, and that if there are any

imperfections in the system, "tinkering" with the system to increase equality of opportunity will make the race more fairly run. Duncan (1968: 685) notes that "from a normative standpoint" one could be concerned with whether the race is fairly run, given the rules, or whether changes should be made in the rules--but the problem with mobility studies is that they rarely get around to explicating the implications of their findings in even the first instance, let alone the second.

Although some studies (particularly the work of Blau and Duncan) have noted the differential rates of mobility between the two broad occupational (and societal) groupings centering around the manual/nonmanual "divide," to my knowledge few if any have spent much time on intra-group differences, and none has related these differential rates to dominant class-configurations in society: that is between different categories of manual or of white-collar workers and their differing relationship to the dominant value and resource centres of the society. The one exception is that of elite studies, which have made exhaustive analyses of social origins, career patterns, and mechanisms of exclusion and cohesion which mark off elites from non-elites--but the studies have not been linked to the mainstream of mobility research. It would appear from this lack of connection that the reality of the elite world is not thought to have repercussions for the non-elite world in terms of opportunity structure at lower points on the ladder, in terms of the locus of control and power, and the basis of elite dominance. This is particularly curious considering the concern expressed by elite researchers about the economic and institutional consequences of concentration of power.

The notion of dominant and subordinate classes and of the property system around which their relations revolve in capitalist societies have been conspicuously absent in the mobility theorist-researchers' kit of concepts and explanations. It appears not to occur to them that, as Parkin (1973: Ch. 2) sees it, some degree of mobility in capitalist societies not only assures the infusion of talent when needed but also serves to legitimate the existing set of relations by reinforcing the belief in the rise of merit regardless of origins.

Both Parkin (1973: Ch. 1) and Anderson (1974: 121-122) criticize the use of the "multidimensional" framework for the analysis of social class common not only to stratification theorists in general, but to those cited here. When wealth, status and power are treated as separate variables with little relationship to one another, or at least, with some disjunctions, attention is drawn away from what is the major societal underpinning in capitalist systems: control of productive property. Anderson argues that property classes or ownership must occupy the first and central part of any theory of stratification, as was held by Marx and Weber, and that from the fact of property other dimensions of stratification can then be examined in proper context. He goes beyond Parkin's view that the occupational order is the "backbone" of the class structure and reward system in modern western societies, stating that occupation has always been an important and usually only source of sustenance for the masses;

the shift from self-employment to salaried employment is due not to the demise but to the "increasing preponderance of property in shaping industrial society" (:122; his emphasis).

Anderson also argues that what is at issue is not the operation of the mobility system but "why such a stepladder society exists in the first place and how and why it is perpetuated." (:140). Mobility researchers have been obsessed with establishing the rate of mobility, and with the existence of stratification systems almost (if not completely) universally as an important fact--but one may ask whether it is the fact of stratification which is the important concern of research once the fact is established, or whether it ought to be the basis of stratification, its underpinnings, and its meaning. This venture has not gone far enough, and the reason it has not within "mainstream" sociology appears due to the limitations imposed by theory and behind that, of an ideological inclination which impedes it.

Strauss (1971: 1) has concluded that sociological theory is "shot through with rhetoric and ideological commitment"--he has found from an analysis of clusters of images in American stratification literature that the dominant themes of the frontiers as "seed-beds of democracy," the honest workman, the "rugged individualist," the emphasis on personal character, "destiny and civilization" and the "just rewards" of social mobility contained in social theories about industrialization "reflect and are virtually inseparable from their views about social mobility." (:105).

The conviction that American stratification literature has been dominated by notions of "evolutionary liberalism" and functionalism has also been expressed by Pease, Form and Rytina (1970). They trace dominant themes and assumptions in the research to the present, and find that in the postwar period, despite the critique of functionalism and the discovery of some merit in the theories particularly of Weber (and to a lesser extent Marx), only a perfunctory nod has been made in their direction. Social mobility researchers have trivialized Weber's work by separating out status from its theoretical brothers; by the 1950's interest evolved into a concern for "mass middle-class society" with consumption patterns of more importance than income patterns.

The authors give three reasons why stratification research seems to have steered clear of hard-hitting issues: the dominant American ideology of individualism which has seeped into sociological theory despite the sociological perspective on "social" explanations for phenomena; the public ideology which conceives of any theoretical debt to Marx as implying Marxism; and the struggle of sociology to achieve scientific status, hence its emphasis on improving quantification procedures and choosing variables like status which are easier to operationalize than power (:132-133).

In summary, the sociological enterprise as it is represented in the vast majority of North American stratification and mobility

studies is aptly characterized by Pease, Form and Rytina thus:

"Sociologists who view stratification as a matter of individual occurrences rather than social structure, who study consumption to the neglect of distribution and production, who study the labor market but not the credit and commodity markets, who emphasize status, oversimplify class, neglect wealth, define power as being outside stratification, and who fail to see 'race relations,' minority status, and poverty in the context of stratification confirm Robert Lynd's observation that when it comes to matters of class stratification, 'the social sciences tiptoe evasively around the problem'." (:134).

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Toward a Marxist Theory of Transition

Chuck Smith

This essay attempts to do two things: 1) to familiarize the reader with certain theoretical concepts (problematic, mode of production, social formation, historical conjuncture, class struggle; 2) to further the process of theorization of these concepts in order that they may be further elaborated and more fruitfully applied to the study and propagation of large scale social change. Such an approach is utilized by the writer as the method of theoretical analysis in the study of colonial social formations. The basic thesis I wish to put forward is that, the elaboration of the concepts mode of production, social formation and class struggle will lead to the building up of an adequate conceptual framework for understanding and changing man's social relations.

The key concepts mode of production and social formation are formulated and utilized in such varied ways that they often have very different meanings. This is not merely a matter of 'semantics' since these varied conceptualizations often lead to radically different theories and practises in determinate concrete situations, rather than being a question of semantics this is a theoretical divergence which at least in the first instance centers on what Althusser calls problematics. That is the underlying structure of knowledge which renders possible the raising of certain questions in a particular form while ruling out certain other questions as unsuitable.¹ To ask questions (even the right ones) is not the same as answering them. Yet one's theoretical perspective is very much a reflection of one's problematic. Following from this, the main questions I wish to raise, concern the theoretical status of the concept mode of production and the manner in which it exists in actu within concrete social formations given, specific conditions of existence (material conditions) and specific class struggle or class struggles, social relations and a specific historical conjuncture. Within the context of modes of production it seems that many of the varying positions and differences of opinion arise precisely from the manner in which the concept is employed and

questions are posed. As Cardoso points out, Marx, from whom the concept mode of production is derived was himself less than instructive since he used "mode of production" ambiguously encompassing at least three distinct meanings (with possible combinations): the first refers in a descriptive way simply to ways of producing; the second to a series of modes of production which become dominant in particular regions and periods and which define "progressive epochs" in the evolution of history (e.g. feudalism and capitalism); and thirdly, secondary modes of production which never become dominant "e.g. petty bourgeois modes, peasant small-holding modes". One can clearly recognize all three tendencies in Marx but I do not agree with Cardoso's conclusion that one must move from such a categorization to the concrete study of the evolutionary process of the totality of the European mediterranean area in order to fathom capitalism as the first universal mode of production which then dissolves previous modes of production.² Rather I believe one must begin with a reading which spells out the relation between the whole and its parts, as Althusser proposes in this case between a dominant and other modes of production.

Before doing so, it is necessary to provide a definition of a mode of production at the most abstract level. I believe that with some modifications the basic problematic proposed by Balibar can be retained. Following the classic Althusserian conception one can discern a pattern of invariants encompassing: 1) labourer (always labour power within the C.M.P.); 2) means of production (the object and instruments [means] of labour) 3) non-labourer (appropriating surplus value in one or more of its component parts). These invariants are held together by two connections (relations), 1) relations of real appropriation, and 2) relations of property. The former refers to the appropriation of nature by man, or the real material appropriation of the means of production by the producer in the labour process, i.e. the production process. This concept approximates the classical Marxist notion of forces of production encompassing raw materials and other subjects of labour, the labour process and object of labour (commodities) but explicitly manifests effects on the other (superstructural) elements. Within the context used relation 1) also refers to the ability and skill of the non-worker appropriating surplus to set the labour process in motion.

The latter (property) relation in the combination, refers to more than legal property, rather it includes use/enjoyment as well as (legal) "property strictly speaking", the process of exploitation of labour within the ensemble of social and technical relations. It approximates relations of production, as used in Capital.³

Balibar then goes on to complete the picture by introducing the concept of determination in the last instance by the economy. Of the three inter-related structures, (otherwise called levels, elements, instances or moments⁴) economic, political-legal, ideological the economy is determinant in that it determines which of the instances of the social structure occupies the dominant place. Dominance refers back to Althusser's definition of over-determination...

"It is the manifestation of the structure in dominance that unifies the whole. This reflection of the conditions of existence of the contradiction within itself, this reflection of the structure articulated in dominance that constitutes the unity of the complex whole within each contradiction, this is the most profound characteristic of the Marxist dialectic."⁵

The structure in dominance then provides the main determinant of the effectivity of material conditions and defines the primary conditions of existence of class struggle and other social forms. Determination in the last instance, must be interpreted as determination by 'economic' material conditions, through a dominant instance. As Balibar states in his self criticism.

"The economic aspect (the 'economic' class struggle) is only one of these aspects [of class struggle], unevenly developed, unevenly decisive according to historical conjunctures, and never capable of producing revolutionary effects by itself. Which by no means rules out, but on the contrary demands that in all historical periods, whatever the dominant mode of production and whatever the conjuncture, the ensemble of the class struggle is still determined by the 'economic' material conditions."⁶

That is, the structures, define the conditions of existence of a class struggle which expresses an effectivity at the level of a transformation of the structures. Change is never necessary in a teleological sense but

mutually conditioned and determined by the ongoing process of the structures combined with the specific events of class struggle. As Poulantzas points out each structure operates in its own connected yet distinct 'region' of practise, within a mode of production. The political exists as a specific level but also as the crucial level in which the contradictions of a social formation are reflected and condensed. Political practise has as its specific object the present moment, the nodal point where the contradictions of the various levels of a formation are condensed in the complex relations governed by overdetermination and by their dislocation and uneven development. The problem of state power arises inside the structure of several levels dislocated by uneven development. The state has the particular function of constituting the factor of cohesion between the levels of a social formation. The struggle for control of the state, class struggle, operates along complex lines of development. Following Gramsci, Poulantzas posits dominant classes with specific hegemonic fractions engaged in compromises and power alliances with popular classes and fractions, whose power is reflected in ideological and repressive state apparatuses, generally reflected by the reigning class (upper levels of the state and corporate bureaucratic hierarchy) and manifested in all the structural levels especially ideology. For Poulantzas, unlike Gramsci, agents are tied to the reproduction of the positions occupied by a social class.

"We are faced with a series of relations between apparatuses, whose roots are deep in the class struggle. In other words the primary distribution of agents is tied to the primary reproduction of the positions occupied by social classes. According to the stages and phases of the social formation, that primary distribution assigns to a given apparatus or series of apparatuses its own proper role which it is to play in distributing agents."⁷

- During a revolutionary conjuncture or period of transition the possibility exists for radical changes in the primary distribution of agents and the role of the various apparatuses in the distribution of agents may in fact be drastically altered or in extreme cases the apparatuses themselves eliminated.

Further elaboration of the concept of mode of production can now be made on the basis of these formulations. Hindess and Hirst very clearly define the structure of the unity of the two relations (property and real appropriation). They define mode of production as an articulated combination of relations of production and forces of production structured by the dominance of relations of production.⁸ Relations of production, define a specific mode of appropriation of surplus labour and the specific form of social distribution of the means of production corresponding to that mode of appropriation of surplus labour. Furthermore the distribution of agents to the positions labourer/non-labourer is seen as a function of the social distribution of the means of production. In fairness to Hindess and Hirst they do not attempt to do this outside of their rather inclusive study of specific modes of production.

Hindess and Hirst specifically define forces of production as the subject of work (raw materials, etc.), the labour process (personal activity of man) and its instruments. This is a vast improvement over the all too prevalent ambiguity in the use of the term production by many Marxists. For example Pierre-Philippe Rey quotes a passage from Marx wherein the term production is used in a context referring to mode of production. This is not clear in Rey's presentation where this term might easily be mistaken for productive forces.

"In all forms of society, it is a determined production and the relations engendered by it which assigns to all other productions and relations engendered by them, their level and their importance."⁹

Similarly Terray even more incorrectly posits that the instruments of labour are determinant in the enumeration and identification of the indices of a mode of production present, i.e. the order of investigation Hindess and Hirst wisely ignore Terray's formulation and extend that of Rey to preclude any definition of forces of relations of production independently of the mode of production in which they are combined. Yet despite their apropos criticisms of certain technicist notions, Hindess and Hirst carry their articulated combination of forces and relations of production too far, i.e. to the point of denying the specific effectivity of forces of production

as a social relation.¹⁰ In their attempt to deduce the productive forces from the concept of mode of appropriation, Hindess and Hirst establish a direct relationship between mode of appropriation, dominant instance and class struggle which bypasses the forces of production subsumed in this articulated combination, and denegates the labour process. In such a formalistic deductive connection the possibility of a contradictory relation between the forces and relations of production virtually disappears in the articulated combination such that it is hard to envisage how such a construct can avoid reproducing its conditions of existence.¹¹ More will be said on this in relation to the question of transition and class struggle.

To avoid possible ambiguities it is necessary to clearly define relations of production. As mentioned such a definition must include appropriation of the product or some portion of it by the labourer and appropriation of the surplus labour by the non-labourer. Following Poulantzas, relations of production in class society, can be viewed as a double relation encompassing man's relations to nature in material production.

"These two relations are relations first between men and other men - class relations, and secondly between the agents of production and the object and means of labour - the productive forces. These two relations thus concern the relation of the non-worker (the owner-director) to the object and means of labour. These relations involve two aspects (a) economic ownership: by this is meant the real economic control of the means of production, i.e. the power to assign the means of production to given uses and so to dispose of the products obtained (b) Possession: by this is meant the capacity to put the means of production into operation."¹²

Ernesto Laclau, posits a similar hierarchical definition of a means of production as an

"integrated complex of social productive forces and relations linked to a determinate type of ownership of the means of production

- ownership of means of production are essential relations among the ensemble of relations of production.
- logically and mutually co-ordinated articulation of
 1. determinate type of ownership of means of production
 2. determinate form of appropriation of economic surplus
 3. determinate degree of development of the division of labour

4. determinate development of productive forces
 ... a totality defined by its mutual interconnections. Within this totality, property in means of production constitutes the decisive element."¹³

I will assume here that property refers both to legal property and the ability to set the labour process into motion (as noted cf. Balibar), not necessarily combined. My main criticism of this formulation and the similar less explicit concept used by Hindess and Hirst is that it's logic is basically economistic. Property in means of production is the key element in the chain of determination which does not leave enough scope for the mutual inter-relation between the economic and its effects on the other levels which are reflected back in the form of the effects of the other levels on the economic as part of the totality of a mode of production or even co-existing modes structured by some form of dominance. If the economy is determinate it is because property in means of production and the other relations of production articulate with forces of production (as a social relation) and all other social relations and their effects at the level of determinant practises.

In other words no hard and fast connection can be assigned to property in the means of production or other relations of production whereby certain productive forces and/or certain political, ideological or economic structures might inevitably be deduced. Rather I prefer to consider these other elements as social relations which act upon and are acted upon by property relations.

One must logically begin with real appropriation or the the forces of production. What does it mean to say that the forces of production constitute a social relation? I believe that this problem has for the most part been inadequately dealt with as a problem within Marxist theory. Despite these large gaps and silences I should like to offer some tentative hypotheses.¹⁴

If one considers first of all the subject of labour (raw materials etc.) one sees that they are almost inseparable from the overall dominant relations of production. The distribution, exchange, circulation and consumption of the subject of labour are moments in the overall totality

of social relations which may involve a whole chain of agents in an extended series of social relations. If one considers the capitalist mode of production (C.M.P.) it is undeniable that it expands the scale and scope of operations to secure a regular and cheap supply of raw materials often from pre capitalist modes of production which may subsequently become part of a world capitalist system of trade relations. Much debate has gone on as to the need for the C.M.P. to expand into all parts of the globe. Colonization and imperialism are often said to arise by necessity from the inherent tendency of the C.M.P. to expand. While a detailed review of such debates are beyond the scope of this essay, I would like to put forward the position (in essence that of Bukharin) that capitalism profits from the super exploitation of non-capitalist areas but does not need them in an absolute sense to continue as a system.

That is the appropriation of raw materials is not determined by the dominant relations of production but is rather a discrete moment in the totality of interdependent social relations structured by the economic instance in a complex fashion (in the sense that theory and the real need not correspond directly). Capitalism may not need to expand outside of its own system but will do so if opportunities for profit (an integral part of the system of capitalist relations) are presented.

Productive forces encompassed within the second level that of the organization of the labour process also constitutes a social relation. This is true in the sense that the form and extent of co-operation among workers and between workers and supervisors often are conditioned if not wholly determined by the level of productive forces as well as by relations of production in the strict sense. Also the part played by the non-labourer may have some direct bearing on the reproduction/non reproduction of a given mode of production.

Finally technology itself is never completely neutral. The tool or machine arises within a certain context and serves certain functions. In the case of military technology it might serve either to defend existing institutions or to overthrow them. Such a role is not simply a function of the level of culture, science, production of commodities, or general affluence,

at least in the short run as the Mongol invasions of China illustrate. Similarly communications networks often manifest an effectivity on the nature of economic organization. In an extremely evolved form, given a determinate mode of production such networks may drastically change the nature of work and types of work needed. An obvious example is automation or cybernetics, in which technology originally developed for use in communications networks have entered and in fact revolutionized production. Similarly energy sources prove more or less efficient and operable over time and the viability of certain types of energy may come to depend on extra costs incurred by resource depletion.

Another factor is that in any given mode of production the organization of the labour process, has certain ideological and political manifestations, as well as reflecting ideology and politics. For example the increasing organic composition of capital can serve to render certain occupations redundant, replacing workers by machines thus changing the nature of the previous social structure. The level of the productive forces is to some extent a reflection of the structure of demand itself conditioned by the totality. Also rhythms of family life and popular culture reflect the nature of the productive forces in a distillation of effects from the totality of practises. Thirdly there is a reciprocal determination (conditioned by the structure) between elements such as: the transfer of the social product; distribution of social labour; levels and amount of consumption and the nature of technical relations; raw materials available; the type and extent of supervision and the scale of production within a given conjuncture, which determines what commodities are producible and in what quantities.

I am not arguing that the forces of production are autonomous, but rather that their intervention with respect to the other practices should never be ignored or underplayed. The relations of production are determinate as Marx points out in the last chapter of Vol. 1 of Capital but specific forces corresponding to those relations are not as simply and unilaterally deducible from the latter as Hindess and Hirst would have it. The two are inseparably tied together as each can and does manifest determination and effectivity upon the other. What is necessary as a precondition is that

Balibar's three invariants (the labourer, means of production, non labourer) be present. In such a case changes in the social relations of production must ensue for the mode of production to change. Generally speaking changes in productive relations will precede changes in productive forces. As Marx pointed out attempts by English systematic colonizers to export capitalist agriculture to virtually uninhabited new lands like Swan River failed to also export English productive relations. Wage workers faced with free land (access to means of production) did not remain workers for long. They quickly became petty bourgeois farmers on their own. In many cases though, the introduction of new productive forces from a more developed mode of production will quickly transform existing productive relations. Witness the rapid transformation of underdeveloped countries today when industrialization takes place.

So as one can see it is sometimes the case that changes in the productive forces precede a transformation of the relations of production and create a new articulated combination of forces and relations encompassing a transformed mode of production. In such cases it is necessary for the old productive relations to change in accordance with new technological possibilities. If such change is not forthcoming then total transformation cannot occur. It is for this reason that despite technological innovations, phenomena such as the "industrial revolution of the sixteenth century" proved chimerical in terms of sustained growth and development.

One must also keep in mind that within any particular social formation various modes of production often co-exist and that the articulated combination of forces and relations of production have to be viewed within the context of a world economy, a complex structure of complex structures which delimits but does not define modes of production. As Bettelheim puts it "the development of the productive forces in every country is to some extent conditioned by world production relations. Furthermore, within social formations social relations of production determine distribution relations (as noted by Terray). Thus attempts to define capitalism in terms of commercial factors alone cannot prove theoretically feasible. It is not the instance of circulation or commerce which is determinate but that of production within a given social

context. That is consumption and circulation, the salto mortale of commodities is determined by what can economically be produced and the historically determined needs and wherewithal available to consumers. In other words the articulated combination relations/forces of production manifests a certain effectivity upon the political and ideological structures which in turn reflect prevalent ideology and superstructural controls or effects upon the moment of production i.e. the economic base.

So to reiterate, it is the totality of the mode of production which is determined in the last instance by the economy and upon which the effects of the practises intervenes generally, mediated by the dominant practise or practises. The conditions of existence of a mode of production must be thought of in terms of the demarcation of that mode of production by the global effect of the structures on social relations. This cannot be equated with the labourer/non-labourer distinction nor even the delimitation of classes with regard to the economic, which Poulantzas defined as,

"... classes with regard to the "economic" includes the following relations:

- relations of production, in the strict sense: producer/owner of the means of production.
 - relations of distribution of social labour: producer/producer.
 - relations of the transfer of the social product: producer/producer.
- These relations are dependent on the combination of the two economic relations, real appropriation and property, and so refer to the organization of the labour process and to the division of labour."¹⁵

Rather the global effect of the structures on social relations must encompass the notion of social classes.

Social classes must be seen as "the result of the ensemble of the structures of a mode of production and a social formation, and to the relations which are maintained there by the different levels - 1. economic - 2. political - 3. ideological.¹⁶ Social classes thus manifest themselves (not inside the structure) but entirely as the "global effect of the structures in the field of social relations". Poulantzas then goes on to define social relations of production as,

"- relations among agents of production distributed in social classes, i.e. class relations. In other words, the "social" relations of production, class relations, manifest themselves at the economic level, as an effect of this specific combination: agents of production/material-technical conditions of labour (real appropriation, C.S.) constituted by the relations of production."17

Now Polantzas posits social relations, the distribution of supports (agents) to social classes as distinct from structures,

"In social relations, the relations of production correspond to the social relations of production: but we can also speak in all strictness of political "social" relations and of ideological "social" relations. These social relations, as class relations, isolated here with respect to the instances of the political and the ideological, manifest themselves as the effect of the political and ideological structures on social relations. The different instances therefore mark levels and degrees in structures and at the same time in social relations."18

I believe all this can be interpreted to mean that the conditions of existence of a mode of production are delimited by social classes and other social relations, (political and ideological) themselves the result of the global effect of the structures. Thus before a mode of production can be transformed, its conditions of existence must cease to be operable. At this point I believe one must reject Poulantzas' structural causality and posit at least the possibility of historical agents playing a direct autonomous and unpredetermined role in their conditions of life within the context of a given class struggle acted out within a specific set of historically determined parameters with differing degrees of freedom at the level of structures and the institutions. Take for example the institution of the family. Here one generally finds hierarchically ordered social relations which display a definite character or effectivity conditioned by the ideological, political and economic structures. The family, the school, the peer group, the community etc all play a role in structuring social relations i.e. socialization, and other such mechanism for the placement of agents into differing structural positions. Yet all these institutions operate with a certain degree of relative autonomy and their exact nature can never be equivocally deduced from the structures. One might then argue that

it is not whether a particular agent occupies a particular structure that is the most important issue, but rather the limitations imposed upon any agent occupying a particular position are fundamentally more important. I would agree with this given the important exception of transitional conjunctures where fundamental changes often of a revolutionary nature become possible.

These issues, of course, can not be resolved at the level of modes of production but must be theorized within additional concepts providing further approximations of the real. At a slightly less ethereal level I should like to introduce the concept of a social formation. A social formation closely corresponds with the ideological notion of a society, but since a society has no rigorous, clearly defined generally accepted theoretical position, the term is of dubious conceptual value. Thus, I prefer to use the term social formation defined as the articulated combination of structures within co-existing modes of production or more specifically,

"The social formation itself constitutes a complex unity in which a certain mode of production dominates the others which compose it... The dominance of one mode of production over the others in a social formation causes the matrix of this mode of production (i.e. the particular reflection of determination by the economic element in the last instance by which it is specified) to mark the whole of the formation. In this way a historically determined social formation is specified by a particular articulation (through an index of dominance and over-determination) of its different economic, political ideological and theoretical levels or instances. As a general rule, taking account of the dislocations which will be encountered, this articulation is that of the dominant mode of production."¹⁹

A significantly different definition is offered by Hindess and Hirst. For them,

"'Social formation'... designates a complex structure of social relations, a unity of economic, ideological and in certain cases, political structural levels in which the role of the economy is determinant. It is determinant in the sense that the conditions of existence of the dominant relations of production assign to each of the levels a certain form of effectivity and a mode of intervention with regard to the other levels. If the dominant relations of production are antagonistic, involving a social division of labour between a class of labourers and a class of non-labourers, then the social formation contains a state and a political level as the necessary space of representation of the antagonistic classes."²⁰

They also specify that,

"... the structure of the social formation is not deducible from the concept of its determinant mode of production. The conditions of existence of a particular mode of production prescribe the limits of variation in the structures of the economic, political and ideological levels if the mode of production is to survive. Thus the structure of the economic level of a particular social formation must be governed by a variant or set of variants of a determinate mode of production but it may also include certain elements of other modes - provided only that the presence of these elements does not contradict the conditions of existence of the dominant relations of production. ...the presence of a particular mode of production is not sufficient to secure the reproduction of its conditions of existence. ...The economic, political and ideological conditions of existence of the mode of production are secured, modified, or transformed as the outcome of specific class struggles conducted under the particular conditions of the economic, political and ideological levels of the social formation. The particular structure of economic political and ideological conditions in the social formation determines the possible outcomes of the class struggle conducted under such conditions."21

Both Poulantzas and Hindess and Hirst seem to be in basic agreement that a social formation operates under a particular articulation conditioned by dominance and overdetermination originating at the economic level of the dominant mode of production. But more importantly the relations between conditions of existence, dominant mode of production and the possible outcome of class struggle (conjuncture) are not adequately theorized. Hindess and Hirst seem to move further in this respect than anyone else I know of, but there are still problems. For if the conditions of existence prescribe the limits of variation in the structures and the reproduction of the conditions of existence are secured, modified or transformed by the outcome of class struggles conducted under the particular economic, political and ideological levels of the social formation then we seem to have at least the hint of a vicious circle. Crudely speaking the formula seems to go like this

Class struggle (conditioned by the structures) secures, modifies or transforms conditions of existence, prescribes limits of variation in the structure.

If class struggle which is conditioned by the structures secures or transforms the conditions of existence of a M.P. or S.F. which prescribes limits to the structures, then the structures are both determined and determinate. Or from another angle, is it possible for class struggle to secure the conditions of existence of a M.P. and thus prescribe limits of variation to the structures if it is itself 'conditioned' by the structures? Clearly the outcome of any given class struggle cannot be pre-determined by the nature of the structures. Ample demonstration of this is expressed by the varied nature of revolutionary conjunctures as well as the lack of success by historians and sociologists in finding universal causal variables to explain revolutions. Nevertheless class struggle does take place within limits set by the social formation and its conditions of existence. For example it is necessary to posit capitalist productive forces or post capitalist ones (even if they must be rapidly developed) before the socialist mode of production could exist. That is, an adequate surplus to satisfy the needs of all including those not directly engaged in production must exist. Theoretically one is left in a position where it is class struggle which determines the reproduction, non-reproduction of a social formation but it is the economic, political and ideological conditions in the social formation which determines the possible outcome of class struggle conducted under these conditions (conjuncture) and yet class struggle itself indirectly prescribes limits of variation upon the structures. How then do class struggles come about? Even when the conditions of class struggle i.e. non-reproduction of the conditions of existence of a mode of production are met, what is the spark which sets off the powder keg? Or even, is such a revolutionary catalyst (the spark) necessary? If so what is the role of the party, the intellectual, trade unions etc within the conjuncture? Also what of the premature revolutionary attempt? Perhaps it is unfair to pose these questions outside of a specific conjuncture but the point is, what theoretical tools are available for an analysis of these questions. The best answers available are contingent upon some notion of social classes. That is, given Hindess and Hirst's guidelines concerning class antagonism as the representation of

antagonistic relations of production at the political level, then class struggle becomes crystallized within the state which exemplifies the political level in all modes of production they deal with, (except primitive communism before the gentile constitution). At the level of social formations and conjunctures if not even at the level of modes of production one must also incorporate civil society into the political moment. It is at this broadly political level that transition takes place. The role of the party is to channel revolutionary energy, to organize to provide the spark at the right time etc. I do not see this as a zero sum total game but rather as an ongoing revolutionary process where the party must not only direct but also learn from and reflect the energies of the labouring class. At the level of the social formation one finds a multiplicity of class and status groups or fractions of class and the necessity for coalitions against the hegemonic bloc arises. It is any mention of such a revolutionary process which is missing in Hindess and Hirst, Poulantzas and Balibar and it is at this level that the work of Pierre-Philippe Rey provides a useful counterpoint.²² It is also at this level the role of the individual and specific institutions are most relevant and least pre-determined.

There still remains the problem of how one conceptualizes a social formation. It is one thing to define social formation as "historically determined as a particular object" or as a real concrete object as Poulantzas does.²³ It is quite another thing to formulate immanent tendencies with the social formation of a particularly constituted object. If Bismarck's Germany, France under Louis Bonaparte, England during the industrial revolution²⁴ and infinite other possibilities constitute a social formation then what if any is their common denominator? The presence of a state in class societies seems to be one very loose indicator but clearly the conception social formation does not imply the necessity of a state. Similarly the "ideological" notion of a society does not really explain anything but merely gives a name to some kind of loosely knit social organisation.

One is then left with a choice, determination by the dominant mode of production which structures the articulation (Poulantzas) or determination by the dominant economic structure within the dominant mode more specifically

dominant relations of production/possession separation from the means of production) (Hindess and Hirst). If one chooses the dominance of one mode of production which produces complex effects of dissolution or conservation on the other M.P.'s which give these societies their character as does Poulantzas then one cannot also posit a social formation as a concrete society at a given moment of time;²⁵ since articulation of M.P.'s is itself a theoretical concept which has not as yet approximated the level of the concrete.

My preference is to posit as Hindess and Hirst do a combination of reciprocally determined and determining elements of possibly more than one M.P. structured by the determinate nature of the economic level of the dominant variant or set of variants of a determinate mode of production. The presence of some or even all of the elements of a mode of production does not in any way necessitate that this M.P. will reproduce itself. In my view it is possible that not all the elements of a particular M.P. even the dominant one in a social formation need be present in some sort of necessary unity. One might sometimes find a feudal political level articulated with a capitalist economic level and perhaps some sort of mixed ideological level. It is not my intention to specify such combinations but I merely want to specify the possibility of such combinations within a social formation.

This brings one back to the question of transition. Is it possible to have more than one ruling class within the same social formation? Is there an especially unstable period within the conjuncture where a dominant M.P. no longer exists and one can discern a 'transitional' mode of production? This is an area which has often been left untheorized in the literature on social formations. For example, take the third step in Godelier's definition of a social formation.

"3) define the exact form and content of the articulation and combination of these various modes of production in a hierarchical order, insofar as one mode of production dominates the others, and in some way subjects them to the needs and logic of its own mode of functioning, and integrates them, more or less, in the mechanism of its own reproduction." (italics C.S.)²⁶

The silence expressed here by the more or less speaks volumes. Clearly if the dominant M.P. structured the social formation in a rigid hierarchical determination then the effectivity of class struggle within the social formation would become problematic, except as a reflection of the antagonistic nature of the labourer/non-labourer classes within the dominant M.P. Such a notion would exclude class alliances, obfuscate fractions, in short become a practical absurdity.

I do not believe that this is Godelier's intention, in which case the reproduction/non-reproduction of the hierarchically articulated social formation is relegated to the 'in some way' in which the dominant M.P. subjects subordinate M.P.s to its 'needs and logic'. In this case reproduction is not theorized but merely hinted at, which further obfuscates the question of transition.

If the manner in which structures and conditions of existence reproduce themselves is not known then it becomes impossible to specify how this reproduction ceases to operate and transition occurs.

It has become fairly commonplace to criticize Balibar's conceptualization of modes of production as a static inventory where the problems of correspondence or non-correspondence becomes meaningless.²⁷ Yet I believe that a careful reading of Balibar shows that his position is in many ways the most sophisticated one presented to date. I believe that Balibar's problematic concerning his notions of synchrony and diachrony can be used quite fruitfully.

It should be noted that Balibar himself has rejected the idea of a transitional mode of production which he put forward in Reading Capital. In his self criticism Balibar makes it clear that

"transition is not, is never, for reasons of principle, mere supersession, an 'internal' results of 'tendencies' observable in the mode of production itself and responsible for the development of its characteristic relations of production, even if this development is simultaneously a development of contradictions. ...transition requires the analysis of other material conditions and other social forms than those implied in the concept of mode of production alone."²⁸

Balibar then adds

"There is a general problematic... of 'transition' in social formations i.e. of 'revolution in the relations of production'. This pertains to the fact that the concept of 'class societies', resting on mode of production which are of the same time mode of exploitation, cannot be constituted without reference to the historical transformation of modes of exploitation (in other words, there is no such thing as exploitation in general, only determinate forms of exploitation). But for all that there is no such thing as a general theory of transition, in the strong sense of an explanation of the causality of a process. On the contrary, it emerges that each historical 'transition' different, materially and therefore conceptually. ...historical materialism is not only a theory of the necessity of the (revolutionary) transformation of the social relations, but also a theory of the transformation of the mode of transformation of social relations such that two revolutions never have the same concept.²⁹

Earlier within the text of Reading Capital Balibar had elaborated a theory of social change which distinguished between modes of production reproducing themselves (synchrony) and those in a state of transition (diachrony).

"We have seen that the analysis of the relations which appertain to a determinate mode of production and constitute its structure must be thought as the constitution of a theoretical "synchrony": this is reflected with respect to the mode of production by Marx in the concept of reproduction. The analysis of all the peculiar effects of the structure of the mode of production is necessarily part of the synchrony. The concept of diachrony will therefore be reserved for the time of the transition from one mode of production to another, i.e. for the time determined by the replacement and transformation of the relations of production which constitute the double articulation of the structure."³⁰

Balibar then goes on to develop the notion of the complexity of a mode of production defined by the correspondence or non-correspondence of the two connections (productive forces and the relations of production).

"In the form of non-correspondence which is that of the phases of transition such as manufacture, the relationship between the two connections no longer takes the form of a reciprocal limitation, but becomes the transformation of the one by the effect of the other: this is shown by the whole analysis of the manufacture and the industrial revolution, in which the capitalist nature of production (the necessity of creating surplus value in the form of relative surplus value) determines and governs the transition of the productive forces to their specifically capitalist form ... The "reproduction" of this specific complexity is the reproduction of the effect of the one connection on the other... In the one case (correspondence C.S.) we are dealing with the reciprocal limitation of the effectivities of the two connections, in the other (non-correspondence C.S.) with the transformation of one by the effectivity of the other."³¹

The mode of correspondence between the different levels of the social structure (mode of articulation) of these levels can likewise be generalized. This articulation "depends in turn on the form of the internal correspondence of the structure of production". This generalized relationship (correspondence) can be analysed as the "mode of intervention of one practice within limits determined by another" for example the intervention of the class struggle within limits determined by the economic structure.³² The length of the working day and wages are subject to a variation which is not determined by the structure but depends on the balance of forces. But the limits to this variation are set by the structure thus its autonomy is relative. So in this case the result of the intervention of political practice is to transform and fix the limits of the mode of production.

"In the transition period, the forms of law and of State policy are not as hitherto, adopted to the economic structure (articulated with the peculiar limits of the structure of production) but dislocated with respect to it: as well as showing force as an economic agent, the analyses of primitive accumulation also reveal the precession of law and of the forms of the State with respect to the forms of the capitalist economic structure. This dislocation can be translated by saying that the correspondence appears here, too in the form of a "non-correspondence" between the different levels. In

a transition period, there is a "non-correspondence" because the mode of intervention of political practise, instead of conserving limits and producing its effects within their determination, displaces them and transforms them. There is therefore no general form of correspondence between the level, but a variation of forms, which depend on the degree of autonomy of one instance with respect to another (and to the economic instance) and on the mode of their mutual intervention ... the theory of dislocations (within the economic structure, between the instances) and of the forms of non-correspondence is only ever possible by a double reference to the structure of two mode of production ... Periods of transition are therefore characterized by the co-existence of several modes of production, as well as by these forms of non-correspondence."³³

As noted earlier in this paper I would agree with this formulation of synchrony and diachrony only given the proviso that the structure of two modes of production need not be present in toto. This brings us back to Engels' question (one taken up recently by Perry Anderson in his analysis of the absolutist state). Is it possible for more than one ruling class to co-exist in such a way that these antagonistic (warring) classes of non-labourers somehow balance each other and the state acquires a certain amount of independence? This may in fact be a real problem for the study of absolutism or even for the study of certain colonial social formations with dual indigenous and foreign ruling classes. Yet if one accepts that no general theoretical concept of diachrony or transition is possible then I do not believe that one can posit state autonomy in some sort of teleological fashion as an invariant element in transition. This does not solve the problem of whether the state can function independently of the ruling class or classes in some instances which is a question not yet fully worked out. I feel that an independent state is possible and perhaps may have existed in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe and might exist today in certain third world countries, but full periodization of this problem would require a separate work and is not resolvable within the realm of theory abstracted from concrete states, social formations and class struggles.

There has in fact been much debate on the nature of transitional "societies" such as that between Sweezy, Dobb et al on the nature of the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe (including a perfunctory comparison with Japan). I believe that the main problems with such debates (e.g. whether to characterize manufacturing as feudal, capitalist or a transitional mode of production) have to be resolved into levels of abstraction to become comprehensible. It is at the most abstract level that the formulations of Hindess and Hirst are most operational. That is, the relations of production are determinate of the structure of the dominant mode of production which characterizes a social formation.

That is, the mode of production as such does not constitute the object of theoretical investigation in this case, but rather the social formation. In the example given i.e. the case of sixteenth century western Europe, I would agree neither with Dobb who posits that the social formation ("economic system") was characterized by capitalism nor with Sweezy who sees it as a transitional conjuncture, but rather with Rodney Hilton who posits a dominant feudal M.P. within the varying social formations, albeit one that was being undermined. That is the economic basis of those who still held commanding positions in the state was still feudal and in the terms of analysis offered here the predominant relations of production were still feudal (or so they seem to me without claiming any special expertise on the period). The point is at the level of abstraction of a social formation one can coherently make such a judgement.

A very important theoretical question remains i.e. at what point in an historical conjuncture do the conditions of existence of the dominant M.P. stop reproducing themselves and therefore the dominant relations of production? Generally speaking I believe that the site of the problem can be identified as the point of intersection of the base (the articulated combination of forces and relations of production replete with ideological effectivities) and the superstructure (the state and political-legal level also replete with ideological effectivities). It is this correspondence which conditions transition. Yet as in the example cited the changing nature of productive forces and relations undermining this correspondance may continue for a

period of say roughly 300 years in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. I do not believe that one can pinpoint the exact moment whence a given social formation is no longer dominated by a particular mode of production. On the contrary, what I wish to achieve is to provide broad parameters for the characterization of given social formations in given conjunctures. Such analysis are not straightforwardly open to empirical prediction based on manipulation of key variables. One cannot specify the exact percentage of separation of direct producers from the means of production which would make capitalism operable for example. Such an exercise would be an absurdity since obviously many other factors are at work and play important roles.

The transition phase provides a difficult problem in theorization. It cannot represent a transitional mode of production but rather an unstable social formation, caveat emptor. For as Bettelheim points out the starting point of analysis is not instability but rather the dislocation or non-homology between formal (property) and real appropriation.

"What marks the transition phase as a whole is not mainly the instability of the new social order, nor is it the absence of domination by the new production-relations, it is the fact that there is still a relatively large degree of non-correspondence between the new production-relations, henceforth dominant, and the nature of the essential production forces."³⁴

As noted I don't agree with Bettelheim or Balibar that this dislocation (diachrony) characterizes a new transitional mode of production. Such a concept would emasculate the theoretical specificity of modes of production into infinite permutations and combinations.

How then does one periodize transition? I will offer three possible modes of analysis corresponding to the degree of complexity of a social formation. At the most general level, formal appropriation (the possession of or separation from the means of production, appropriation of surplus, distribution of surplus labour) determines the economic structure of the dominant practise within a given social formation. In the first case that of a social formation almost completely dominated by one mode of production,

for example primitive communism, it is the immanent contradiction within the economic structure of the single and therefore dominant M.P. which provides the mode of transformation i.e. determines whether reproduction or non-reproduction of the conditions of existence of the M.P. takes place. The tendency toward territorial expansion accompanying population growth under primitive communism could lead to various crises at the level of ideological social relations. As the tribe, phratry or whatever expanded new forms of social control through kinship or religion might be called into existence. Transitional forms of a superstructure (already dislocated in terms of correspondence with the economic base) might arise, such as the gentile constitution. At this point under certain conditions the state itself might come into existence a state once constituted would involve a different system of productive forces and property and this would help to create a new mode of production.

The second type of transitional conjuncture again involves a non-correspondence (in no way complete of course) between productive forces and productive relations, but in this case one will be able to discern quite clearly the presence of essential elements of two distinct modes of production. In such cases the dominant mode of production is demarcated by its more or less hegemonic control of productive property and productive relations albeit often in rather bastardized forms. Such articulated modes may in fact be particularly resilient and long lasting. In the case of domestic manufacture predominating in a social formation one finds predominant capitalist freehold property, bourgeois law combined with artisanal production carried out by direct producers (perhaps cottars) still in possession of most of their own means of production and a situation where merchants and usurers capital fulfills the directive functions and mediates between production and exchange. Such social formations (common in eighteenth century Europe) are not yet entirely capitalist, in fact metayage may still exist in widespread form, but they are for the most part dominated by capitalist institutions (even if sometimes of a perfunctory nature) capitalist relations of production and a capitalist state i.e. one controlled primarily in the interests (if not by) a bourgeoisie. I would characterize

such a conjuncture as capitalist at the point at which the predominant mode of appropriation of surplus takes place within predominantly capitalist relations of exchange and social relations. The actual forms that the transformation of productive and corresponding superstructural relations take depend on specific internal and external contradictions of the the social formation delineating its conditions of existence and the actual course of class struggle within such prescribed limits.

The third transitional conjuncture involves a multiplicity of more than two modes and forms of production which can again be expressed in terms of dominance set by the economic level but where direct state intervention would seem to be necessary to stabilize such a complex articulation in order that the dominant relations of production might reproduce themselves. For example in 1921 Lenin periodized Soviet Russia in terms of five separate modes and forms of production wherein the collective ownership of the means of production provided the determinant level but one which could only structure articulation of the social formation through the state and political practise. Multiple contradictions within the varied elements existed which could have possibly served to undermine socialism of various points, one could in fact argue that this is what happened under Stalin. But at any rate the main, point I wish to make is only that new productive forces were not immediately forthcoming as an inevitable result of changed relations production. Such correspondance can only come about through struggle at the level of all existing social relations which is necessary because the outcome of such struggle while prescribed within certain limits is in no way pre-determined in any strict sense.

In summary then actual transition does not constitute a new separate mode of production but a dislocated state of an articulated combination of modes of production (diachrony) where one mode is dominant. In practise the boundaries can be obscure, capricious and relatively undefined, but I prefer this uncertainty to positing a transitional mode which undermines mode of production as a theoretical concept. In concrete terms the actual transition is defined by a non-inevitable class struggle between the major

classes and fractions so the co-existing modes and forms of production which takes place at different levels and reflects the structural and superstructural totality. The state manifests itself as the region of condensation of the levels, but control of the state does represent a complex and possibly long and arduous accession to power.

A further problem involves the generally contradictory nature of articulation of M.P.'s. Can synchrony as a concept exist outside of tendencies toward transition? The answer I believe does not lie simply within the realm of theory. As I have said transition depends on determinate class struggle within the structural complexity of a mode of production or more generally a social formation. Unique circumstances with their own causal specificity and relative autonomy play an important part at the level of concrete conjunctures. It is at this level that factors such as geography, climate, demography, personality, etc. come into play. They are never isolated from the structural complexity but neither are they simply or unilaterally determined by it or subsumed within it. Thus the concrete conjuncture must be separated from social formation as a theoretical construct and should be seen not merely as possible outcomes predetermined by the structures but also as outcomes derived from the give and take of actual class struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. Callinicos, N., Althusser's Marxism, p. 34, Pluto Press, London, 1976.
2. Cardoso, C.F.S., "Colonial Modes of Production", Critique of Anthropology, Nos. 4 and 5, Autumn, 1975.
3. Balibar, Etienne in Reading Capital (B. Brewster, trans), New Left Books, London, 1970. Althusser, Louis, pages 209-253.
4. Another level theoretical is sometimes introduced but for methodological reasons beyond this essay I reject Althusser's distinction between theory and ideology and thus I leave it out for my purposes here. My reasons for doing so are grounded in what I take to be Althusser's fundamental demarcation of scientific work as the activity of generality II, theoretical concepts on generality I ideological representations. For example Marx's concept of mode of production could be applied to the representations of a particular social formation to produce scientific theory. Whether this theory would have a specific effectivity from the ideological instance and thus would constitute a transformative element cannot be posited in a mechanical fashion and would very much depend upon the particular historical conjuncture, and it is the conjuncture which is at issue here. If as Althusser maintains "the knowledge effect is the appropriation of the real object" then the real object of revolutionary theory must be revolutionary politics and the two cannot be separated as Althusser would at times maintain.
5. Balibar, E., op. cit., p. 224. Althusser, L. For Marx, Allen Lane, (B. Brewster, trans), 1969, p. 200.
6. Balibar, Etienne, "Self Criticism: An Answer to Questions from 'Theoretical Practise'" in Theoretical Practise, No. 7/8 January 1973.
7. Poulantzas, Nicos, Political Power and Social Classes (T. O'Hagan, trans), New Left Books, London, 1973, 12, 13, 40, 42, "On Social Classes", New Left Review, p. 54.
8. Hindess, B. Hirst, P.Q., Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975, p. 125.
9. Rey, Pierre-Philippe, Les Alliances de Classes, My translation. p. 22, Maspero, Paris, 1973.
10. Cf. Balibar, E., in Althusser and Balibar, op. cit., 1970, p. 235.
11. Gareth Stedman-Jones, "Modes of Production Workshop", Communist University of Cambridge, April, 25, 1976.
12. Poulantzas, Nicos, "On Social Classes", p. 28, New Left Review, No. 77.
13. Laclau, Ernesto, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America", New Left Review, No. 67, May-June, 1971, p. 33.

14. In cases where the technical conditions of existence for a new mode of production come into existence before the social relations of production, this does not necessitate transition but might facilitate such an historical process given a suitable conjuncture. An example of such a conjuncture could be China during the period of the warring states or Tokugawa Japan.
15. Poulantzas, N., op. cit., 1973, p. 63, footnote 8.
16. Ibid., p. 63.
17. Ibid., p. 64.
18. Ibid., p. 66.
19. Ibid., p. 15.
20. Hindess and Hirst, op. cit., p. 31.
21. Ibid., p. 15.
22. Cf. Rey P.P., op. cit., postscript.
23. Poulantzas, N., op. cit., 1973, p. 15.
24. Ibid., p. 15.
25. Poulantzas, N., "On Social Classes" in New Left Review, p. 33.
26. Godelier, Maurice, "On the Definition of a Social Formation" Critique of Anthropology, No. 1, Spring 1974, p. 63.
27. Rey, P.P. "The Linneage Mode of Production", Critique of Anthropology No. 3, Spring 1975.
28. Balibar, E. in Theoretical Practise, op. cit. p. 64.
29. Ibid., p. 69.
30. Balibar, E., op. cit. 1970, p. 297.
31. Ibid., p. 304.
32. Ibid., p. 305
33. Ibid., p. 306-307

"CLASS ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM"

Ken Campbell

The role of technology and its interaction with other elements of social structure has been one of the least examined questions in social theory. As Gordon (1976:35) has recently pointed out, there is a strong streak of technological determinism in both non-Marxist and orthodox Marxist literature. But, for numerous reasons, the charge of 'technological' or 'economic determinism' has been levelled far more commonly at Marxist theory. Rarely does one encounter an equivalent assessment of Weberian theory, although it can be shown* that the Weberian literature is heavily imbued with technological determinist assumptions.

In large part, the assumptions of technological determinism which underly the Weberian view have been obscured by the emphasis which Weber and later Weberian writers place on subjective and non-economic factors in social life. It has generally been assumed that this emphasis in some way contradicts the assumptions of a technological determinist view. In fact, this is not the case. Technological determinism is not a theory that defines the immediate motives of men as economic; indeed, it implies no psychological theory at all. Rather, it assumes that technological and scientific progress exert a determining influence over social institutions, that technological development determines the division of labour, and that social development can best be understood in terms of technological advance. More concretely, it assumes that the modern organization of work — the division of labour within industry, the existence of various levels of skilled labour and th

*The argument of this paper has been compressed from a much more lengthy review of the Marxist and Weberian concept of class and the division of labour. If its arguments appear assertive, rather than demonstrative, this — at least in part — is due to the limitations of the present presentation.

growth of administrative hierarchies — are determined by the exigencies of advancing technique, i.e., by the technical requirements of modern industrial production.

As a number of writers have observed, Weber's views on class and the division of labour are heavily imbued with the assumptions of technological determinism (see Johnson, 1976:5-8; also Navarro, 1976:34). Many features of social organization (the growth of bureaucracy, for example) were viewed by Weber as the product of technological development and the technical demands of an industrial economy.¹ The concept of 'legal-rational' authority, around which Weber's views on bureaucracy revolve, is a typification of the type of normative (value) structure presumably imposed by the technical imperatives of expanding technique. This concept expresses all that is essential to the Weberian tradition: the view that social development is a process of "cumulative technological rationalization" (see Gerth and Mills, 1967:51). According to this principle, history can be viewed as the gradual, if uneven, emergence of social forms corresponding to an increasingly complex technique and its requirements.

Recent theoretical works within the Weberian tradition remain completely wedded to this technological determinist outlook. Two recent, and popular works, Frank Parkin's Class Inequality and Political Order (1972) and Anthony Giddens' The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (1973) exemplify the reliance upon technological determinist assumptions which characterizes much of modern sociology. Both these writers address themselves directly to class inequality in capitalist societies, yet fail to adequately conceptualize their subject matter precisely because they accept the division of labour as (technologically) given.

1. According to Weber, bureaucracy can be viewed as a technical requirement of complex organization, i.e., it is technologically determined. "The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization" (1968:973)

On an immediate level, this is evident in the inability of Parkin and Giddens to move beyond a description of immediate market processes in their attempt to account for class inequality. Class differences, according to these authors, arise from differences in skills, education, and expertise and the manner in which these potential resources are actualized by the market. Parkin argues that differences in class position (which he defines, after Weber, as "market position") are determined by the skills and knowledge necessary for performing different occupational roles.

..... marketable expertise is the single most important determinant of occupational reward.
 . . . the greater the skills or knowledge commanded by an occupation, the greater is its relative scarcity in the market place (1972:21)

Similarly, for Giddens, class differences derive from differences in skill and education (conceptualized as different "market capacities")

. . . . possession of recognized 'skills' — including educational qualifications — is the major factor influencing market capacity. (1973:103)

Parkin and Giddens thus offer an "explanation" of class differences which focuses upon the occupationally relevant characteristics (skills, education, expertise, etc) of class agents.

The suggestion that class differences (i.e., differences in market position) are determined by differences in skill and education level is singularly uninformative as an explanation of class inequality. The attempt to explain class differences in terms of differences in skills and education merely pushes the need for explanation one step further back. If class differences are determined by differences in

skill and education, what (one must ask) are the factors that determine differences in skill level? The existence of differentially skilled labour-power is hardly something that can be taken for granted in class analysis, especially when these differences are thought to account for class inequality. Differences in skill are not the "givens" around which the class structure is built; these differences broadly correspond to positions in the social division of labour, the determining conditions of which must themselves be theorized. Concretely, it is necessary to ask what are the determinants of the modern division of labour which requires differentially qualified labour-power.

The failure of Parkin and Giddens to theorize the problem at this level (i.e., to relate skills to specific positions within production and to analyze the development and inter-relation of these positions) is readily explained by the technological determinist outlook which informs their treatments. Giddens, in fact, is reasonably clear on this point. The division of labour and the structure of "paratechnical relations" ^{in industry,} he argues, corresponds to the level of industrial development; under these conditions a "wholesale reorganization" of the division of labour is quite impossible. In an argument not fundamentally different from that earlier advanced by Dahrendorf (1959:36-41), Giddens charges Marx with failing to recognize that many of the features of the capitalist division of labour are, in fact, features of industrialism per se, not a product of antagonistic relations of production (p.136). This is another way of saying that the modern division of labour is technologically determined, and that Marx erred in not recognizing this..

Parkin is far less direct in his treatment of these questions. Like Giddens, he is critical of so-called "technocratic" and "convergence" writers who assume a direct and inevitable correspondence between the level of technological development and social structure. He argues that "rewards" within the occupational structure and access (mobility) within the class structure are variable i.e., not technologically determined (p. 140-159). Yet, as a criticism of technocratic writers, this argument remains weak, for it fails, in any way, to question the theoretical foundation of technocratic theory: a technological determinist explanation of the division of labour. Insofar as it accepts the existing division of labour and corresponding skill differentials as given, Parkin's argument implicitly falls back upon a technological determinist explanation of these phenomena.

Is the division of labour in capitalist societies a product of the technical exigencies of large scale industrial production? Can the existing pattern of "occupational differentiation" be taken as a given in class analysis, as neo-Weberian argument suggests? These questions, which are central to class analysis, have been (uncritically) answered in the affirmative by the majority of non-Marxist sociologists. Celebrants of the technocratic thesis of "post-industrialism", such as Bell, Kerr, Inkeles and Etzioni (to name only a few), not only accept this technological determinism, they relish in its implications. Although they remain critical of some of the more egregious conclusions drawn by 'post-industrialist' theorists, progressive Weberian writers such as Giddens and Parkin remain captive to the technological determinism which underlies the 'post-industrialist' view. This is a legacy of Weber that is not easily shaken off.

In contrast, recent Marxist writers have tended to take a more critical view of the relationship between technology and social structure. Herbert Gintis (1976:37), for example, writes of the "dynamic interaction" between technology and social relations — a view quite removed from the economic and technological determinism commonly ascribed to Marxist writers. In Gintis' view, the division of labour in capitalist society is not technologically determined; rather, it is the product of an interlacing set of management priorities designed to increase worker productivity while structuring the workplace in a manner consistent with capitalist relations of production.

Braverman, in Labor and Monopoly Capitalism (1974), has tackled the relationship of technology and the division of labour in more depth. Braverman has argued that while the proliferation of technical operations within production is determined by the level of technological development, the fragmentation of these operations (i.e., their assignment to different workers) is socially determined, determined, more specifically, by capital's interest in maximizing the productive output of the labour-power it employs. By dissociating the labour process into a series of fractional operations, capital not only gains greater control over the fragmented labour process, it is, also, able to reduce the overall wage bill. "The labour capable of performing the process may be purchased more cheaply as dissociated elements than as a capacity integrated into a single worker" (p. 81). The fragmentation and routinization of tasks which characterize the modern organization of work are thus explained in terms of capital's domination over the labour process, not the inexorable demands of technique.

Braverman's work offers a vivid contrast to the descriptive and ahistorical account of class inequality presented by Parkin and Giddens. Whereas these Weberian writers provide an immediate description of stratification processes based on skill and education differences, Braverman provides an historical analysis of changes in the division of labour which are thought to determine the extended reproduction of differentially skilled labour-power. Braverman's analysis thus offers an explanation of the source of skill and education differences which enter neo-Weberian analyses as "givens".

In this connection, he argues that the dissociation of the labour process in the large scale industrial enterprise involves a gradual destruction of general skills, and the creation of a large category of unskilled manual labour alongside a category of technical and scientific specialists who monopolize knowledge of the labour process. This division of labour has all the appearances of a technically ordained specialization; yet it expresses, above all else, the separation of the immediate producers from control over production, and their consequent inability to develop an alternative division of labour. . . (See also Poulantzas, 1975, for whom the division between manual and mental labour represents a condition of ideological domination of the working class; also, Gorz, 1972)

These changes wrought by capital in the labour process are thought to be responsible for the transformation of the occupational structure over the past century. Whereas in craft production each worker is a "repository of human technique for the labour process of that branch" (p. 109), the dissociation of the labour process creates new categories of workers who perform work which is largely mental (p. 109, 239). Braverman depicts this transformation in terms

of a separation between the process of execution and conception in production:

The novelty of this development during the past century lies not in the separate existence of hand and brain, conception and execution, but the rigor with which they are divided from one another, and then increasingly subdivided, so that conception is concentrated insofar as possible, in ever more limited groups within management or closely associated with it (p. 125)

For Braverman, the separation of conception from execution, and the reduction of all labour to increasingly fragmented elemental tasks is a product of social relations of production, not of technical exigency.

Experiments conducted on a limited scale, such as those at electronics and automotive plants, have already demonstrated that productivity is not tied to any particular form of work organization. Indeed, as Gordon (1976:22) has pointed out, there appears to be no theoretical reason why a number of alternative organizational forms might not yield equivalent productivities.

Why then does industrial organization remain tied to the assembly-line model? What accounts for the division of labour as we now know it, in the factory and in society? Weberian theorists implicitly assume that, at least in broad outline, the division of labour is technologically determined. The general explanation offered by Marxist writers is that the division of labour is determined by the social relations of production, specifically, capital's interest in increased productivity and in maintaining the authoritarian and hierarchial structure of the enterprise. (Braverman, 1974; Carchedi, 1975; Gintis, 1976; Gordon, 1976). Job fragmentation and the separation of manual and mental labour, execution from conception, are related to political and ideological relations of production.— not merely quantitative technical efficiencies. Technical imperatives

remain important, but the way these imperatives are translated into a detailed division of labour is determined by those who control industrial production, not the "industrial system" itself.

Quite clearly, it is impossible to establish the precise relationship between technology and social relations at the theoretical level. This demands a concrete study of the division of labour and the specific influences which determine its development. Technological determinist assumptions have long dominated theoretical thinking in this area; these assumptions are firmly imbedded in the dominant ideology where they serve to legitimize existing social relations. Serious questioning of these assumptions promises to bring sociology closer to the potentialities for overcoming class inequality — potentialities that, to date, have been obscured by determinist ideologies.

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IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOMESTIC ROLE OF WOMEN

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The feminist movement has posed a fundamental challenge to social scientists, a challenge reflected in the necessity of providing an analysis of the causes of the oppression of women. The response has been varied, with available models ranging from a focus on biological explanations to class analysis. I would argue, however, that we have not yet reached the point where we are able to integrate these various positions into an adequate analysis of the forms of oppression women have experienced and continue to experience, the sources of their oppression, the mechanisms by which it is maintained, and the means to eliminate it. The resolution of this "impasse" requires that we begin to fully examine the spheres of female activity and attempt to integrate our understanding of the social forces which shape female participation in society.

As Juliet Mitchell has shown in her criticisms of socialist movements, we have failed to look at woman's role through the structures that compose it: production, reproduction, sexuality and socialization (Mitchell, 1966). The value of her analysis is its ability to examine the position of women historically in terms of their variable role within each structure. The difficulty, on the other hand, emerges in treating these categories as independent structures which are unrelated in origin. For this reason, R. Bridenthal has argued that it is possible to fuse Mitchell's latter three

structures into one, each representing an aspect of the reproduction of the species (Bridenthal, 1976:3-5). One is then able to examine the situation of women through an analysis of their position in the productive sphere (as workers) and the reproductive sphere (as housewives and mothers). Through an historical examination, one can discover the nature of the relationship between these spheres, and the implications this holds for the societal position of women.

A beginning point in such an attempt is an examination of the structure of the reproductive sphere and the position it occupies under capitalist relations. Using a Marxist framework, W. Seccombe has questioned the role of household labour (i.e., reproductive) in the creation of value, and examines its linkages to the overall wage-relation system (Seccombe, 1973).

Seccombe's thesis is that sexual oppression emerged, with the advance of capitalism, due to the sexual division of labour: a division into an "industrial unit" and a "domestic unit" (1973:6). Moreover, this development required the physical separation of the workplace and the home (I will return to a discussion of this "division" in my discussion of the transition from a precapitalist mode to a capitalist mode of production).

Seccombe argues that the labour of the domestic unit has a dual nature. On the one hand, domestic labour is necessary labour because the commodities of capital require

additional labour (i.e., housework) before consumption. In the preparation of food for family consumption, the housewife's labour creates a use-value insofar as the product of her labour directly serves certain consumption needs. Such labour also allows for the reproduction of the wage earner's labour-power (i.e., capacity for work, 1973:14). Domestic labour thus creates value because "all labour produces value when it produces any part of a commodity that achieves equivalence in the market place with other commodities" (Seccombe, 1973:9). Domestic labour helps produce and reproduce labour power as a commodity.

On the other hand, and here is where we begin to approach the dual nature of domestic labour, the Marxist "law of value" cannot apply to labour in the reproductive sphere. There are two reasons for this: first, domestic labour is not engaged in an exchange relation with capital, and second, it is unproductive because it produces no surplus value. In other words, because domestic labour has only a use-value, it has no direct relation to capital. It then becomes difficult to measure the value of such labour. For other commodities, this is unproblematic. For example, labour power as a commodity achieves its equivalence through the wage relation. But, since domestic labour is not exchanged on a market, it has no apparent exchange value. Seccombe's solution is to argue that the value of domestic labour is equivalent to that part of the worker's wage that goes to the maintenance of

domestic labour (1973:8-10). Its value, in this sense is mediated by the wage transaction between capital and the wage earner. It is also for this reason that Seccombe argues that one cannot speak of surplus value creation in reference to domestic labour. Because the value of this labour is seen as equivalent to its maintenance costs, the possibility of an extraction of a surplus value from household labour by capital is rendered impossible under Seccombe's scheme.

The housewife is assumed to receive the value she creates. He recognizes that a "mystification" of the wage relation occurs under capitalism. Whereas wages are equivalent to the value of labour power, not the value produced by labour power, this is not the case with the relation between capital and the housewife. The value she produces is contained in the wage received by the wage earner.

Seccombe's analysis is valuable in several respects. It represents needed insight into an area which Marxists have tended to ignore in theoretical endeavors. Moreover, his analysis of the mediation of the relation between capital and domestic labour by the wage transaction contains important implications regarding the "political potential" of housewives (1973:21-23). The problem however is that he does not really develop his argument to the necessary point. It is useful to explicate the structure of domestic labour under capitalism, but this in itself is not sufficient. One must question the motivation behind the continuing reproduction

of that structure in its present form. In other words, does domestic labour, in its privatized and unwaged form, serve a value to capital in addition to the simple use value it creates? I am really seeking to question the conception of household labour as non-productive, in the sense of creating no surplus value. A strict Marxist application of the term surplus value blinds us to the value extracted by capital from domestic labour. The structure of the domestic sphere allows for the reproduction of class relations in various forms. These must be explicated before one can attempt to account for the reproduction of sexism in contemporary society. What I am suggesting is a reconceptualization of our understanding of surplus value creation so that we are not forced to deal only with those exchange transactions which occur on an open market. If one can demonstrate a value served by domestic labour in the direct reproduction of class relations, and the extraction of that value by capital, then it becomes possible to discuss the productivity of domestic labour.

I will now discuss the role of domestic labour in the satisfaction of certain of capital's needs. First, capitalism cannot satisfy all a worker's needs through commodity production. These needs must however be met in order to maintain a passive working force. Domestic labour becomes the forum for the satisfaction of these needs in that it has personal value which cannot be reproduced by socialized domestic labour.

The family and the role of the housewife provide an area where the male worker can achieve some sense of authority and control (which is otherwise lacking in his relation to capital).

Secondly, domestic labour realizes a higher standard of living for the worker than is realized in his actual wages. Workers are paid a wage to cover the cost of maintaining their labour power. Domestic labour is the activity which transforms that wage into usable goods. Obviously, there are alternative methods of maintaining labour power: restaurants, laundries, tailors, etc. But it is cheaper for capital to maintain domestic labour than to give workers higher wages so that they can buy these services on a competitive market.

The wage labour system is sustained by the socially necessary, but private, labour of housewives and mothers. Child rearing, cleaning, laundry, maintenance of property, food preparation, reproduction, etc. are all necessary elements in the maintenance of life and the reproduction of the work force. In this sense, they are all aspects of the mode of reproduction. This sphere produces daily and generationally the labour needed by capital.

Finally, by maintaining an economically dependent, and therefore passive, individual within the family the industrial sector creates an individual who is easier to manipulate. Historically this has been the case: women have functioned as a cheap and passive reserve work force. This is reflected in their unequal wages, narrow choice of occupations, and

underrepresentation in trade unions. It is a situation which has been relatively easy to maintain. She has no structural responsibility in the waged labour force. Rather, her participation is seen as transitory, depending on the labour needs of the industrialized sector. Reserve labour power is stored in the family, drawn upon when necessary, and then reabsorbed when no longer needed. The position of women as unwaged privatized labourers in the family is reproduced outside of the family. They have traditionally been located in low wage positions in more or less marginal occupations.

However, one must be careful not to view female wage labour as only transitory in nature. This is a problem in Secombe's analysis, as well as in that of other Marxists who only deal with the housewife and ignore women as workers. The error is compounded when Marxists attempt to find a basis for the unity between the working class and housewives. To see only her domestic labour or her position as wage earner as the source of unity is to ignore that women are often both domestic labourers and wage earners. The central feature of women under capitalism is not their position as domestic labourers, but rather their dual role. The task is to relate these two roles in a coherent fashion -- something which Marxists have not yet done. When Marxist feminists deal with the issue of wage labour, they assume that their interests are synonymous with working class interests. This is not the case however, due to the contradictory nature of wage labour and

domestic labour, a contradiction contained in the female role. Female wage labour is not synonymous with male wage labour: the former's economic position as domestic labourers has transformed their economic position as wage labourers. Their increased proletarianization has not eliminated the gap between female and male workers. It is a question again of the specific oppression of women: this is an issue which is not dealt with by merely recognizing that women serve two roles. The key is to see the integration of these two roles, and the contradiction that integration poses for women.

Female labour is both privatized and socialized: she is both a domestic and an industrial unit. Her status as worker reduces her isolation, but has done nothing to reduce the oppression of her privatized labour at home. Her domination within the family is controlled by the male worker. Granted, it was originally based on his relation to the means of production, but it has been maintained, even with the entry of women into industry. The solution is to look for the interplay of this dual role of women, a situation which has given rise to a tension between the productive sphere and the reproductive sphere.

Women are positioned historically in the center of this dialectic, and with advanced capitalism the opposing forces of production and reproduction have posed contradictions for women which demand a resolution. If one can isolate these

contradictions, then perhaps one can build a base for a successful feminist movement. The Women's Work Study Group (1976) has argued that these contradictions do in fact reflect "stress points" in the capitalist system. One needs to examine the historical emergence of these contradictions and the changing nature of the productive and reproductive spheres. I will briefly discuss three historical phases and the impact the changing roles of production and reproduction has had on the position of women. The historical phases are the stages of precapitalism, industrialization, and monopoly capitalism.

In precapitalist societies, the family was the major productive unit in the economy. The female performed the tasks of the reproductive sphere (reproduction, health care, laundry, and so on), as well as the tasks associated with the material production of necessities. Production was generally for immediate consumption, but also involved the market exchange of goods. There was a sexual division of labor at work, both categories of sexually divided tasks being regarded as valuable and socially necessary. Moreover, both forms of labour were performed within the family unit. In fact, one could say that the productive and reproductive spheres maintained a symbiotic relationship, in that each sphere was dependent to a great extent on the labour which occurred within the other sphere (Bridenthal, 1976:5).

It is only with capitalism that material production, organized socially in the form of wage labour,

became separated from the reproductive tasks within the family. With this separation of production and reproduction, the family relinquished its economic functions, and the household was devalued in terms of its socio-economic contribution. It was devalued precisely because it became isolated from the socialized production of surplus value.

In the nineteenth century, with the rise of industry, commodity production shifted increasingly to the factory system. The shift fundamentally altered the position of women. It shifted the nature of demand from skilled workers to low wage unskilled workers who could perform the tasks of running the machines. Since physical strength was no longer as important a variable for this task, women were increasingly brought in as a cheap and readily available source of unskilled labour. However, the increased entry of women posed a serious threat to the bargaining position of the skilled male worker. It was during this period that the ideology of the family unit was transformed. The focus shifted from its value as a productive unit to its value as an institution for securing personal happiness and fulfillment (Zaretsky, 1976:47-57). Females were regarded as the key figures in that unit, thereby reinforcing motherhood as the feminine ideal. At the same time, the ideology defined the labour undertaken by women in this sphere as economically unproductive. Such an ideology served two purposes. First, by upholding motherhood and the household as the "natural" and "true" position of women, the male worker

was able to restrict the entry of a large number of women into the labour market. At the same time, capital's needs were met. For those women who could not afford the "luxury" of remaining in the home, their ideological position as unproductive domestic labourers left them in a weak bargaining position upon entry into socialized production. Capitalists were then able to maintain a cheap supply of labour, which could be easily laid off during economic recessions. Women workers are the first to go when jobs are scarce. Part of this is due to the ideology that a male worker has a family to support, whereas a female probably has a husband to support her.

The sexist ideology of this period crossed class-boundaries as well. Whereas the vote was extended to all white men, regardless of social position, in the mid 1800's in North America, women, regardless of their economic standing, were refused the franchise (Women's Work Study Group, 1976:31).

The increasing socialization of production, and its separation from the more privatized reproductive sphere posed visible contradictions for women in this period. Female workers were doubly exploited, both as domestic and as wage labourers, while bourgeois women were increasingly isolated in their separate sphere. The result was an upsurge of feminist protest. As Zaretsky notes, the protest took two forms. First, the bourgeois women organized a protest against the enforced idleness of their domestic lives, and demanded access to middle class occupations. Protest from working class women was focused

on a call for reforms in the industrial sphere so as to lessen the hardships of their working position (Zaretsky, 1973:37). Unfortunately, both movements placed their hopes solely on the granting of the franchise; they assumed that contradictions could be resolved through legal means. As they quickly came to realize, this was not the case. The oppression of women was too integrally connected to the specific mode of production.

The monopoly phase of capitalism which began to emerge in the early twentieth century is characterized by several developments: an increasing concentration of capital, a shift away from labour intensive industry, and a rise in profit rates which is accompanied by a need to maintain high consumption rates. It is a period marked by a rise in wages, which is controlled for by capitalists by a corresponding rise in commodity prices (see Braverman, 1974). Furthermore, monopoly capitalists reorganized corporate facilities to spread the ideology of consumerism, and thereby ensure a market for their commodities. The family unit took on a new value for capital as a market for products. With increasingly sophisticated forces of production and ideological manipulation at their control, capitalists were able to cultivate that family market through an ideology of mass consumption. A cheap yet educated work force was required to perform the task of marketing the increasing mass of commodities. The result was a rapidly expanding white collar sector for which women provided an ideal source of labour. However, the rising expectations imposed by mass

consumerism often could not be met by a single wage earner in the family unit. To facilitate the entry of married women into the work force, the technology of capitalism produced new labour saving devices (automatic washers, dryers, freezers, TV dinners, and so on) which decreased the time spent on household tasks. These devices undoubtedly have had an impact on domestic labour; at the same time there has been a qualitative expansion of woman's work. Due to the increased emphasis on consumption and standard of living, women have had more tasks to perform. Her responsibilities in the reproductive sphere were not reduced: if anything, they were redefined in order to widen their scope. Women now have to be child Psychologists, aware consumers, and "efficient" housekeepers. What has occurred with monopoly capitalism is the development of a larger group of women who are engaged in labour in both the productive and reproductive spheres.

Women have entered the productive sphere largely in work tasks which are part of the reproductive sphere (i.e., teaching, nursing, social work, domestic service sectors). Bridenthall argues quite convincingly that this phenomenon is indicative of an increasing shift of the mode of reproduction from the personal to the public forum (1976:6-8). While the labour within the family remains privatized, decisions and policy concerning the form and use of that labour are no longer in the woman's control. Bridenthall's discussion focuses on the increasing intervention of the capitalist system

into the reproductive sphere in order to ensure the control of the reproduction of the labour force. The increased entry of the female into socialized production transformed the area of reproductive labour. This in turn threatens the maintenance of the specific mode of production unless the former is controlled by capital. In other words, capital must on the one hand maintain the stability of the nuclear family (to ensure the personal happiness of the worker and obscure his alienation on the job), and on the other hand, it requires women as an available source of reserve labour. The structural contradiction of these needs has left women in advanced capitalism both socialized and privatized in their labour; both waged and unwaged.

The contradictory nature of capitalist ideology becomes only too evident. The family unit is portrayed as a separate entity from the economic sphere. But in fact, the household as a productive and consumptive unit is integrally tied to certain economic needs of the system. The myth of the family as independent of the productive sphere is necessary if society is to maintain the notion that the personal life of the worker has an entirely self controlled meaning. Because the family is organized around reproduction and consumption however, it is impossible to speak of family organization without considering the labour needs of capital. As already noted, monopoly capital relies on high rates of consumption and high commodity prices. These needs, in turn, force women into the work force

on an increasingly permanent basis in order to maintain the standard of living demanded by mass consumerism. This poses a challenge to the traditional position of the male as the wage earner, and to the authority that position has given him over the female. The result is an erosion of the traditional ideology of the family unit, though the demand by capital for such a unit remains. This is not to say that capital has re-organized its sexist ideology. On the contrary, it is reproduced as long as women receive lower wages and are concentrated in low-skilled occupations. However the transformation in the reproductive sphere (it is becoming less and less the primary position for women as greater numbers join the work force) makes visible the need for a transformation in the productive sphere. Women are now both regular participants in the wage labour force and in the domestic labour force, yet still the ideology defines them in terms of housewives and mothers. The tension and contradiction inherent in their dual role is masked by a false separation of the two spheres. Capital has mystified the place of women within capitalist production. It thus becomes the task of a revolutionary movement to "de-mystify" their position, and organize on the basis of an understanding of both spheres of female labour.

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